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CONTRACTING IN THE AGE OF
THE INTERNET OF THINGS: ARTICLE 2 OF
THE UCC AND BEYOND
Stacy-Ann Elvy*
This Article analyzes the global phenomenon of the Internet of
Things ("JOT") and its potential impact on consumer contracts for the
sale of goods. Recent examples of JOT products include Amazon's Dash
Replenishment Service, which allows household devices to automatically
reorder goods. By 2025, the IOT is estimated to have an economic
impact of as much as $11.1 trillion. To date, there are approximately
fifteen billion interconnected devices, and by 2020, there will be fifty
billion such devices worldwide. IOT devices will revolutionize the way
that consumers shop for consumable supplies and other goods.
Consumers will no longer need to log on to a company's website or use
a mobile application to purchase goods but will be able to conclude
contracts for the sale of goods by using IOT devices. This Article
contends that the legion of IOT data expected to be generated about
consumers and their preferences will worsen preexisting information
asymmetry in consumer contracts to the benefit of companies: increase
the lack of proximity between consumers and the contract formation
process; further encourage consumers'failure to read and understand
contract terms prior to contracting; and likely lead businesses to further
take advantage of consumer ignorance and apathy by including one-
sided contract terms, such as unilateral amendment provisions and
terms that restrict consumer access to judicial process. Common law
agency principles, e-commerce statutes, contract law, and Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code ("Article 2") are unlikely to effectively
address these concerns. This Article suggests important amendments to
Article 2 and argues that courts should adjust their application of
existing contract law and agency principles to account for the new
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School; B.S.,
Cornell University. I am grateful to my colleagues at New York Law School for their
valuable comments and insights. I would also like to thank my research assistants, Victoria Stork
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automatic and interface-free contracting environment that the age of the
10T will herald.
I. INTRODUCTION
The commercial and contract law implications of the Internet of
Things ('JOT") have been under-explored in legal scholarship.' The IOT
is a network of products, systems, and platforms connected through
enabled devices that collect, store, and communicate with other devices,
cloud software, on-site infrastructure, and individuals to maximize
efficiency.2 Recent examples of IOT products include the Nest
thermostat,3 the Amazon Echo,4 and the Amazon Dash Button and Dash
Replenishment Service ("DRS"), which will allow household devices to
automatically order goods without human intervention (or, at the most,
with a push of a button).' Today, merchants frequently use electronic
shopping agents in automated transactions to buy and sell goods.
Consumers also consistently interact with electronic agents on merchant-
operated websites and currently use online shopping agents, such as
Priceline.com and eBay's automatic bidding agent, to scour the Internet
for the cheapest travel tickets and to bid on items. However, IOT robotic
devices are revolutionizing the way that consumers shop for consumable
supplies and other goods.6 Consumers no longer need to log on to a
company's website or use a mobile application to purchase goods.
Instead, they are able to enter into contracts for the sale of goods by
using IOT devices.7
Consider a consumer who has purchased a Brita-connected water
pitcher or an August Smart Lock enabled with Amazon's DRS. The
1. For a rare look at this burgeoning area of legal study, see Nancy S. Kim, Two Alternate
Visions of Contract Law in 2025, 52 DUQ. L. REv. 303, 317 (2014) (discussing briefly the role of
courts in using unconscionability and duress to prevent abusive business practices that may be
facilitated by the development of new technology). See generally Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of
Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns Without Derailing
Innovation, RICH. J.L. & TECH. (Feb. 2015), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v2li2/article6.pdf.
2. Internet of Things Explainer, TIME (June 22, 2015), http://time.com/3930444/internet-of-
things-explainer.
3. See Megan Rose Dickey, The Internet of Things Is Finally Here and Soon
Your Fridge Will Buy Milk For You, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 11, 2013, 12:44 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-internet-of-things-will-evolve-2013-1.
4. Michael Wolf, With Echo, Amazon Creates the First Potential Hit of JoT Era, FORBES
(Nov. 11, 2015, 10:59 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelwolf/2015/11/11/with-echo-
amazon-creates-the-first-potential-hit-of-iot-era/#33414e816241.
5. Chris Neiger, Amazon's Brilliant New Service Will Make You Want the Internet of Things
in Your Home, MOTLEY FOOL (Apr. 6, 2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.fool.com/investing/
general/2015/04/06/amazons-brilliant-new-service-will-make-you-want-t.aspx.
6. See, e.g., id.
7. See id.; infra text accompanying notes 65-83.
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Brita device would have the capacity to measure the amount of water
that passes through its filter, as well as order physical goods, such as a
new filter when it needs to be changed, and the August Smart Lock
could automatically order replacement batteries for the consumer.'
These devices will be able to collect location and consumption rate data,
among other things, about the consumer on behalf of the manufacturer
and retailer. The IOT has the potential to transform the advertisement
and marketing industry, and the data generated by IOT devices could be
used to target vulnerable consumers for contracting.9 Goods can be made
with a readable element in the packaging, which will allow
manufacturers to assess, in real time, the types of consumers who
are buying and using their products.'0 Digital tracking technology
embedded within IOT devices and smart labels could permit a
manufacturer or retailer to advertise additional products to consumers
once a product is in the consumer's home or office based on the data
generated by the device. Diageo, a liquor producer, has already created a
similar product.11
How should courts assess consumer assent to contract terms where
the consumer allows an IOT device to place orders for goods but is not
provided with contract terms prior to each purchase made by the device?
Should the consumer's assent to contract terms, which limit the
consumer's ability to obtain legal recourse, be inferred from the use of
DRS and the consumer's initial acceptance of the DRS terms of use or
upon each successive order placed by the device? Alternatively, should
the consumer's assent to the terms be inferred from the consumer's
initial purchase of the water pitcher or the Smart Lock from Amazon?
What if Amazon elects to use its unilateral amendment provision to
amend the contract and the device then places a new order prior to the
consumer reviewing the amended provisions? How is assent determined
in that instance? Is the Brita water pitcher or the August Smart Lock the
consumer's electronic agent acting on the consumer's behalf
despite data collection by the manufacturer, thereby suggesting the
consumer's assent can be inferred from the agent's actions? Should the
data obtained by companies from IOT devices about individual
8. Introducing Amazon Dash Replenishment Service, AMAZON, https://www.amazorlcom/
oc/dash-replenishment-service (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
9. See Internet of Things Data Could Fuel Ad Targeting, ET TELECOM (June 8, 2015, 5:18
PM), http://telecom.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/internet/internet-of-things-data-could-fuel-
ad-targeting/47586092.
10. Id.
11. Id.; see Diageo and Thinfilm Unveil the Connected 'Smart Bottle,' DIAGEO,
http://www.diageo.com/en-row/ourbrands/infocus/Pages/diageo-and-thinfilm-unveil-the-connected-
smart-bottle.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
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consumers be considered in assessing consumer assent to contract terms
or contract defenses?
This Article seeks to address these questions by evaluating the
potential contract doctrines, agency principles, and federal and state
statutes regulating e-commerce that may govern disputes involving JOT
consumer contracts.'2 The goal is to introduce traditional legal principles
and existing e-commerce statutes to the myriad consumer transactions
likely to be entered into through the use of IOT devices, identify
potential areas of concern for consumers, and lay the foundation for
future work in this area.'3 As many contract scholars have noted, the
current law governing adhesion contracts is far from satisfactory. This
Article ultimately argues that the existing legal framework applicable to
form contracts is unlikely to provide adequate protection to consumers
who enter into contracts for the sale of goods by using IOT devices, and
the new, automatic, and interface-free contracting environment created
by the JOT aggravates existing problems and creates difficulties in
consumer transactions in a manner that compels a revision of applicable
legal rules. The potential lack of effective consumer protection is due, in
part, to the standards developed by courts to address consumer
contracting, lack of clarity and guidance in Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("Article 2") on consumer contracts, and the
development of a new contracting environment.
While much has been written about e-commerce contracts,
programs and software agents, contracts of adhesion, and the impact of
mobile technology on freedom of contract, there is scant legal
scholarship on JOT devices.' 4 Of the few articles that have discussed
12. See infra Parts III-V.
13. See infra Parts III-V.
14. See, e.g., Jean-Francois Lerouge, The Use of Electronic Agents Questioned Under
Contractual Law: Suggested Solutions on a European American Level, 18 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 403, 418-25 (1999) (discussing the treatment of electronic agents under the
National Conference of Commissioners on the Uniform State Laws' creation of the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act, which began with the purpose of revising Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code); Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The
Case of Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REv. 676, 712-15 (2012) (discussing e-commerce
transactions); John P. Fischer, Note, Computers as Agents: A Proposed Approach to Revised U.C.C.
Article 2, 72 IND. L.J. 545, 558, 569-70 (1997) (analyzing the legal response to computer
technology under Article 2 of the UCC and stating that only computers which "serve the contracting
function" should be subject to agency law and "computers that serve merely as media of
communication should not"); see also Sabrina Kis, Contracts and Electronic Agents: When
Commercial Pragmatism and Legal Theories Diverge 26-41 (Aug. 1, 2004) (unpublished LL.M
thesis, University of Georgia School of Law), http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/stu llm/25
(comparing U.S. and French approaches to software programs as electronic agents). See generally
Juanda Lowder Daniel, Electronic Contracting Under the 2003 Revisions to Article 2 of the
[Vol. 44:839
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lOT technology, many focus on its privacy, security, and discrimination
implications. 5 In contrast, this Article is the first to provide a
comprehensive analysis of the potential impact of the IOT on contracts
for the sale of goods, and it makes three salient points. 16 First, in a world
where IOT devices are entering into contracts on behalf of consumers,
common law agency principles and current federal and state statutes that
regulate e-commerce may not be equipped to adequately protect
consumers. Under these laws, consumers may automatically be bound to
one-sided contract terms where they elect to deploy IOT devices as their
contracting agents.
Second, courts continue to struggle to effectively address consumer
assent to form contracts, as evidenced by the recent Second Circuit
decision in Starkey v. G. Adventures, Inc., which upheld the disclosure
of contract terms to consumers via email post-contract formation.
17
As currently drafted and interpreted by courts, Article 2 is unprepared
to adequately evaluate new developments in the IOT where robotic
devices have the capacity not only to inform a consumer that a
product is running low, but also to purchase replacement products
directly from companies without consumers actively participating
in each purchase. These technological innovations will likely exacerbate
already problematic issues under Article 2, as well as compound
areas of uncertainty.
For instance, IOT products, such as Amazon's DRS and Dash
Button, increase the lack of proximity between consumers, contract
terms, and the contract formation process ("Contract Distancing"). The
device, rather than the consumer, places the order for the goods, or the
consumer places the order by clicking the Dash Button. Amazon's Dash
Button allows orders to be placed automatically via a consumer's home
Wi-Fi network by clicking the Dash Button-a small wireless reorder
Uniform Commercial Code: Clarification or Chaos?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 319 (2004).
15. See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 117-40 (2014)
(discussing concerns regarding discrimination, privacy, and security on the JOT); Thierer, supra
note 1, at 40-45 (noting the privacy and security implications of the JOT); Brad Turner, When Big
Data Meets Big Brother: Why Courts Should Apply United States v. Jones to Protect People's Data,
16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 377, 382-404 (2015) (focusing on data collection and tracking online).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 17-28.
17. 796 F.3d 193, 195-96, 198 (2d Cir. 2015). The Starkey case involved the plaintiffs
purchase of a travel ticket from the defendant and, as such, may lead one to argue that the holding
should be limited to carriage contracts. Id. However, the court's holding has much broader
implications for contract formation and disclosure of contract terms in consumer contracts, and it
potentially incentivizes companies to adopt similar practices. See infra text accompanying notes
218-25.
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plastic device linked to a specific product. 8 The consumer is not
required to access the company's website or mobile application (which
contains contract terms), review the company's terms and conditions, or
click an "I agree" button before each subsequent order is placed. This
complicates the analysis of mutual assent, as contract terms are not
displayed on 1OT devices. The ease with which goods can be purchased
using these devices facilitates a contracting environment in which quick
purchases without contract review are the norm, thereby further
incentivizing consumers to fail to read and understand contract terms. In
turn, this encourages businesses to continue to take advantage of
consumer ignorance by including one-sided contract terms that impede
the ability of consumers to obtain legal redress and may even lead to
contractual abuse.
Amazon's terms of use permit the company to unilaterally amend
the Dash Button and DRS agreement and contain warranty disclaimers,
class action and jury trial waivers, and a mandatory arbitration provision
that excludes small claims.' 9 These provisions are common to e-
commerce consumer contracts and pose potential problems for
consumers as they frequently permit companies to shield themselves
from liability to consumers."z This has negative implications for fairness
in contracting. While contract law and the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") do not mandate fair bargains, various contract doctrines, such
as the doctrines of unconscionability and good faith, ensure a minimal
level of fairness in both the bargaining process and the bargain itself
18. See Gordon Fletcher, Amazon Dash is a First Step Towards an Internet of Things That
Is Actually Useful, CONVERSATION (Apr. 8, 2015, 1:31 AM), http://theconversation.com!
amazon-dash-is-a-first-step-towards-an-internet-of-things-that-is-actually-usefu-39711; see also
Brian Benchoff, Inside the Amazon Dash Button, HACKADAY (May 12, 2015),
http://hackaday.com/2015/05/12/inside-the-amazon-dash-button (describing and picturing the
Dash Button). The Dash Button is currently offered as an invitation-only option to Amazon
Prime members. See Jennifer Van Grove, Are Amazon's Shopping Buttons for You?, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB. (May 29, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2015/may/29/amazon-
dash-review.
19. Amazon Dash Button and Amazon Dash Replenishment Terms of Use, AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.htmlnodeld-201730770 (last updated Nov. 18,
2015); Conditions of Use, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/
?noded-508088 (last updated Feb. 12, 2016). Claims that qualify for small claims court are
excluded from the mandatory arbitration provisions of Amazon's Conditions of Use. Conditions of
Use, supra.
20. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking Deck of
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/
arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html (citing a study of over 1179 federal class
action cases decided between 2010 and 2014, which found that courts upheld arbitration provisions
in four out of every five cases and that companies have used mandatory arbitration and class action
waiver provisions to prohibit consumer challenges to deceptive practices, such as "predatory
lending, wage theft and discrimination," among other things).
[Vol. 44:839
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These contract doctrines, arguably intended to police the bargain, may
not provide relief to consumers in the IOT setting.
Third, the legion of data that will be generated by the IOT
regarding consumers and their preferences will further shift the
power dynamics between companies and consumers, thereby worsening
preexisting information asymmetry in consumer contracts in favor
of companies.21 JOT devices will be able to measure and monitor
their environment, goods, and consumers in real time and provide
status data, location data, and actionable data.22 With the dawn
of the JOT, companies will gain access to lifestyle and consumption
rate data. JOT devices can also generate health-related and biometric
data about consumers, such as temperature, heart rate, hemoglobin
levels, blood pressure, blood flow levels, fingerprint scans, voice
patterns, and scans of retinas and irises. 23 Other JOT devices, such as
Whirlpool's washing machine enabled with Amazon's DRS and
Belkin's WeMo, can measure appliance use, electricity and water
consumption, and work productivity. 24
Once issues with interoperability-where interconnected devices
from different providers communicate and share data-have been
resolved, all of these devices will be able to communicate with each
other and transmit data amongst themselves, as well as to manufacturers
and retailers. Ford has recently announced plans to collaborate with
Amazon to connect smart cars to JOT home devices, which will allow
these devices to share consumer data.25 Companies that have access to
this information will be able to map out the daily activities, health, and
lives of individual consumers and members of their households and
target those individual consumers for contracting. History is replete with
examples of companies that have used consumer data and information to
exploit vulnerable consumers. Predatory lending is one such example,
and it highlights the danger of allowing companies to easily obtain and
freely use consumer data. Further, consider that consumer data generated
21. See infra Part V.A.2.a.
22. See David Friedman, Get to Know the Four Types of Data in the Internet of Things,
READWRITE (Aug. 13, 2015), http://readwrite.com/2015/08/13/five-types-data-internet-of-things.
23. Peppet, supra note 15, at 88, 100, 139. At least one state has attempted to regulate the use
of consumer biometric information. Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.
14/15 (2008).
24. Peppet, supra note 15, at 88; Introducing Amazon Dash Replenishment Service, supra
note 8.
25. Marco della Cava, Ford Partners with Amazon to Connect Cars with Homes, USA
TODAY (Jan. 5, 2016, 11:31 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2016/01/05/ford-working-
amazon-boost--car-links/78284584.
2016]
HOFSTRA L4W REVIEW
from playing videogames can be manipulated by companies to create a
profile of a consumer's spending habits.26
Currently, privacy law cannot effectively deal with the data
collection problems posed by the 1OT. Almost every privacy statute or
regulation adopted in the United States embraces "the assumption that
anonymization [of data] protects privacy, most often by extending safe
harbors from penalty to those who anonymize their data."27 As Scott
Peppet notes, though, it is almost impossible to de-identify and
anonymize IOT data.28
This Article suggests that Article 2 should be amended to safeguard
consumers and that courts should adjust their application of existing
contract law and agency principles to account for the new, automatic,
and interface-free contracting environment by considering the increased
levels of information asymmetry and the growing distance between
consumers, contract terms, and the contract formation process.29
Cisco estimates that the IOT's roots can be traced back to research
conducted at the Auto-ID Center at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology as early as 1999.3" The IOT is already a multibillion-dollar
industry, and a recent report by research firm McKinsey & Company
estimates that, by 2025, the IOT will have an economic impact of as
much as $11.1 trillion.3' As of 2015, there were roughly fifteen billion
interconnected devices, and by 2020, there will be fifty billion such
devices worldwide.32 Approximately ninety percent of companies expect
to access and store data generated by IOT robots via cloud infrastructure
and software rather than through onsite infrastructure.33
26. ASHLEY SAUNDERS LIPSON & ROBERT D. BRIAN, COMPUTER AND VIDEO GAME LAW:
CASES, STATUTES, FORMS, PROBLEMS & MATERIALS 764 (2009).
27. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1701, 1740 (2010).
28. Peppet, supra note 15, at 129-31, 157-58.
29. See infra Part VI.
30. Dave Evans, The Internet of Things: How the Next Evolution of the Internet Is Changing
Everything, CISCO 2-3 (April 2011), http://www.cisco.com/web/aboutl/ac79/docs/innov/IoT
IBSG 0411FINAL.pdf (noting that the Auto-ID Center at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology worked on networked radio frequency identification ("RFID") and emerging
sensing technologies).
31. James Manyika et al., Unlocking the Potential of the Internet of Things, MCKINSEY &
Co. (June 2015), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business technology/The Internet of Things
The-value of digitizing thephysical world; Aaron Tilley, Qualcomm: The Internet of Things Is
Already a Billion Dollar Business, FORBES (May 15, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/aarontilley/2015/05/15/qualcomm-the-internet-of-things-is-a-billion-dollar-business/print.
32. Jennings Brown, Connectedness: A Reckoning, ESQUIRE MAG., May 2015, at 32, 32;
Evans, supra note 30, at 3; Morne Janse van Rensburg, The Internet of Things Could See Massive
Changes to Logistics in South Africa, MEMEBURN (June 2, 2015), https:Hmemeburn.com/2015/06/
the-internet-of-things-could-see-massive-changes-to-logistics-in-south-africa.
33. Chris Murphy, 7 Lessons from the Internet of Things Frontier, FORBES (Aug. 4,
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The JOT is expected to change supply chains, how products are
built, how orders are placed, and how goods are delivered to consumers.
For instance, Saia, one of the most successful carriers in the United
States, uses web-enabled sensors on its fleet of trucks to track
maintenance needs, driver safety, fuel economy, and several other
metrics.34 This information allowed Saia to save $15 million in its first
year of implementation by increasing fuel efficiency.35 The JOT can
allow real time data about warehouse performance and energy
consumption to be generated daily.3 6 The connected devices in the JOT
are "elements found along the supply chain."37 By 2025, the JOT will
likely create more than $1.9 trillion in economic value for the supply
chain sector.38 Further, it has the ability to revolutionize payment
systems by permitting "payment processing based [on] location or
activity duration for public transport, gyms, theme parks and a variety of
other scenarios.
' 39
The JOT will also have a significant impact on consumers. A 2014
study conducted by Acquity Group found that forty-five percent of
consumers planned to purchase in-home connected devices within the
next two years and ninety-two percent plan to purchase such devices by
2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/oracle/2015/08/04/7-lessons-from-the-intemet-of-
things-frontier.
34. Erica E. Phillips, Internet of Things Reaches into the Trucking Business, WALL
STREET J. (Apr. 29, 2015, 7:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/internet-of-things-reaches-into-
the-trucking-business-1430342965. But see Leo Sun, Steve Wozniak Says the Internet of Things Is in
'Bubble Phase,' MOTLEY FOOL (June 12, 2015), http://time.com/money/3919058/steve-wozniak-
internet-of-things-bubble (noting that companies have overestimated the appeal of everyday inter-
connected devices).
35. Phillips, supra note 34.
36. See Loretta Chao, Cisco Tests 'Internet of Things' in Its Supply Chain, WALL STREET J.
(May 13, 2015, 6:06 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cisco-tests-internet-of-things-in-its-supply-
chain-143 1554801 (detailing Cisco's installation of thousands of sensors in a Malaysian plant for
the monitoring and reduction of energy consumption and its plans to coordinate with logistics
provider DHIL in order to generate real-time data on warehouse operations). Similarly, in the food
industry, IOT scanning technologies, such as RFID, can tighten container management and can
calculate the most efficient picking and put-away inventory sequences, which will reduce required
labor and handling while managing inventoy by expiration dates to reduce spoilage. David Arkles,
Internet of Things Scanning Technology and the Future of Food, FOOD MAG. (May 14, 2015),
http://www.foodmag.com.au/features/internet-of-things-scanning-technology-and-the-fut; see also
Thor Olavsrud, Why Johnnie Walker Joined the Internet of Things, CIO (May 26, 2015),
http://www.cio.com/article/2926218/innovation/why-j ohnnie-walker-j oined-the-internet-of-
things.html (discussing ThinFilm sensor technology on Johnnie Walker bottles, which allows
personalized communications to be sent to consumers).
37. Rensburg, supra note 32.
38. Phillips, supra note 34.
39. Shane Schick, 10 Internet of Things Use Cases That Have Already Become Cliches, IT
WORLD CAN. (June 22, 2015), http://www.itworldcanada.com/slideshow/10-internet-of-things-use-
cases-that-have-already-become-cliches.
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2019.40 Qualcomm, a San Diego chipmaker, estimates that it earned
$1 billion in revenue in 2014 from chips used in home appliances, cars,
and other devices. 41 LG and Microsoft intend to jointly develop products
for the IOT.42 Google is now the owner of the Nest smart thermostat and
the live-feed device Dropcam, and it has announced plans to develop
additional smart home technology products. 43 Apple intends to use its
HomeKit platform to connect Apple devices in consumer homes.44 The
Dash Button is expected to allow consumers to place orders for goods
that are connected to a device, as well as consumables that are not
associated with an IOT device, such as water or paper towels. 45
Additionally, Whirlpool, Brita, Quirky, Samsung, General Electric,
August, Sealed Air, Oster, Gmate, CleverPet, Sutro, Brother, and Thync
(a manufacturer of wearable technology that uses neurosignaling
waveforms to boost energy levels and decrease stress levels) have all
announced plans to integrate Amazon's DRS into their latest products.46
Much of this Article focuses on Amazon's JOT services and
devices, as Amazon is the first online retailer to actively engage in the
IOT.47 Amazon is now the largest online retailer in the world, and e-
commerce is projected to have an annual growth rate of eleven percent
per year by 2017, which is larger than any other segment of the retail
industry, including brick and mortar supercenters.48 The growth rate for
e-commerce consumer packaged goods, such as household items, is
projected to increase by twenty percent annually.49
Part II of this Article describes the types of IOT devices that may
be used to facilitate the sale and purchase of goods.5" This Part also
40. The Internet of Things: The Future of Consumer Adoption, ACCENTURE 8 (2014),
https://www.accenture.com/t20150624T211456 w /us-en/ acnmedia/Accenture/Conversion-
Assets/DotCom/Documents/Global/PDF/Technology 9/Accenture-Internet-Things.pdf#zoom=50.
41. Tilley, supra note 31.
42. Kevin Parrish, Microsoft, LG Partnering on the Internet of Things, TOM'S HARDWARE
(Sept. 24, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.tomshardware.com/news/microsoft-Ig-internet-things-
windows,27756.html.
43. See Brown, supra note 32.
44. Id.
45. See Van Grove, supra note 18.
46. Introducing Amazon Dash Replenishment Service, supra note 8; Leo Sun,
Amazon.corn Inc. Assembles an Internet of Things Army, MOTLEY FOOL (Oct. 5,
2015, 5:00 PM) http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/10/05/amazoncom-inc-assembles-an-
internet-of-things-anny.aspx.
47. See Fletcher, supra note 18.
48. Clare O'Connor, Wal-Mart vs. Amazon: World's Biggest E-Commerce Battle Could Boil
Down to Vegetables, FORBES (Apr. 23, 2013, 4:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/
2013/04/23/wal-mart-vs-amazon-worlds-biggest-e-commerce-batte-could-boil-down-to-vegetabes.
49. Id.
50. See infra Part II.
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contends that these devices are distinct from existing electronic agents
and subscription services provided by online retailers. 5
Part III evaluates the potential role of IOT devices as electronic
agents entering into transactions on behalf of consumers and sellers by
employing traditional agency law, the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act ("UCITA"), the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
("UETA"), and the Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act ("E-Sign").5 2 Under general agency principles and e-
commerce statutes, consumers may be automatically bound to contracts
entered into by IOT robots acting on their behalf.53 This Part highlights
the difficulties of applying agency principles and e-commerce statutes to
IOT devices and IOT consumer transactions, such as the potential
inability of IOT robots to grasp the fiduciary nature of the agency
relationship, and the probable conflict of interest of IOT robots serving
as the electronic agents of consumers while simultaneously collecting
and reporting data on consumers to manufacturers and retailers.54
Part IV addresses the contract formation issues posed by contracts
entered into by consumers using IOT devices ("JOT Contracts") under
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts ("Contracts Restatement"),
Article 2, and the UCITA; and, it illustrates the problems with applying
traditional standards, such as notice and an opportunity to review, to IOT
Contracts to assess mutual assent.55 This Part posits that while providing
convenience to consumers, IOT devices will increase Contract
Distancing. Where there are high levels of Contract Distancing,
consumers are further incentivized to enter into contracts without
reviewing or understanding the terms; thus, consumer assent to contract
terms is more difficult to assess under the notice and opportunity to
review standard as contract terms are not displayed on IOT devices.5 6
Part V addresses the doctrine of good faith, section 211(3) of the
Contracts Restatement, and applies the traditional contract defenses of
unconscionability, mistake, and misrepresentation to IOT Contracts.57
This Part posits that IOT technological innovations will worsen
information asymmetry in consumer contracts, and the application of
these doctrines without accounting for the new IOT contracting
environment is likely to generate negative results for consumers.58
51. See infra text accompanying notes 83-97.
52. See infra Part III.
53. See infra Part III.A.
54. See infra Part III.A.
55. See infra Part IV.
56. See infra Part IV.C.1.
57. See irnfra Part V.
58. See infra notes 300-19.
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To address the concerns highlighted in this Article, Part VI
proposes important amendments to Article 2, including, but not limited
to, amending (1) section 2-204 to prohibit post-contract formation
disclosure of terms in consumer JOT Contracts; (2) section 2-209 to
prohibit the use of unilateral amendment provisions, where the use of
such a provision would permit contract amendments that are detrimental
to a consumer's rights in an JOT Contract; (3) section 2-206 to
specifically provide that restrictive notions of constructive notice and an
opportunity to review are inadequate for consumer JOT Contracts; and
(4) section 2-302 to provide that unconscionability can result from high
levels of information asymmetry and Contract Distancing.59 In assessing
consumer assent to JOT Contracts, courts should evaluate the extent to
which consumers are able to access and own the JOT data they generate,
the amounts and types of data collected, and manufacturer and merchant
compliance with regulatory JOT best practices, among other things.
Courts must also consider the increased knowledge that companies will
have about individual consumers as a result of JOT data. Article 2's
unconscionability provisions should be modeled after the European
Union's Council Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
("EU Directive").
Part VII acknowledges that the three central arguments made in this
Article are subject to critique.60 Potential counterarguments include the
following: (1) consumers should always be held accountable for their
failure to read contracts regardless of the setting; (2) the use of form
contracts in the IOT context will lower transaction costs for both
consumers and sellers rather than facilitate contractual abuse; (3) the
IOT will increase consumer bargaining power, and information
asymmetry will decrease, rather than increase, in the age of the IOT; and
(4) there are economic justifications for information asymmetry in
consumer IOT contracting. 61 This Part addresses each of these critiques
and demonstrates the soundness of the three central arguments of this
Article.6 2 I conclude by arguing that while the IOT has the potential to
enhance the shopping experience of consumers, there are serious
concerns with consumers' use of IOT devices. 63 To ensure that the law
effectively protects consumers, courts, the Uniform Law Commission
("ULC"), and the American Law Institute ("ALI") must adequately
consider the new contracting environment created by the IOT.
59. See infra Part VI.
60. See infra Part VII.
61. See infra Part VII.
62. See infra Part VII.
63. See infra Part VIII.
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This Article is part of a larger project that will examine the
impact of the 1OT on contracts subject to the UCC.64 Subsequent
work on this project will explore the role of federal and state
agencies in protecting consumers in the new 1OT contracting
environment and will evaluate additional questions raised by 1OT
devices, such as the potential consumer protection concerns where
consumer data (including health and biometric data generated by 1OT
devices) is sold to third-party companies during bankruptcy or is used as
collateral by a company to obtain financing as part of a secured
transaction under Article 9 of the UCC.
II. THE THING
The 1OT is projected to enhance the automatic shopping experience
of consumers.65 With Amazon's Echo, a consumer could verbally
instruct the device to order a product from Amazon, all without the
consumer accessing Amazon's website or a mobile application
directly. 66 A General Electric washing machine that has been prebuilt
with Amazon's DRS could automatically reorder laundry supplies
directly from Amazon. Similarly, a Thync module using DRS could
measure a consumer's stress and energy levels, adjust the consumer's
mood, and automatically reorder Thync strips on behalf of the
consumer. 67 DRS is expected to "leverage Amazon's authentication and
payment systems, customer service, and fulfillment network. 68
The new 1OT developments are distinct from the subscription
services typically provided by online retailers such as Walmart, Target,
and Amazon, as well as the one-click payment option offered by
Amazon.69  The success of Amazon's subscribe-and-save service
64. See infra note 183.
65. See Jonathan Gregory, The Internet of Things: Revolutionizing the Retail
Industry, ACCENTURE 2 (2015), https://www.accenture.com/t20151211T035242 w /us-en/
acnmedia/Accenture/Conversion-Assets/DotCom!Documents/GlobaIIPDF/Dualpub 14/Accenture-
The-Internet-Of-Things.pdf; Leo Sun, 3 Ways Amazon Inc. Could Become an Internet of Things
Superpower, MOTLEY FOOL (July 23, 2015, 8:43 AM), http://www.fool.com/investing/
general/2015/07/23/3 -ways-amazon-inc-could-become-an-internet-of-thirLaspx.
66. See Sun, supra note 65.
67. See David Nield, Why (and How) Startups Are Tying into Amazon's DRS System,
READWRITE (Oct. 7, 2015), http://readwrite.com/2015/10/07/amazon-drs-partners; supra note 46
and accompanying text.
68. Introducing Amazon Dash Replenishment Service, supra note 8.
69. About ]-Click Ordering, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.htmlnoded=468482 (last visited Apr. 10, 2016); Rick Aristotle Munarriz, Wal-Mart Takes
Another Shot at Amazon, MOTLEY FOOL (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.fool.com/investing/
general/2012/11/14/wal-mart-takes-another-shot-at-amazon.aspx (describing Walmart's Goodies
Co. monthly shipment option for artisanal "foodies"); Subscriptions, TARGET,
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encouraged other maj or online retailers, such as Walmart, to use similar
services, and if Amazon's Dash Button and DRS prove to be successful,
it is likely that other major online retailers will begin to provide similar
products. 70 Amazon's current subscribe-and-save service allows buyers
to obtain a small discount if they create an order schedule for specific
products. 71 With this service, buyers must log on to Amazon's website to
select the intervals-between one and six months-at which new orders
are to be placed.72 Under this service, before each order is placed, buyers
routinely receive reminder emails that an order will be placed via the
subscription service. As the name suggests, the one-click payment
option gives buyers the ability to place subsequent orders by clicking the
one-click payment button at checkout after associating a credit card with
their account.73
With Amazon's DRS, manufacturers have the option to either build
a physical button on the device to allow for automatic reordering with
the touch of a button, or enable the device to measure consumable usage
and reorder products automatically without the consumer clicking a
physical button.74 The first DRS option appears similar to the Dash
Button. Under this option, as well as the subscribe-and-save service and
the one-click payment option, a consumer has the sole ability to
determine when new orders will be placed by clicking either a physical
or virtual button at checkout.75 The Dash Button option may work in
concert with the one-click payment option so that once the consumer
associates a credit card with an account, the consumer's credit card will
be charged upon clicking the physical button.7 6
Despite the seeming similarities between these three purchasing
options, the Dash Button has the capacity to increase the ease with
which consumers engage in automatic shopping. Once the Dash Button
has been activated, the consumer no longer has to access Amazon's
website to place orders. Instead, the consumer can simply reorder goods
http://help.target.com/help/subcategoryarticle?childcat-Subscriptions&parentcat-Delivery+Options
(last visited Apr. 10, 2016) (describing Target's subscription service); Walmart Beauty Boxes:
Brand Name Savings!, WALMART, https://beautybox.walmart.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2016)
(describing the Walmart beauty box subscription service).
70. Munarriz, supra note 69; O'Connor, supra note 48 (contending that Walmart has
"copycatt[ed]" Amazon's most successful tactics).
71. Subscribe & Save, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/subscribe-and-save/details (last
visited Apr. 10, 2016).
72. Id.
73. About ]-Click Ordering, supra note 69.
74. Introducing Amazon Dash Replenishment Service, supra note 8.
75. Fletcher, supra note 18.
76. Set Up Your Dash Button, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.htmlnoded-201746340 (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
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with the click of a physical button.77 In contrast, with the one-click
payment option and the subscribe-and-save option, consumers must
either wait for orders to be placed based on the existing order schedule
previously established by the consumer or access Amazon's website or
mobile application to place a new order or change the delivery schedule.
The second DRS option is in stark contrast with the subscribe-and-
save option and the one-click payment option, where consumers select
the frequency with which orders are placed based on the consumer's
assessment of her consumable usage. With the second DRS option, the
robotic device measures the rate of consumption and potentially selects
the frequency with which the consumer enters into a contract for the
purchase of replacement goods based on the consumable usagedetermined by the device. 78 These robotic devices are also likely to have
the capacity to select the type of goods that are reordered. However, it is
possible that Amazon and other manufacturers will permit consumers
who use DRS devices to establish preorder levels for successive orders.
DRS can be integrated into any device that can be connected to the
Internet, and therefore, both large and small manufacturers will be able
to connect their goods to DRS.79
1OT technology, such as DRS and the Dash Button, will usher in a
new wave of automatic and interface-free shopping facilitated by
autonomous electronic agents, which will be dominated by large online
retailers. The goal of these new types of services and devices is to
provide consumers with easy and convenient shopping methods while
simultaneously locking consumers into a routine of ordering specific
goods from a specific retailer online.80 Ultimately, it is projected that
1OT devices will increase consumer loyalty to specific retailers and
brands, thereby increasing profitability for manufacturers and retailers.8
With the DRS, consumers "don't have to do anything-they can simply
rely on the connected device to automatically reorder the consumables
that keep their homes running smoothly.18 2 Thus, in the age of the 1OT,
it is likely that consumers will routinely elect to use 1OT robotic devices
77. Get to Know Your Dash Button, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.htmlnoded-201746300 (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
78. See Introducing Amazon Dash Replenishment Service, supra note 8.
79. Id.
80. Jillian D'Onfro, An 'Overlooked' Amazon Service Could Help the Company Dominate the
Future of Shopping, BUS. INSIDER (July 23, 2015, 11:47 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
amazon-dash-buttons-could-be-future-of-ecommerce-2015-7.
81. Id.
82. Jeff Byrnes, Amazon Dash Replenishment Service Makes Shopping Smarter, APP ADVICE
(Oct. 1, 2015) http://appadvice.com/appnn/2015/10/amazon-dash-replenishment-service-makes-
shopping-smarter (quoting Amazon Vice President of Devices, Peter Larsen).
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to contract for goods, as it is more convenient than going to a grocery
store, logging on to a seller's website, or using a mobile application.
Electronic agents are not new to the contract formation process.
Parties have used electronic data interchange ("EDI"), which has been
around since the 1980s, and electronic online shopping agents to
facilitate electronic transactions.83 EDI allows businesses to enter into
contracts by transferring data and documents electronically.8 4 Generally,
parties using EDI agree in advance to the types of transactions that will
be entered into via EDI. 85 Today's online shopping electronic agents are
used as mediators to assist both buyers and sellers in purchasing goods,
and these agents are generally pre-programmed to make choices based
on price, quality, quantity, or type of goods. Examples include
relatively autonomous programs that recommend products, vendors, and
services, as well as websites that bid on behalf of users.8 Additionally,
in financial markets, automated trading systems routinely "use
intelligent algorithms that respond to market information in real time
using short-term predictive signaling techniques to determine the
optimal execution timing, trading period, size, price, and execution
venues, while minimizing market impact."88
In contrast to EDI and preexisting online shopping electronic
agents, JOT robotic devices will be powered by the Internet and will be
able to share data between devices, cloud software, and on-site
infrastructure.89 JOT robotic devices are expected to do more than
simply enter into transactions based on the parties' preexisting
agreements, as is the case with EDI, or make preprogrammed choices, as
is the case with current online shopping electronic agents. 90 Furthermore,
83. Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Contracting with Electronic Agents, 50 EMORY L.J. 1047,
1050 (2001).
84. Id.
85. See Stephen T. Middlebrook & John Muller, Thoughts on Bots: The Emerging Law of
Electronic Agents, 56 BUS. LAW. 341, 347-48 (2000) (describing EDI).
86. See Bellia, supra note 83, at 1051-52 (describing the current electronic agents, which
search the Internet for better prices, and the next generation of electronic agents that may have the
capacity to negotiate contract terms and select the best product based on price and warranty terms);
Kis, supra note 14, at 66; Emily M. Weitzenboeck, Electronic Agents and the Formation of
Contracts, 9 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 204, 208-09 (2001) (describing the different ways in which
electronic agents are currently used).
87. SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS
ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 7 (2011) (noting that "relatively autonomous programs.., do much of the
grunt' work of the Internet").
88. CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 87, at 7 (citation omitted).
89. See Angelo Corsaro, Building the Internet of Things with DDS, EMBEDDED COMPUTING
DESIGN (July 8, 2014), http://embedded-computing.com/guest-blogs/building-the-internet-of-things-
with-dds.
90. On the other hand, one could potentially argue that IOT devices are quite similar to EDI
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such devices are projected to simultaneously measure consumable usage
and enter into transactions unilaterally.9 ' To fully utilize the data
expected to be generated by IOT robotic devices, it is expected that these
devices will be embedded with artificial intelligence that will permit
them to "analyze data immediately as it's collected to accurately identify
previously known and never-before seen new patterns, ... learn normal
behaviors for each [owner,] and track, uncover and flag anything outside
the norm," as well as adapt to the needs of its owner and environment.9 2
Examples of modem day artificial intelligence include IBM's Deep
Blue computer, which beat chess champion Garry Kasparov, and, IBM's
computer, Watson, which beat seventy-four-time "Jeopardy!" champion,
Ken Jennings.93 Microsoft and Google have announced plans to
incorporate artificial intelligence into IOT robotic devices.94 Nvidia
announced earlier this year that it has developed a super chip that will
allow autonomous cars to connect to the JOT, identify parking spaces,
and park themselves.95 This suggests that these types of autonomous
cars may ultimately have the capacity to enter into contracts for
and perhaps even preexisting online shopping electronic agents, as JOT devices may be
preprogrammed by the manufacturer to select the types of consumable goods that can be purchased
using the Amazon DRS, as well as conduct a search on Amazon's website for the cheapest price.
91. See Bellia, supra note 83, at 1052; Introducing Amazon Dash Replenishment Service,
supra note 8.
92. Mark Jaffe, JOT Won't Work Without Artificial Intelligence, WIRED,
http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/11/iot-wont-work-without-artificial-intelligence (last visited
Apr. 10, 2016).
93. Adam Gabbatt, IBM Computer Watson Wins Jeopardy Clash, GUARDIAN (Feb. 17,
2011, 5:54 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/feb/17/ibm-computer-watson-wins-
jeopardy; Luke Harding & Leonard Barden, Deep Blue Win a Giant Step for Computerkind,
GUARDIAN (May 12, 1997), http://www.theguardian.comntheguardian/201 1/may/ 12/deep-blue-
beats-kasparov-1997.
94. See Jason Deign, When Artificial Intelligence Meets the Internet of Everything, Cisco:
NETWORK (Nov. 17, 2014), http://newsroom.cisco.com/feature-content?type webcontent&
articleld=1534483; Christina Mulligan, 2015: The Internet of Things Takes Another Step,
SOFTWARE DEv. TIMEs (Dec. 29, 2015), http://sdtimes.com/2015-the-internet-of-things-takes-
another-step. Despite expectations that IOT devices will ultimately be merged with artificial
intelligence, it has been suggested that the effectiveness of such a merger may be limited by
incompatible operating systems. Deign, supra.
95. Scott Bicheno, Nvidia Focuses on the Connected Car with New Tegra XI Chip, IOT
WORLD NEWS (Jan. 5, 2015), http://iotworldnews.com/2015/01/nvidia-focuses-on-the-connected-
car-with-new-tegra-xl-chip; Derrick Harris, AIIs Coming to JOT, and not All the Brains Will Be in
the Cloud, GIGAOM (Jan. 6, 2015), https:Hgigaom.com/2015/01/06/ai-is-coming-to-iot-and-not-all-
the-brains-will-be-in-the-cloud. This suggests that autonomous cars embedded with these chips will
have the capacity to enter into contracts with parking attendants and parking machines and pay for
parking tickets on behalf of their owners. Cf Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking Ltd., [1970] EWCA
(Civ) 2, [1971] 2 QB 163 (Eng.) (discussing offer and acceptance with a parking ticket machine);
Samir Chopra & Laurence White, Artificial Agents and the Contracting Problem: A Solution via an
Agency Analysis, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 363, 373 (analyzing contract formation in the
context of parking ticket machines).
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parking spaces on behalf of their owners. Nvidia has also created
an 1OT development kit, labeled the "Jetson TKI," which the
company hopes will be incorporated into devices, robotics, and
computer systems.
96
As discussed above, 1OT devices are distinct from current
automatic shopping options and existing electronic agents.
9 7
These devices will have the capacity to facilitate transactions for the
sale of goods and services on behalf of consumers. But, how will agency
law and the existing framework for electronic agents address the role of
1OT devices?98
III. 1OT ROBOTICS AND AUTONOMOUS ELECTRONIC AGENTS
A. Agency Law
While scholars have used agency law to evaluate existing artificial
electronic agents and some have contemplated the evolution of more
autonomous electronic agents, legal scholars have not yet fully explored
the role of agency law in transactions entered into by 1OT devices. 99
Pursuant to section 1-103 of the UCC, the common law of agency is
applicable to agreements subject to the UCC unless specifically
displaced by a particular provision in the code.' Under traditional
agency principles, the agent imposes contractual liability on the
96. See Ryan Smith, NVIDLA Announces Jetson TK] Dev Board; Adds Erista to Tegra
Roadmap, ANANDTECH (Mar. 27, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.anandtech.com/show/7905/nvidia-
announces-jetson-tkl-dev-board-adds-erista-to-tegra-roadmap; see also Ryan Smith, NVIDLA
Announces Jetson TXI A Tegra XI Module & Development Kit, ANANDTECH (Nov. 10, 2015,
6:50 PM), http://www.anandtech.com/show/9779/nvidia-announces-jetson-txl -tegra-x1 -module-
development-kit (introducing an improvement on the Jetson TK1).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 69-92.
98. See infra Part III.
99. But see, e.g., SUSAN W. BRENNER, LAW IN AN ERA OF "SMART" TECHNOLOGY 4-6 (2007)
(discussing the potential ability of smart technologies to act on their own, and contending that the
law assumes "dumb" technology and, thus, fails to account for the role of modem technologies);
CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 87 at 160-70 (describing the requirements needed for artificial agents
to be viewed as agents under traditional agency law); MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF LAW: NOVEL ENTANGLEMENTS OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 22-
27 (2015) (discussing agents defined by deterministic algorithms, agents based on machine learning,
and agent-based multi-agent systems that execute their own programming and negotiate with each
other to achieve their own goals, as well as solve problems that their programmers could not
foresee); Deborah A. DeMott, Agency Law in Cyberspace, 80 AUSTL. L.J. 157, 157-61 (2006)
(discussing the applicability of traditional agency principles in legal relationships created by
interactions involving modem technology). Courts have also addressed the role of non-JOT
electronic agents and agency law. See Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473-74
(Ct. App. 1996); Marshv. Am. Locker Co., 72 A.2d 343, 344-46 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950).
100. U.C.C. § 1-103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2013); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY intro. (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
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principal for acts done on account of the principal.'0 ' To establish an
agency relationship, the principal must manifest consent through written
words, spoken words, or conduct to the agent; the agent must consent to
act on behalf of the principal; and, the principal must have the ability to
exercise control over the agent. 10 2 While both the agent and the principal
must consent to the agency relationship, an express written agreement
evidencing this consent is not required to establish agency.0 3 Further,
the agent's consent need not be manifested to the principal. 10 4
Amazon recently announced that DRS is operational on a small
number of select devices, such as Gmate's smart blood glucose meter.0 5
Consider a Quirky coffee maker that has the capacity to measure
consumable usage and order coffee using DRS. This JOT robotic device
could potentially be labeled as an "agent" using common law agency
principles. The principal-consumer-has control over the device and
has potentially manifested consent to the agency relationship by
permitting the device to utilize DRS to order products on her behalf An
agent's consent to the agency relationship can be established where the
agent "performs the service requested by the principal following the
principal's manifestation."'01 6 The Quirky device could be said to
manifest assent to the agency relationship by placing the orders for the
consumable supplies on behalf of the consumer. Thus, a contract entered
into by the Quirky coffee maker on behalf of the consumer (principal)
with Amazon for the purchase and sale of consumable supplies would be
binding on the consumer.
Moreover, under traditional agency principles, if the Quirky coffee
maker acted against the wishes of the consumer and placed an order for
consumable supplies, a consumer may still be bound by the actions of
the device as the device could be deemed to have apparent authority. iOT
This could happen, for instance, where the consumer attempts to disable
DRS but is unable to do so or where the device acts in a manner that is
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 194 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 1.01, 1.03; see also id. § 1.03 cmt. b. (noting that
"a manifestation is conduct by a person, observable by others, that expresses meaning").
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 cmt. b (noting that the agreement between the
principal and the agent need not be in the form of a contract); WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF AGENCY § 3(A) (1964) (noting that, while consent is essential to establishing agency,
the relationship between the principal and the agent is not necessarily contractual as consideration is
not essential to establishing agency).
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. d (noting that "it is not necessary to the
formation of a relationship of agency that the agent manifest assent to the principal").
105. First Amazon Dash Replenishment Devices Now Available, Amazon Press Release (Jan.
16, 2016), htp://phx.corporate-ir.net/phocenix.zhtml?c l76060&p irol-newsArticle&ID 2130275.
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. d.
107. Id. § 2.03.
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contrary to the instructions of the manufacturer. On the other hand, even
where the principal becomes bound by such a contract, retailers such as
Amazon routinely provide consumers with the ability to cancel orders
that have been mistakenly placed or to return products.' 8 This, of
course, places consumers at the mercy of a retailer's return and
cancellation policy. Despite the preceding analysis, using common law
agency principles to evaluate the relationship between JOT devices and
consumers is potentially problematic for a number of reasons.
First, it is not clear whether consumers will have sufficient control
over JOT devices necessary to establish an agency relationship. For the
purposes of agency, control is broadly defined to include the ability of
the principal to "give interim instructions or directions to the agent" and
influence the actions of the agent.'0 9 The principal is not required to be
able to control "the full range of the agent's activities."" 0 Further, the
principal's ability to control the agent assumes that the principal has the
ability to terminate the agency relationship."' As noted above, one could
argue that a consumer provides directions to the JOT robot and
authorizes the purchase of consumable goods once the consumer
establishes an Amazon account and elects to use the DRS." 2 If the
consumer has the capacity to initiate the device's use of DRS, it is likely
that the consumer will also have the power to prevent the device from
using DRS to order products, thereby terminating the agency
relationship and exercising a certain degree of control over the device.
However, whether a consumer will have sufficient control over the JOT
robot ultimately depends on how the DRS and other similar products are
implemented by retailers and manufacturers. As currently described,
DRS JOT devices-not consumers-will control the measurements of
consumable usage, when and how such data is collected, and when new
consumable supplies will be ordered." 3 If consumers do not have the
ability to determine the frequency with which orders are placed by the
JOT robotic device or the types and amount of data that is collected by
the device, then consumers may not have sufficient control over such
devices to establish an agency relationship.
108. About Our Returns Policies, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.htmlnoded-15015721 (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, § 1.01 cmt. f; see also Green v. H & R Block, Inc.,
735 A.2d 1039, 1051 (Md. 1999) (asserting that "the principal must have ultimate responsibility to
control the end result of his or her agent's actions; such control may be exercised by prescribing the
agent's obligations or duties before or after the agent acts, or both").
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c.
111. Id. § 1.01 cmt. f.
112. See supra Part II.
113. See Introducing Amazon Dash Replenishment Service, supra note 8.
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Second, the fiduciary character of the agency relationship and the
ability of the IOT device to consent to agency must be considered. As a
fiduciary, the agent must "act loyally in the principal's interest" and
"interpret the principal's statement of authority.""' 4 Whether IOT
devices will have sufficient intelligence to fulfill the duty of loyalty to
the principal, as well as to understand the acts required to be performed
by the principal, is unclear. To the extent that IOT robotic devices are
able to measure and collect consumable usage and then determine when
new orders will be placed based on each buyer's consumption rate, one
could contend that such devices have the ability to think for themselves
and act independently. In such an instance, the IOT robotic device could
be described as autonomous since "its behavior is determined by its own
experience.""' 5 On the other hand, manufacturers may preprogram the
frequency with which IOT robotic devices place orders using DRS or
permit consumers to select the schedule of orders, in which case the
argument in favor of artificial intelligence becomes less convincing.
Even if one assumes that IOT devices will eventually possess the
cognitive ability to think on their own, that capacity may be limited to
solely measuring consumable usage and determining when to place new
orders. It may not extend to the type of intelligence needed to express
consent to the agency relationship or to understand the duty of loyalty
and the fiduciary relationship between agents and principals.
Scholars evaluating non-IOT electronic agents have contended that
electronic agents are less likely to breach their fiduciary duties than
human agents. 1 16 However, to the extent that the data generated by IOT
devices about individual consumers are automatically and exclusively
provided to retailers and manufacturers, the provision of such
information could violate the agent's obligation to act in the best
interest of the principal and protect the principal's confidential
information. 11' IOT devices pose significant privacy and security
concerns for consumers.is There is an inherent conflict of interest posed
in the IOT context, where the device is following the instructions of the
consumer who has initiated DRS but also generating data about the
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e.
115. STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH
35 (1995); see also Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 25, 27 (1996) (contending that computers may be able to "learn through experience,
modify the instructions in their own programs, and even devise new instructions").
116. See, e.g., David D. Wong, Note, The Emerging Law of Electronic Agents: E-Commerce
and Beyond. . ., 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 83, 103 (1999).
117. See Aronoffv. Lenkin Co., 618 A.2d 669, 687 (D.C. App. 1992); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY, §§ 8.07-.09 (describing the duties of the agent).
118. Peppet, supra note 15, at 129-40.
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consumer that can be provided to the manufacturer and Amazon and
potentially sold to third parties.
Agency principles do not prohibit conflicts of interest entirely.
Rather, disclosure and the principal's consent are required." 9 Since
consumers routinely fail to review terms and conditions prior to
contracting, it is likely that they will also ignore such disclosures and
consent to data collection without understanding the implications. Thus,
a disclosure of this type of conflict of interest is unlikely to be sufficient
to protect consumers. Where there is a conflict of interest, the agent must
act in good faith and deal fairly with the principal, even after obtaining
the principal's consent. 2 ° It is unclear whether lOT devices will be able
to understand or meet their good faith obligations. Consumers who
purchase these devices are routinely becoming aware of the data privacy
implications of using them. However, upholding data collection
practices solely because a manufacturer or retailer has obtained
consumer consent and has disclosed the potential conflict of interest may
further embolden businesses to engage in dubious data collection
practices. Imposing disclosure requirements for such conflicts of interest
may serve as a basis for courts to uphold form contract terms and
accompanying data collection provisions under the notice and an
opportunity to review standard-discussed in Part IV, below-as
consumers could be deemed to have notice of the conflict once it is
disclosed by the manufacturer. 2'
As lOT devices evolve, it is likely that these devices may
ultimately collect much more than consumption rate data, thereby posing
significant privacy issues for consumers. For instance, although
Samsung's smart televisions do not have the capacity to purchase goods
on behalf of consumers, the televisions include a voice activation feature
that can listen to the chatter of television viewers.' Samsung has
warned consumers that any information discussed when the feature is
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06. However, the attorney-client context may
create conflicts issues.
120. Id. A dual-agent must also satisfy these duties. Id.
121. See infra Part IV.C.
122. Not in Front of the Telly: Warning Over 'Listening' TV, BBC NEWS (Feb. 9, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31296188. Owners of a Samsung smart television have the
option to purchase Domino's pizza using the device; however, the purchasing service is being
provided by Domino's as part of its AnyWare suite technology, and consumers, not the device,
place the pizza orders. Jonathan Maze, Domino's Enables Ordering by Smart TV, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS (Mar. 31, 2015), http://nrncom/technology/domino-s-enables-ordering-smart-
tv; see also Dale Buss, Domino's Lets Samsung Smart TV Watchers Order From Couch, FORBES
(Mar. 31, 2015, 12:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dalebuss/2015 3/31 /dominos-lets-
samsung-smart-tv-watchers-order-from-couch (noting that the Domino's is "constantly talking"
with potential tech partners of all varieties).
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active may be shared with Samsung and other third parties. 123 By 2020,
all Samsung devices will be online and interconnected, and it is possible
that Samsung devices will be manufactured to work with non-Samsung
connected products. 124 Thus, potentially any data generated about a
consumer by a non-Samsung 1OT device could be collected by a
Samsung device, sent back to Samsung, and sold to third parties.
121
Samsung's privacy policy provides that the data from the voice
activation feature on its latest smart TVs can be shared with third
parties. 126 Apple has also been accused of sharing consumer Siri requests
with third parties despite promises to the contrary. 1
27
Third, given this conflict of interest and the types of data expected
to be generated by 1OT devices, it may be difficult to assess whether the
1OT device is acting on behalf of the consumer or the manufacturer.
Alternatively, the 1OT device may be a dual-agent, in which case the
fiduciary concerns highlighted above become even more problematic.
1OT devices could potentially be characterized as the agents of retailers
and manufacturers. Manufacturers will preprogram DRS 1OT devices to
collect data on their behalf, thereby potentially manifesting consent to an
agency relationship. The manufacturer and Amazon may have sufficient
control over the device as the manufacturer can regulate the type and
quantity of data collected and the frequency with which the data is
collected, as well as communicate with the consumer through the device
to offer more information about the device or to advertise other products
and services. The 1OT device's assent to agency could be inferred from
the collection, processing, and communication of the data back to the
manufacturer and retailer. Manufacturers could permit third-party
advertisers to feed product suggestions to consumers while the consumer
123. Chris Matyszczyk, Samsung's Warning: Our Smart TVs Record Your Living Room
Chatter, CNET (Feb. 8, 2015, 2:10 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/samsungs-waming-our-smart-
tvs-record-your-living-room-chatter; Not in Front of the Telly: Warning Over 'Listening' TV, supra
note 122. Similarly, LG has been investigated in the United Kingdom for obtaining information via
its smart television sets about what programs viewers have watched, as well as the files and
file names viewers stored on USB disks attached to smart televisions. Charles Arthur, Information
Commissioner Investigates LG Snooping Smart TV Data Collection, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21,
2013, 12:25 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/21/infornation-commissioner-
investigates -lg-snooping-smart-tv-data-collection.
124. Brown, supra note 32.
125. To date, California is the only state that prohibits any recorded speech collected through
the operation of a voice recognition feature by the manufacturer of a connected television from
being sold or used for an advertising purpose. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22948.20 (West 2016);
Brian Schaller, New State Privacy Regulation for Connected Televisions, INFO. L. GROUP
(Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.infolawgroup.com/2015/10/articles/privacy-law/new-state-privacy-
regulation-for-connected-televisions.
126. Brown, supra note 32.
127. Id.
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who has purchased the lOT device is under the impression that the lOT
device is acting on her behalf or adapting to her specific needs, rather
than the third-party advertiser or the manufacturer.'28 This, of course,
has a number of implications, such as the potential liability of retailers
and manufacturers for acts of the agent. Most retailers, like Amazon,
disclaim all warranties, but manufacturers routinely extend warranties on
goods sold to consumers. 2 9 If the device acts in a manner that is
inconsistent with the manufacturer's instructions or contracts a virus
and, perhaps, harms a third party, should the manufacturer as the
principal be held liable where the agent is not acting within the scope of
its authority? Apparent authority principles may lead to manufacturer
liability in such an instance.
The UCC provides for manufacturer liability for breach of express
and implied warranties. 30 Article 2 provides three alternatives to address
third-party beneficiaries of warranties, which generally depend on
whether it can be reasonably expected that the third-party beneficiary
would use, consume, or be affected by the product. 3 ' Scholars who have
addressed products liability for accidents caused by autonomous self-
driving cars have noted the potential problems with attributing liability
where the device fails to follow the manufacturer's instructions. 132
Consumers have unsuccessfully sued Ford, Toyota, and General Motors
for selling automated cars containing software that can be easily
breached by a hacker. 133 One potential solution that has been offered in
the context of addressing self-driving cars is to assume that the injury
suffered by the third party is evidence of a defect in the goods, and
therefore, manufacturers, designers, and programmers should be
liable. 34 However, it is difficult to assess how such liability should be
shared among the various parties.
128. Deign, supra note 94 (suggesting that the Sint of tomorrow may act on behalf of
advertisers and not its owners).
129. See Conditions of Use, supra note 19; Marianne Goldstein, Are Extended Warranties
Worth the Money?, CBS NEWS (Aug. 10, 2007, 3:36 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/are-
extended-warranties -worth-the-money.
130. Vesselin Petrov, If Your Warranty Fails, Will You Be Liable for Consequential Losses?,
LEXOLOGY (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/libry/detail.aspx?g-a3l4f9ca-ef9d-4cc8-
8fd2-58116b0dab12.
131. U.C.C. §2-318 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2013) (describing all
three alternatives).
132. David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial
Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 143-44 (2014).
133. Cahen v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 15-cv-01104-WHO, 2015 WL 7566806, at *1, *10,
"12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2015) (holding that plaintiffs' claims of harm were speculative, as there
had not yet been any property or physical damage).
134. Vladeck, supra note 132, at 127-28.
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Fourth, lOT devices are not "persons" under the law. Samir Chopra
and Laurence White have argued that artificial electronic agents should,
in some instances, be given legal personhood, and they contend that
"[a]n artificial agent could, and should, be understood as an intentional
agent, as acting for reasons that are the causes of its actions, if such an
understanding leads to the best interpretation and prediction of its
behavior."'35 Further, rather than being an agent of a consumer, one
could also argue that an IOT device is simply an extension or tool of the
individual consumer, in the same way that a mobile phone or computer
is used by the consumer to purchase products online. Both the
Restatement (Second) of Agency and Restatement (Third) of Agency
frequently use the term "person" to refer to agents and principals, which
suggests that agency principles can apply only to parties with legal
personhood. 3 6 Thus, although existing law recognizes artificial persons,
such as corporations and business entities, as principals in the agency
context, the fact that IOT devices and other electronic agents do not have
legal personhood poses significant problems for the application of
traditional agency principles to IOT Contracts. In fact, the UCITA,
discussed in detail below,'37 specifically acknowledges that the legal
relationship between electronic agents and individuals "is not equivalent
to [the] common law [of] agency since the 'agent' is not a human." '38
However, as will be discussed in detail below, under the UCITA, the
actions of the electronic agent are binding on the principal. 3 9
Fifth, concepts of actual and apparent authority are difficult to
apply in the IOT context. Under the Restatement (Third) of Agency
("Agency Restatement"), an agent "acts with actual authority when, at
the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the principal,
the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal's
manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to
act. '" O4 Moreover, an agent's interpretation of the principal's instructions
will be reasonable "if it reflects any meaning known by the agent to be
ascribed by the principal and, in the absence of any meaning known to
135. CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 87, at 12. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Legal
Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1231 (1992).
136. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmts. a-c. (AM. LAW INST. 2006);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1957).
137. See infra Parts III.B-IV.B.
138. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 102 cmt. 23 (amended 2002), 7 pt. 2 U.L.A.
227 (2009).
139. See infra Part III.B.
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01.
2016]
HOFSTRA L4 W REVIEW
the agent, as a reasonable person in the agent's position would interpret
the manifestations in light of the context."' 4'
Where the JOT device acts in a manner that is similar to the actions
of a reasonable person under the circumstances, the JOT device could be
characterized as acting with actual authority. There may be no difference
between an JOT device acting as an agent to purchase goods and a
human acting on behalf of a buyer in the same capacity. Suppose, the
vice president of a small corporation discovers that the corporation will
need a large quantity of printer ink for an upcoming project and receives
instructions from the chief executive officer to place an order on
Amazon's website for 100 printer ink cartridges. In such an instance, the
vice president may be said to have acted with actual authority on behalf
of the corporation, and a reasonable person in the vice president's
position would have ordered the ink under the circumstances. If a
consumer has activated DRS on a Brother printer and the device places
an order for new printer ink cartridges, the device could be said to have
acted as a reasonable person under the circumstances in complying with
the instructions of the consumer in the same way that the vice president
has complied with the instructions received from the chief executive
officer. Under the Agency Restatement, "[t]he focal point for
determining whether an agent acted with actual authority is the agent's
reasonable understanding [of the principal's instructions] at the time the
agent takes action. '42 It is questionable whether an JOT device will
ultimately have the capacity, even with artificial intelligence, to
reasonably believe that, at the time it places an order, the principal
desires the action be taken or that it is acting in a manner that complies
with the principal's instructions.
Assuming that an JOT device can be said to act with actual
authority, the Agency Restatement permits principals to revoke the actual
authority of the agent by notifying the agent, but a principal may be
subject to liability to the agent for breach of contract.'43 While the ability
of JOT devices to act as agents on behalf of consumers is likely to be
revocable, this result depends in part on how JOT devices are
manufactured and used by parties in contracting. Moreover, it is difficult
to conceive of a scenario in which a buyer or seller may be liable to an
JOT device for breach of contract due to the revocation of an agency
relationship, particularly since electronic agents lack legal personhood.
141. Id. § 2.02(2).
142. Id. § 2.01 cmt. c.
143. Id. The Agency Restatement provides that a manifestation by principal or agent is
effective to revoke or renounce actual authority "when the other party has notice of it." Id. § 3.10.
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Under the Agency Restatement, "[a]pparent authority is the power
held by an agent or other actor to affect a principal's legal relations with
third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has
authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to
the principal's manifestations." '144 Consider an IOT device that has the
capacity to order replacement consumable goods from any seller,
including Amazon. Rather than purchasing the goods from Amazon, the
IOT device elects to purchase the goods from a small online retailer with
a no-refund policy for final sale items because of the lower price. The
small retailer could be said to reasonably believe that the IOT device,
which places the online order, has the ability to act on behalf of the
consumer. Suppose the IOT device succumbs to a virus and places two
other orders with this small retailer. As the number of orders is not large,
the small retailer may still be said to reasonably believe that the orders
and actions of the agent are valid, and therefore, the consumer may be
bound by the contract including the no-refund policy. What relief should
be provided to a consumer in such an instance? The Agency Restatement
provides that where the agent acts with apparent authority, the principal
may be bound to contracts with third parties, but the agent may be liable
to the principal. 145 How would a consumer be able to obtain a remedy
from the IOT device? Would the consumer have to sue the
manufacturer? 146 Has the consumer assumed the risk of mistake? There
are no definitive answers to these questions in the IOT context. Part V,
below, considers assumption of risk by consumers who use IOT devices
as contracting electronic agents. 147
B. The UCITA, the UETA, and E-Sign
In addition to traditional agency principles, statutes such as
the UCITA, the UETA, and E-Sign address the role of electronic
agents in online transactions. 141 The UCITA, a model statute, concerns
transactions involving computer information, such as software licensing
agreements, electronic books, disks that hold only computer information,
and access contracts. 149  The UCITA provides a substantive set
144. Id. § 2.03.
145. Id. § 2.03 cmts. a, c.
146. See Kis, supra note 14, at 38 ("[J]t must be noted here that if agency principles
are applied to robots, one of the human parties (the principal or the third party or
perhaps a party outside the contractual relationship) will have to bear the risk of malfunction by the
robot.").
147. See infra Part V.B.
148. See irnfra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
149. E.g., Deborah Tussey, UCITA. Copyright, and Capture, 21 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
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of default contract rules-which will be explored in Parts [V and V,
below-that apply, unless the parties agree otherwise. The UCITA
generally validates shrinkwrap and browsewrap software license
agreements, even where contract terms are disclosed to consumers after
payment. 50  Under the UCITA, sellers are authorized to impose
additional terms on consumers after payment, including warranty
disclaimers and limitations, and arbitration, choice of law, and forum-
selection provisions. 5 '
The UETA, another model statute, has been widely adopted by
states and applies to transactions in which the parties have agreed
to conduct the transaction using electronic means. 52 The UETA
validates contracts using an electronic agent, as well as electronic
records and signatures.'53 E-Sign provides that electronic records and
319, 337-39 (2003) (describing UCITA's application to electronic books); see also UNIF. COMPUT.
INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 103(b)(3), 7 pt. 2 U.L.A. 236 (2009) ("[T]his Act applies to the entire
transaction if the computer information and informational rights, or access to them, is the primary
subject matter, but otherwise applies only to the part of the transaction involving computer
information, informational rights in it, and creation or modification of it." (emphasis added)). Under
the UCITA, computer information is defined as "information in electronic form which is obtained
from or through the use of a computer or which is in a form capable of being processed by a
computer." UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 102(10). The UCITA was initially intended
to be part of the UCC and to replace Article 2 with respect to computer information transactions.
Warren E. Agin & Scott N. Kumis, A Framework for Understanding Electronic Information
Transactions, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 277, 301-02 (2005). The UCITA does contain rles
regarding mixed transactions involving both the sale of goods and computer information. The
UCITA also creates implied warranties that can be disclaimed, as well as establishes an implied
warranty of compatibility. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 405.
150. WILLIAM H. ROACH, JR. ET AL., MEDICAL RECORDS AND THE LAW 443 (4th ed. 2006);
David A. Szwak, Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act [U. C.L TA.]: The Consumer's
Perspective, 63 LA. L. REv. 27, 28 n.10, 29 (2002); see infra Parts IV-V. To date, only Maryland
and Virginia have adopted the UCITA. Legislative Fact Sheet Computer Information Transactions
Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.unifornlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title =
Computer o2olnformationo2oTransactions o2OAct (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
151. Szwak, supra note 150, at 30.
152. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 5(b), 7A pt. 1 U.L.A. 247 (2002). State adoption of
the UETA precludes the application of the federal E-Sign, as expressly permitted by the latter.
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229, § 102, 114 Stat.
467-68 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7002 (2012)). To date, forty-seven states have adopted the UETA.
Legislative Fact Sheet Electronic Transactions Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.unifornlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Electronic /o20Transactions /o2OAct
(last visited Apr. 10, 2016). The UETA applies to "action[s] or set of actions occurring between two
or more persons relating to the conduct of business, commercial, or governmental affairs." UNIF.
ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2(16). The UETA allows for the application of existing contract
formation rules but allows these contract formation rules, such as the Statute of Frauds rules under
Article 2 of the UCC, to be satisfied via the use of accurate electronic records. Id. pref. note.
153. Legislative Fact Sheet Electronic Transactions Act, supra note 152 (noting that UETA
establishes the legal equivalency of electronic records and signatures with written documents and
manual signatures); see also Williamson v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 947 F. Supp. 2d 704, 710 (N.D.
Tex. 2013) (holding that an automatic signature block indicates intent to be bound); Forcelli v.
[Vol. 44:839
CONTRACTING IN THEAGE OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS
contracts cannot be denied legal effect simply because they are
in electronic form.'54 The UETA and E-Sign are both applicable to
Article 2 transactions. 55
Transactions for the purchase of goods entered into by JOT devices
enabled with Amazon's DRS may be subject to the provisions of the
UETA or E-Sign, as such transactions will likely be entered into by the
JOT device on behalf of either buyers or sellers who can be deemed to
have agreed to transact using electronic means. The buyer has selected
the JOT device to act on her behalf, both parties are transacting business
online, and the seller is likely also using an online electronic agent on its
website. DRS-enabled JOT devices may qualify as electronic agents
under E-Sign, the UETA, and the UCITA, as they are electronic devices
or automated means that can be used to initiate an action, such as the
purchase of consumable supplies "without review or action by an
individual. ' 'iS 6 While the consumer may need to initiate the device's use
of DRS, the consumer need not review subsequent purchases made by
the JOT device using DRS before each purchase is made.
E-Sign and the UETA treat electronic agents as both agents of the
principal and tools of communication on behalf of the principal. 151
Under E-Sign, contracts generated through the involvement of electronic
agents cannot be denied legal effect as long as the electronic agent's
activity is attributable "to the person to be bound. ' 'iSS The prefatory note
of the UETA and its text suggest that the party who deployed the
electronic agent is automatically liable for all actions taken by the
electronic agent, even if a human has not reviewed the transaction.i59
Gelco Corp., 972 N.Y.S.2d 570, 575 (App. Div. 2013) (discussing the electronic signatures iteration
of the UETA adopted in New York and holding that the printed name at the end of an email
constituted a valid signature); UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2(6) (defining an "electronic
agent" as "a computer program or an electronic or other automated means used independently to
initiate an action or respond to electronic records or performances in whole or in part, without
review or action by an individual").
154. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act § 101(a). Subject to
exceptions such as adoption, divorce, and other family matters, a transaction under E-Sign is "an
action or set of actions relating to the conduct of business, consumer, or commercial affairs between
two or more persons." Id. §§ 103(a)(2), 106(13).
155. Id. § 103(a)(3); UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3(b)(2).
156. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act § 106(3); UNIF. COMPUT.
INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 102(27) (amended 2002), 7 pt.2 U.L.A. 214 (2009); UNIF. ELEC.
TRANSACTIONS ACT §§ 2(6), 14(1).
157. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2 cmt. 5 ("An electronic agent, such as a computer
program or other automated means employed by a person, is a tool of that person. As a general rule,
the employer of a tool is responsible for the results obtained by the use of that tool since the tool has
no independent volition of its own."); Kis, supra note 14, at 13 (describing the UCITA's treatment
of electronic agents as both a hybrid agent and tool of communication).
158. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act § 101(h).
159. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT pref. note. The text of the UETA also provides that
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Similarly, under the UCITA, an individual that employs an electronic
agent to conduct a transaction is bound by the actions of the agent. 6 '
The UCITA notes that this principle is similar to the common law of
agency but "does not depend on agency law."' 6' Thus, under these
statutes, a consumer that elects to use an JOT device to purchase goods
and services could be bound to contracts made by these devices. On the
other hand, if JOT devices are viewed as the agents of manufacturers, as
discussed above, it could also be argued that the manufacturers who
have deployed IOT devices should be bound by contracts entered into by
these devices.'62
However, the UETA and E-Sign do not provide substantive contract
law, and, therefore, questions of authority and contract formation are left
to state law, such as Article 2 and common law.'63 The UETA notes that
electronic agents may evolve to act autonomously rather than
automatically, and then goes on to provide that, in such an instance,
courts should apply the "definition of electronic agent accordingly, in
order to recognize such new capabilities."' 64 To the extent that IOT
devices act autonomously rather than automatically, common law
principles of agency, including those of apparent and actual authority,
may become even more relevant when determining whether consumers
should be bound to contracts entered into by JOT devices acting on their
behalf under the UETA. Thus, the preceding analysis of traditional
agency principles is particularly germane to assessing the effect of
electronic JOT agents in facilitating JOT transactions for the sale of
contracts can be formed though the use of electronic agents even though a human neither was aware
of the electronic agent's actions nor reviewed the contract terms. Id. § 14(1). However, the UETA
does, in some instances, permit individuals to avoid the effect of an electronic record generated by
an automated transaction where the electronic record resulted from an error made by the individual
in dealing with the electronic agent of another person if the electronic agent did not provide an
opportunity for the prevention or correction of the error and, at the time the individual learns of the
error, the individual satisfies a number of conditions. Id. § 10(2).
160. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 107(d). Under the UCITA, a party being
bound by an electronic agent is "limited to situations where the party selects the agent, and includes
cases where the party consciously elects to employ the agent on its own behalf, whether that agent
was created by it, licensed from another, or otherwise adopted for this purpose." Id. § 107(d) cmt. 5.
Additionally, the electronic agent "must be operating within its intended purpose." Id.
161. Id. § 107(d) cmt. 5.
162. See supra Part I1.A.
163. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act § 101(b); see also Patricia
Brumfield Fry, Why Enact UETA? The Role of UETA After E-Sign, UNIFORM L. COMMISSIONERS,
http://www.unifornlaws.org/Shared/Docs/Why / 20Enact% /2OUETA.aspx (last visited Apr. 10,
2016) (noting that that the UETA defers explicitly to state law on issues of agency, contract
formation, and authority).
164. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2 cmt. 5.
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goods and services. 165 Part IV, below, elaborates on contract formation
issues using Article 2 and common law contract principles. 166
The potential applicability of the UCITA to lOT Contracts depends,
in part, on whether such contracts fall within the scope of transactions
subject to the UCITA, as well as whether the state has adopted the
UCITA.' 6 Currently, Amazon's Dash Button and DRS contemplate the
sale and purchase of physical consumer goods, not computer
information. 161 OT DRS devices may eventually be able to order not
only consumer goods but also electronic books related to those
consumer goods, electronic books advertised by the lOT devices, and
other types of computer information, thereby making the UCITA
potentially relevant to the transaction. To the extent that the UCITA is
applicable, its substantive rules regarding contract formation would
govern transactions entered into by lOT devices for the sale and
licensing of computer information. 169
IV. CONTRACT FORMATION
The often-cited goals of contract law include autonomy and
efficiency. 7 ° The UCC specifically acknowledges protection of the
principle of freedom of contract. 17 ' However, the UCC contains
limitations on this principle. 172 For instance, parties may not disclaim
their good faith, diligence, and reasonableness obligations, but they
may determine the standards by which the performance of these
obligations are to be measured as long as such standards are not
unreasonable. 173  The UCC's prohibition on the disclaimer of
165. See supra Part I1.A.
166. See infra Part IV.
167. The scope of the UCITA is outlined in section 103. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS
ACT § 103.
168. See Rafe Needleman, Press to Pay: Amazon Dash Button Dispatches Diapers,
Razorblades, Gatorade, More, YAHOOTECH (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/tech/press-to-
pay-amazon-dash-button-dispatches-i15073933334.html (listing the brands onboard for the Dash
Button launch and describing the function of the DRS automatic reordering of goods).
169. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 103(a).
170. Nancy S. Kim, Evolving Business and Social Norms and Interpretation Rules: The Need
for a DynamicApproach to Contract Disputes, 84 NEB. L. REv. 506, 509-16 (2005).
171. U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2013); see also John E.
Murray, Jr., The Article 2 Prism: The Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 4 (1981) (contending that the UCC emphasizes the private
agreement of the parties).
172. U.C.C. § 1-302(b).
173. Id.
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reasonableness and good faith also evidences its recognition of the
174importance of fairness in contracting.
Contract law, including Article 2, was designed to address freely
negotiated agreements reached by rational and informed parties with
equal bargaining power. 175 For years, contracts and law and economics
scholars have debated the impact of contracts of adhesion. 17 1 Critics of
form contracts have made the case that such contracts generally place
more risk on consumers. 77 Conversely, law and economics scholars
argue that businesses are in the best position to allocate contractual risks,
subscribing to the theory that businesses often treat consumers fairly
because extremely one-sided pro-seller contract terms are not "the
optimal technique for exploiting market power. i17s Economic theory
suggests that in well-functioning markets, both sellers and buyers prefer
the same contract terms because the market would ensure only efficient
terms are included in form contracts; and, therefore, courts should
enforce form contracts. 179 Scholars also disagree about whether the
current state of contract law adequately addresses contracting over the
Internet.' The JOT has been described as "the next evolution of the
Internet." 's Will Article 2, the UCITA, and the common law of contracts
adequately address contract formation issues in JOT transactions? This
Part considers this question and argues that the JOT will increase the
lack of proximity between consumers, contract terms, and the contract
formation process, thereby complicating any analysis of consumer assent
174. Id.
175. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 295-96 (3d ed. 1999).
176. Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet Retail
Contracting, 108 COLuM. L. REV. 984, 984-85 (2008).
177. Jeffrey Davis, Revamping Consumer-Credit Contract Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 1333,
1333-48 (1982).
178. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer
Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 828-31 (2006); Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 176, at 984-85;
see Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1208-12 (2003); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in
Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1462
(1983) ("Firms have an incentive to exploit consumers only if consumers routinely understate
the adverse consequences of purchase choices, and an analysis of the psychological literature
dealing with cognitive error suggests that such systematic consumer optimism respecting the odds
seldom exists.").
179. Korobkin, supra note 178, at 1208-09.
180. Nancy S. Kim, Contract's Adaptation and the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1327,
1341-52 (2011) (calling for changes in the courts' interpretation of contract law in order to address
online contracts); Shawn E. Tuma & Christopher R. Ward, Contracting Over the Internet in Texas,
52 BAYLOR L. REV. 381, 390 (2000) (stating that electronic contracts are valid as long as there is
mutual assent, consent, and agreement).
181. Evans, supra note 30, at 2.
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to contract terms. This increased lack of proximity further encourages
consumers to fail to read and understand contract terms.8 2
A. Internet Contracts and Basic Contract Formation Rules
The accompanying rules of Article 2 generally apply only to parties
that qualify as buyers, sellers, or merchants under Article 2, or third
parties who have rights in the goods.'83 It is unclear whether transactions
entered into through the use of JOT devices will be categorized solely as
transactions for the sale of goods or if such transactions will also be
viewed as involving the sale of services or software. This Article
assumes that Article 2 applies to JOT transactions.
Section 2-103 of the UCC defines a "seller" as a person who sells
or contracts to sell goods. 84 However, it is unclear whether companies
such as Amazon provide only an online marketplace for merchants, or
can be classified as actual retailers who offer goods for sale, which could
have implications for their liability under Article 2. These companies
provide both services, as Amazon sells goods directly to buyers, while
also providing an online marketplace for third-party sellers to sell goods
to consumers that are sometimes packaged and shipped by Amazon.8 5
Amazon likely qualifies as a merchant-seller under the broadest
definition in the UCC-one who deals in goods of that kind. 1 6
182. See irnfra Part IV.A-C.
183. The contract formation principles and other accompanying rules of Article 2 apply only to
transactions involving the sale of goods. U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW CoMM'N
2013). A future project will evaluate the types of hybrid transactions that may be entered into by
IOT devices for both the provision of goods and services.
184. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(d). A merchant is defined as follows:
[A] person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself
out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of
an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as
having such knowledge or skill.
U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
185. Milo & Gabby, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C13-1932, 2015 WL 4394673, at *1-2
(W.D. Wash. July 16, 2015).
186. U.C.C. § 2-104(1). Article 2 has a number of additional rules that apply only to merchants
including the implied warranty of merchantability. U.C.C. § 2-314(1). A recent district court case
illustrates the problem of categorizing online companies that sell goods to consumers while
allowing third-party sellers to sell goods on their websites. See Milo & Gabby, LLC, 2015 WL
4394673, at *1-2. The court noted that "the content of the detail pages and advertisements was
supplied by thirdparties [sic] via an automated file upload system, and did not originate from
Amazon." Id. at *6. In Milo, the plaintiff sued Amazon claiming that it was responsible for
copyright and trademark infringements and design patent violations because merchants used
Amazon's website to sell counterfeit goods based on its products. Id. at *2-3. The court held that
Amazon did not qualify as a seller of goods with respect to the trademark and copyright
infringements allegedly conducted by third-party sellers on its websites as Amazon did not have
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The UCC and the UCITA define an agreement as a bargain of the
parties, in fact, as found in their language or by implication from other
circumstances, including course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of
performance. 18 7 The creation of an agreement under the UCC requires a
bargain between the parties, but the term "bargain" is not defined in the
code.188 Article 2 adopts the common law principle that mutual assent of
the parties via offer and acceptance is crucial to contract formation. 189
The term offer is not defined in Article 2. The lack of a definition
implies intent to adopt the common law definition of an offer-a
"manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain."'19  Per
section 2-204, a contract can be made for the sale of goods in any
manner sufficient to show agreement. 191 The UCITA contains similar
language, but it also expressly notes that a contract may be formed
through the use of electronic agents. 19 2 Acceptance under the UCC can
be made in any manner and by any medium reasonable under the
circumstances. 193 The UCITA also provides for acceptance using
electronic means. 194
In today's contracting environment, businesses frequently use form
contracts in e-commerce. 195 Consumers are routinely faced with contract
terms via clickwrap, shrinkwrap, and browsewrap agreements, which
they either fail to fully understand or simply ignore. 196 A consumer's
purported assent to contract terms differs depending on the type of
electronic contract used by the seller. For instance, shrinkwrap
agreements provide that buyers accept the terms of the license
agreements by unwrapping the software packaging or using the
software. 197 In such agreements, the terms are included alongside the
control over the sellers' actions, but the court noted that as far as the plaintiffs' direct patent claims,
Amazon might have offered the goods for sale. Id. at *4, *6, *9, *14. The direct patent claims (a
direct patent gives the holder the exclusive right to sell goods) were sent to trial. Id. at * 13-15.
187. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3); UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 102(a)(4) (amended
2002), 7 pt. 2 U.L.A. 212 (2009). A contract is defined as the total legal obligation that results from
the parties' agreement, as determined by the UCC (or the UCITA), and as supplemented by other
applicable laws. U.C.C. § 1-201(11); UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, § 1-102(a)(17).
188. Murray, supra note 171, at 4-5.
189. Carolyn M. Edwards, Contract Formulation Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 215, 218 (1977).
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
191. U.C.C. § 2-204(1).
192. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 202(a).
193. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a).
194. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT §§ 203(4), 206.
195. Kim, supra note 180, at 1333-37.
196. Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 HOUS. L. REV.
975, 975-76 (2006).
197. See Kim, supra note 180, at 1336.
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compact disc containing the software.'9 8 In clickwrap agreements, the
buyer is required to click an "I agree" button after the terms of the
agreement are shown to the buyer.'99 Clickwrap agreements are
routinely used in software downloads and goods transactions. 0 0
Conversely, in browsewrap agreements, the contract terms are visible to
the buyer only if the buyer clicks on the provided links, and the buyer is
generally assumed to have consented to the terms by continuing to use
the website. 20' Sign-in wrap contracts, a new development in internet
contracting, do not require consumers to click on a box accepting
contract terms but, instead, provide notice of a website's terms of use
when a consumer proceeds through the login process.20 2
These types of contracts routinely pose significant contract
formation issues under general contract law, as well as under Article 2.
The UCITA and Article 2's requirements of a bargained for exchange
presuppose the existence of rational and informed parties that have
mutually agreed on contract terms. 203 Thus, "[m]utual assent is the
bedrock of any agreement to which the law will give force. 20 4 If a
consumer fails to understand the terms of a clickwrap or browsewrap
agreement, such as a provision that requires arbitration or a class action
ban, how does one then assess mutual assent and bargained for
exchange? The remainder of this Part evaluates mutual assent in IOT
Contracts under the UCITA, Article 2, and the Contracts Restatement.
20 5
198. Id.
199. LINDA J. RUSCH & STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK, COMMERCIAL LAW: PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS ON SALES AND PAYMENTS 60 (2012).
200. Id. Clickwrap agreements are also referred to as click-through agreements. Christina L.
Kunz et al., Click-Through Agreements: Strategies for Avoiding Disputes on Validity of Assent, 57
BUS. LAW. 401, 401 (2001). Scrollwrap agreements are another type of clickwrap agreement. Juliet
M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, From Lord Coke to Internet Privacy: The Past, Present,
and Future of the Law of Electronic Contracting, 72 MD. L. REv. 452, 466 (2013) ("Click-to-agree
transactions come in many flavors. Sometimes the click is at the end of the terms so that a reader
must at least scroll through to reach the 'I agree' icon, while [at] other times the click is next to a
hyperlink that leads to the terms, either in one click or in several.").
201. Kim, supra note 180, at 1336-37.
202. Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 838-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (upholding the
enforceability of sign-in wrap contracts). To date, the U.S. Court of Appeals has yet to address the
validity of these types of contracts.
203. See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
204. Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Courts
have also held that assent can be manifested by words or other conduct. Softman Prods. Co. v.
Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that when a buyer merely
receives software and does not review contract terms because there was no attempt to install the
software-which would reveal the terms upon the beginning of installation-contract formation
may not occur).
205. See infra Part IV.B-C.
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B. Mutual Assent Under Article 2 of the UCC and
the Contracts Restatement
In transactions subject to Article 2 or the common law of contracts,
courts have addressed the issue of consumer assent to online contract
terms by focusing on constructive notice and an opportunity to read.20 6
This standard is problematic in the consumer context for a number of
reasons. Notice and an opportunity to read do not always effectively
address the issue of mutual assent. Even in clickwrap agreements, where
the terms of the agreement are displayed and the consumer is required to
click on the "I agree" button before being permitted to purchase the
goods, notice of and an opportunity to read the contract terms does not
mean that a buyer has assented to all of the terms.
Consumers routinely fail to read contract terms. 2 7 A 2007 study
estimates that less than one percent of users access a company's
conditions of use and that, of the few users who did access the
company's terms and conditions, half of the users' access lasted for less
than thirty seconds and ninety percent of users spent less than two
minutes reviewing the terms and conditions.208 In Ting v. AT&T, the
court noted that only thirty percent of AT&T's customers read the entire
updated form agreement, ten percent did not read the terms, and twenty-
five percent would throw away the updated contracts without reading
them.2 9 Technically, one cannot assent to a term that one has not read.
210
The failure of consumers to read or understand contract terms may
206. Nancy Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 818 (2007); see ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1448-49, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that buyer had assented to
contract terms by retaining goods after having had an opportunity to review the terms); Schaer v.
Webster Cnty., 644 N.W.2d 327, 338-39 (Iowa 2002) (identifying a "duty to investigate");
Additionally, the Electronic Contracting Group of the ABA has stated that a user should only be
considered to have "validly and reliably" assented to the terms of an electronic agreement if the
following four conditions are met:
(i) The user is provided with adequate notice of the existence of the proposed terms.
(ii) The user has a meaningful opportunity to review the terms.
(iii) The user is provided with adequate notice that taking a specified action manifests
assent to the terms.
(iv) The user takes the action specified in the latter notice.
NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 131-32 (2013). Most
courts have ignored this test. Id.
207. R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an Informed
Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 636, 640 (1996) (noting that
fine print terms are "frequently" not read by parties); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An
Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1173, 1179 (1983).
208. Yanmis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-
Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 10, 19-24 (2014).
209. Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
210. Kim, supra note 206, at 818.
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211prevent markets from establishing efficient form contracts. Where
consumers have no knowledge of contract terms they cannot shop
competitively for contract terms, and therefore, sellers are not
incentivized to improve contract quality.2 12 A consumer's failure to read
contract terms will not excuse performance under the contract.213
However, if a buyer has read but failed to understand the terms of a
contract, it is unlikely that mere notice of a contract term (even after
clicking the "I agree" button) provides concrete evidence of assent to the
contract term.2 14 Further, in shrinkwrap contracts, courts have not
required that buyers be provided with an opportunity to read the contract
before purchase.215
Browsewrap agreements exacerbate the problem of lack of notice
and assent. Non-conspicuous terms of use and copyright hyperlinks do
not provide buyers with adequate notice of the terms of the agreement.
Furthermore, even if a hyperlink is conspicuous, a buyer may not
click on the terms of use hyperlink, read the terms of use, or understand
the terms of the agreement prior to purchasing the goods. Despite
the problems of assent posed by browsewrap agreements, retailers
such as Barnes & Noble continue to use them with terms of
use hyperlinks buried on the bottom of their webpages.21 6 The
effectiveness of a browsewrap agreement often depends on whether the
seller's website places a reasonably prudent buyer on notice of the terms
of the contract.217 Under this test, courts are required to tediously review
211. Korobkin, supra note 178, at 1217. Even if buyers were to read and understand contract
terms, all market failures would not be eliminated. Cruz & Hinck, supra note 207, at 664-76.
212. Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66
STAN. L. REv. 545, 562-63 (2014).
213. Nguyenv. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014).
214. Sellers often attempt to use consumer-friendly language in their terms of use. Whether
consumers truly understand these terms remains to be seen. For instance, Amazon's Conditions of
Use agreement stipulates the following: "All items purchased from Amazon are made pursuant to a
shipment contract. This means that the risk of loss and title for such items pass to you upon our
delivery to the carrier." Conditions of Use, supra note 19. However, the average consumer may not
understand the myriad implications of a shipment contract and/or the risk of loss rules under the
UCC. On the other hand, in practice, sellers may adopt policies that are consumer friendly, such as
replacing lost packages, despite the stated contract terms.
215. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1448-49, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
216. In Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, the court held that the Barnes & Noble terms of use
hyperlink, which was located on the bottom left hand comer of the webpage, failed to provide
adequate notice to the buyer, and therefore the buyer was not bound by the arbitration clause. 763
F.3d at 1174, 1178-79; see also Sw. Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 3: 06-CV-0891, 2007
WL 4823761, at *4-7 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007) (validating contract formation where defendant
was notified of the terms of use in a cease-and-desist letter).
217. See Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177-78; Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 30-
32 (2d Cir. 2002) (refusing to enforce terms of use that would have become visible to plaintiffs only
if they had scrolled down to the next screen); Be In, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 12-CV-03373, 2013
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the design and content of the seller's website to assess whether a
reasonable buyer would be put on notice of the terms of use. This
assumes that judges are in the best position to assess the effectiveness of
website design.
Many of the recent cases between consumers and merchants
involve a flawed contract formation process, and these cases frequently
involve disputes about whether the consumer consented to an arbitration
clause or a forum-selection clause. 218 In Starkey v. G Adventures, Inc.,
the Second Circuit upheld the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiffs
negligence claims, as the contractual forum-selection clause required the
plaintiff to file suit against the defendant in Canada.219 The court held
that since the defendant had sent the plaintiff a purchase confirmation
email and other emails with hyperlinks to the terms and conditions,
which included the forum-selection clause, the defendant reasonably
communicated its terms and conditions to the plaintiff and had placed
the plaintiff on inquiry notice. 220 The defendant did not use a
clickthrough or browsewrap agreement, and the plaintiff alleged that it
would be unreasonable to require her to litigate in Canada. 22' However,
the court reasoned that the plaintiff had manifested assent to the
defendant's terms and conditions, even though the plaintiff did not
expressly agree to the terms.222
Courts have routinely upheld post-contract formation disclosure of
terms and conditions in shrinkwrap cases where the consumer is
provided with an opportunity to return the product.223 Although the
Starkey decision did not implicate Article 2, the case may extend the
WL 5568706, at *6-9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (noting that browsewrap agreements will not be
enforced where the link to a website's Terms of Use is buried at the bottom of the page or tucked
away in obscure comers of the website where users are unlikely to see it); In re Zappos.com, Inc.,
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 893 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1064 (D. Nev. 2012) (noting that the
Terms of Use was inconspicuous, buried in the middle to bottom of every Zappos.com webpage
among many other links).
218. Knutsonv. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 771 F.3d 559, 565-69 (9th Cir. 2014); Savetsky v. Pre-
Paid Legal Servs., Inc., No. 14-03514, 2015 WL 604767, at *1, *2.4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2015);
Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., No. 14 C 1850, 2015 WL 507584, at *3, *5-7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5,
2015); Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
219. 796 F.3d 193, 195-98 (2d Cir. 2015). Plaintiff alleged that defendant's employee assaulted
her. Id. at 195.
220. Id. at 197-98.
221. Id. at 195-96, 198.
222. Id. at 197-98. In contrast, in Holdbrook Pediatric Dental, LLC v. Pro Computer Services,
LLC, a non-consumer case, the court declined to uphold an arbitration clause contained in a
hyperlinked email. No. 14-6115, 2015 WL 4476017, at *1, *6-7 (D.N.J. July 21, 2015). The court
reasoned that the notice provided by the defendant, an email with the hyperlink "Download Terms
and Conditions," was insufficient, particularly since the contract was not formed online as the
plaintiff had to print the contract out in order to sign it. Id. at *1, *3, *6-7.
223. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
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ability of businesses to disclose contract terms by burying them in
hyperlinks in a series of emails after conclusion of the contract
formation process. Companies may become emboldened to use similar
disclosure methods in Article 2 contracts. This could decrease the
willingness and ability of consumers to sue sellers who have sold
defective products or services or, in the case of Starkey, whose
employees have assaulted consumers, as consumers could be found to
have consented to contract terms, including forum-selection clauses,
disclosed after contract formation, outside of the shrinkwrap and
carriage context.224 Further, by using forum-selection clauses in form
contracts, companies impose significant geographical hardship on
consumers, severely disadvantaging them.225 These concerns become
even more troublesome when forum-selection clauses are imposed after
contract formation and are also problematic in the JOT context where
consumers are further removed from the contract formation process.
1. Contract Distancing in JOT Contracts and the Constructive
Notice Standard
Applying the constructive notice standard to assess mutual assent is
also likely to be problematic in JOT Contracts. Consider an order for a
product placed by a consumer using Amazon's DRS or Dash Button. In
order to use the Dash Button, a consumer must first activate the device
by accessing her Amazon account, select the product she would like to
order, and enable the one-click payment option.226 Once the device has
been activated, the consumer may order a product with a single click of
the button.227 How is assent to be determined in such an instance? Under
the notice and an opportunity to review standard, the consumer could be
deemed to have consented to Amazon's conditions of use by clicking the
Dash Button, or by allowing the device to place an order via DRS, as
notice of such terms and a program agreement may have been provided
upon activating the Dash Button or the DRS device. 228 This result may
224. The Supreme Court has upheld post-contract formation disclosure of contract terms in
carriage contracts. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587-88, 595-97 (1991).
The facts of the Starkey case can also be distinguished from Carnival. In Carnival, the contract
terms were printed on the back of the consumer's tickets, but in Starkey, the contract terms
were buried in a series of hyperlinks contained in an email. Id. at 587; supra text accompanying
notes 219-23.
225. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection
Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REv. 423, 442 (1992).
226. See Set Up Your Dash Button, supra note 76.
227. See Benchoff, supra note 18.
228. Amazon Dash Button and Amazon Dash Replenishment Terms of Use, supra note 19;
Conditions of Use, supra note 19.
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hold true even though the consumer may not be given another
opportunity to review and agree to the terms and conditions before
entering into a new contract by placing successive orders for new goods
through the IOT device.
Contract Distancing-the growing distance between consumers,
contract terms, and the contract formation process in the IOT setting-
complicates the analysis of consumer assent to contract terms. With IOT
devices, a consumer no longer has to go into a store, visit a seller's
website, or use a mobile application to place an order, nor does she have
to review the terms of use or click the "I agree" button before each
purchase.22 9 The device places the order for the consumer or the
consumer places the order by clicking a physical button on a small
wireless plastic device, thereby creating distance between consumers,
contract terms, and the contract formation process.230 In such an
instance, it is likely that consumers will continue to have no compelling
reason to evaluate contract terms that may favor sellers prior to
purchasing goods. IOT devices permit consumers to mindlessly enter
into contracts for the sale of goods as these devices facilitate a seamless
process between the consumer's decision to purchase goods and online
ordering. Consider the following consumer review of the Dash Button:
I've got a family of five, and we've got two Dash Buttons-one set for
the razors my entire family uses, and one for the toilet paper. On
Sunday morning, I went to grab a new razor and saw we only had
two more left, so I hit the Dash Button that I have inside the utility
closet in the bathroom where we keep the razors. Three days later, I
have razors, and cheaper than if I bought them at the two places in my
town that sold them. Faster than using an app or going to the store,
located in a spot that is convenient so I'm unlikely to forget to order or
pick them up, I don't have to drive 10 miles to the store and I save a
few dollars.23 1
In today's contracting environment, where consumers can order
products via subscription options and one-click payment options, there is
already a lack of proximity between consumers and contract terms.
These automatic shopping options create a shopping environment in
which quick purchases without contract review are the norm. Courts
have failed to adequately evaluate Contract Distancing. Courts have
continued to apply the constructive notice and an opportunity to review
test, despite the fact that consumers frequently fail to read contract terms
229. See supra Part II.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 74-83.
231. D'Onfro, supra note 80.
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that are buried at the bottom of a seller's website or that they simply
click the "I agree" button without reviewing or understanding the
terms. 23 2 Contracting through the use of JOT devices will likely increase
preexisting levels of Contract Distancing. As discussed in Part II above,
even the one-click payment option and subscription services require
consumers to access Amazon's website or mobile application to place a
new order for goods, but the Dash Button and DRS devices do not.
The consumer described above is not required to review Amazon's
terms and conditions, or express her consent to such terms by clicking an
"I agree" button before placing a new order for a razor through the use
of her Dash Button. Amazon's terms and conditions are not displayed on
the Dash Button. Similarly, if the JOT device purchased the razors
automatically by using DRS, the consumer may not be provided with
contract terms prior to the device placing a sixth or tenth order for
razors, but courts may infer consumer consent to Amazon's terms
because notice of such terms may have been provided when the DRS
device was first activated by the consumer. The lOT has the capacity to
make devices and people, including consumers and sellers, more
interconnected. However, where devices have the capacity to reorder
goods and such devices do not display contract terms or where
consumers order goods by clicking a physical button on a device that
also does not display contract terms, consumers are further removed
from the contract formation process and are less likely to be provided
with an opportunity to review terms prior to placing successive orders.
One could contend that an lOT transaction is similar to a consumer
who purchases a product in a store and who is aware that, by purchasing
the goods, there is an implied contract for sale even though the consumer
is not provided with the contract terms prior to purchase. However, the
purchase and sale of goods online is quite different from in-store
shopping. When consumers purchase goods in stores, they have the
ability to view the physical product, review product descriptions and
terms contained in the product packaging, and consult with store
employees about the product or contract terms. This is not the case in the
JOT context where the consumer simply clicks a Dash Button to place an
order, or where a device places an order on behalf of the consumer.
Further, a consumer who purchases an item in-store may understand that
there is a contract for the sale of goods once she signs a physical piece of
paper. However, online shoppers may not be aware that they have
entered into a contract that restricts their access to judicial process. 233
232. See Kim, supra note 180, at 1344.
233. Kim, supra note 180, at 1343-44.
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Where a consumer is not provided with contract terms prior to each
successive order placed using an JOT device, or fails to understand the
impact of such terms when they are provided, the consumer should not
automatically be deemed to have manifested assent or unequivocally
accepted a company's terms and conditions.
On the other hand, there is more information now available to
consumers than before via mobile phones, tablets, and the Internet.
Consumers may be aware of some contract terms without reading a
seller's terms of use. For instance, when purchasing a car, most
consumers know that the warranty will expire at some point in the future
and is most likely capped by mileage.234 While consumers may not read
or understand the terms in form contracts, consumers may obtain
information about a seller's contract terms by accessing consumer
reports, blogs, and reviews. 235 However, the accuracy of consumer
reviews is questionable. Consumer review websites, such as Yelp and
Angie's List, have been repeatedly accused of permitting companies to
pay to hide negative consumer reviews. 236 Federal statutes may
immunize consumer review companies from liability for user-generated
content.237 Angie's List has recently been sued for fraud, breach of
contract, and unfair trade practices because of its alleged pay-to-play
review manipulation.238
Additionally, a study conducted of end user license agreements
("EULAs"), which used a list of the twenty-five most trafficked websites
likely to have information on EULAs, found that buyers accessed these
websites in only 3 out of 148,522 sessions. 23 9 This suggests that buyers
are not obtaining information about a seller's contract terms by
accessing information on the Internet. Where consumers do not read or
understand form contract terms, and do not consider such terms in their
234. See id. at 1343 ("Consumers signing their name on a piece of paper register the
significance of entering into a contract, even if they have no power to shape the terms of
that contract.").
235. Peppet, supra note 14, at 703-06.
236. Eric Goldman, Angie's List Must Defend Fraud Charges Over Pay-to-Play Review
Manipulation, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2015, 12:34 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/
2015/08/12/angies-list-must-defend-fmud-charges-over-pay-to-play-review-manipulation.
237. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2012). The statute protects companies' decisions about the filtering
of user-generated data. See id. § 230.
238. Moore v. Angie's List, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 3d 802, 808, 812-15 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (describing
the plight of a plaintiff who alleged that she could not view negative reviews of a contractor she had
hired until after she posted a negative review of that contractor herself). In Moore, the plaintiff
alleged that the contractor paid to have his reviews manipulated. Id. at 802. The court held that the
plaintiff had standing to pursue her claims and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss under rule
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 812-18.
239. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 94, 110 (2012).
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buying decisions, it is likely that sellers will elect to decrease their
expenses and risk by using one-sided form contract terms. 240 Law and
economics scholars contend that an informed minority of consumers
who read contract terms may provide sufficient incentives to prevent
sellers from using one-sided contract terms.2 4' Recent studies on
consumer activities appear to discredit the informed minority hypothesis
in the online context.242 Further, if this hypothesis were true, then
unilateral amendment provisions and jury trial and class action waivers
should not be the norm in form consumer contracts.
2. Unilateral Amendment Provisions & Contract Distancing
Consumer form contracts routinely provide companies with the
ability to unilaterally amend their service policies and conditions of use
at any time. 243 Article 2 provides that contract modifications can be
enforceable without consideration; however, all contract modifications
are subject to the duty of good faith.2 4 4 Article 2 has been criticized for
failing to provide additional guidance on the requirements for a valid
contract modification, and, in applying the good faith duty to contract
modifications, courts have failed to develop an effective standard. 245 The
240. A 2012 study that followed the clickstream of 47,399 households to 81 Internet software
retailers suggests that mandating disclosures by sellers only increased consumer readership of form
contracts by 0.1%. Id. at 95-96.
241. See Bakos et al., supra note 208, at 6-7; see also, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Standard Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 441-45
(2002) (describing arguments for and against the informed minority hypothesis).
242. Bakos et al., supra note 208, at 32. Only between 0.05% and 0.22% of retail software
shoppers access online agreements, which casts doubt on the validity of the informed minority
argument, as the percentage of consumers who access and read online contracts is not large enough
to constitute an informed minority. Id.; see James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 161, 169-80 (2013) (questioning the assumption of the informed minority hypothesis that
presupposes the notion that consumers evaluate standard form contract terms).
243. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. At least one court has refused to
enforce a contract that allowed the seller to unilaterally amend the conditions of use. Harris v.
Blockbuster, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 396, 398-400 (N.D. Tex. 2009). In Discount Drug Mart, Inc. v.
Devos Ltd., the court noted that the unilateral amendment contract provision could result in
unfair hardship and surprise. No. 1:12 CV 00386, 2013 WL 5820044, at *2 (N.D. Ohio
Oct. 29, 2013). However, in Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., the court upheld Amazon's terms
of use and the accompanying arbitration clause despite the unilateral amendment clause.
84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 152-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
244. U.C.C. § 2-209 & cmt. 2. (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2013). Where a
merchant is involved in a transaction, good faith means honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. Id. § 2-103(1)(b).
245. See Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 680, 686 (1982) (contending that Article 2's approach to contract
modification has been unsuccessful because it fails to provide guidance on which contract
modifications should be enforced); Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications Under the
UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849, 856-74 (1979);
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UCITA's position on this issue is much clearer, as it expressly authorizes
the formation of a contract despite the fact that one party has reserved
the right to unilaterally amend the contract.246
Consider an amendment to Amazon's Dash Button terms of use
that removes the mutual waiver of the right to a jury trial so that only
consumers make such a waiver, an amendment that changes the
applicable law from Washington to New York, or an amendment that
imposes a forum selection clause: Where a consumer uses an already
activated Dash Button to purchase a replacement product without first
checking the Amazon website to review the amended conditions of use,
a consumer has not unequivocally assented to the new terms simply by
clicking the Dash Button. Further, in such an instance, the consumer
should not be deemed to have had notice and an opportunity to review
the amended terms.
The high level of Contract Distancing in the IOT context all but
ensures that consumers will have less of an opportunity to review the
amended terms before clicking the Dash Button. Recall that Amazon's
terms of use are not displayed on the Dash Button or on DRS devices, as
these IOT products lack the traditional screen found on laptops, tablets
and mobile phones. To view any amendments to the terms of use, the
consumer has to log on to Amazon's website and attempt to decipher
which provisions were amended, as the terms of use currently only
indicate the date the terms were updated, but not the specific provision
that was amended. If sellers retain the ability to unilaterally amend the
terms of use, consumers are less likely to view or have the opportunity
to read amended terms of use where IOT devices routinely purchase
goods on behalf of consumers.
One may argue that by previously agreeing to the original
conditions of use, which authorized unilateral amendments, the
consumer has agreed to the newly amended conditions of use. This
argument places the burden of notice on the consumer, which is
particularly harsh given the lack of a traditional bargained for exchange
in contracts of adhesion. It requires consumers to continually review the
seller's website to ensure that the conditions of use have not been
Richard E. Speidel, Contract Formation and Modification Under Revised Article 2, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1305, 1308-13 (1994).
246. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 202(b) (amended 2002), 7 pt. 2 U.L.A.
297 (2009).
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amended. 247 Further, how can there be a real and voluntary meeting of
the minds where one party is unaware of the contract terms?
Suppose that the consumer in the hypothetical above simply
continues to use the product purchased on Amazon, but Amazon then
modifies its terms of use and the consumer has a potential claim
regarding the product purchased prior to the amendment. In such an
instance, the consumer may believe that the original contract terms are
still in place. Consumers may not fully understand the impact of a
unilateral amendment clause and the almost limitless power it gives to
companies to affect the rights of consumers under the contract.
Retailers such as Sears explicitly obligate consumers to periodically
review their online conditions of use for modifications. Continued use of
the company's website after an amendment constitutes acceptance of the
revised terms.24 Rational buyers are unlikely to willingly incur the costs
of searching for and understanding a seller's terms of use. 2 49 Companies
could simply notify buyers of any changes to the terms of use. However,
not all form contracts require companies to notify consumers of
amendments to their terms of use prior to implementing such changes.
Barnes & Noble, Costco, and Home Depot's terms of use provide that
these companies may unilaterally amend the terms of use without
providing notice to consumers. 20 Even if retailers provided such
notifications to consumers, it would not address the problem of whether
consumers truly understand the terms provided in the seller's conditions
of use or whether consumers actually view the email notices, click on
hyperlinks contained in email notices, or realize that the email notice
provided relates to services or goods that they have already purchased.
3. Battle of the Forms & Contract Distancing
Suppose an IOT device purchases a consumable supply from an
online seller and the seller's website does not include all of the
applicable terms and conditions. Rather, the complete set of terms and
247. At least one court has held that sellers should bear the burden of explaining contract terms
to consumers rather than buyers being expected to seek out hidden terms. Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97
F. Supp. 3d 359, 402-03 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
248. Terms of Use, SEARS, http://www.sears.com/csternsofservice/nb-100000000022530 (last
visited Apr. 10, 2016).
249. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 211, 243 (1995).
250. Terms and Conditions of Use, BARNES & NOBLE, http://www.bamesandnoble.com/
h/help/about/terns-of-use (last visited Apr. 10, 2016); Terms and Conditions of Use,
COSTCO WHOLESALE, http://www.costco.com/terns-and-conditions-of-use.html#Modification-of-
Site-Terms (last visited Apr. 10, 2016); Terms of Use, HOME DEPOT, http://www.homedepot.com/
c/Terms of Use (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
2016]
HOFSTRA L4W REVIEW
conditions, including a requirement of arbitration, is sent to the
consumer's email address along with the order confirmation. In order to
accept an offer, the offeree must be aware of the terms prior to
contracting. 251 Article 2 provides that, where one of the parties to the
contract is a non-merchant, additional terms proposed in an acceptance
are to be viewed as mere proposals.2 52 As such, where a merchant
submits additional contract terms, such as an arbitration clause, to
consumers via a confirmation email, the consumer should have the
ability to accept or reject those additional terms under Article 2. If the
consumer does not expressly accept the additional terms, these terms
should not form part of the contract. The consumer's failure to reject the
terms should not be viewed as conduct that evidences acceptance of the
additional terms.
Consumers may review an order confirmation email only to
confirm that it correctly summarizes the price, quantity, and type
of product purchased and may not subsequently click on hyperlinks
to review additional terms and conditions. Despite Article 2's "battle
of the forms" rules, "the conventional chronology of contract-making
has become unsettled over recent years by courts' increased acceptance
of 'terms-later' contracting. ' 253  Courts may view the ordinary
confirmation email as placing a reasonable consumer on inquiry notice
of additional contract terms and the consumer's failure to expressly
reject the additional terms as an acceptance of the additional terms.
Further, courts have refused to apply the battle of the forms rules to
consumer contracts by reasoning that these rules are not applicable
where only one form is involved in the transaction, which is often the
case in consumer transactions.254
251. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 4:16 (4th ed. 2007) ("As a general principle, an offeree cannot actually assent to an offer unless
the offeree knows of its existence.").
252. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (AM. LAW INST. &UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2013).
253. Sclnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2012). In Schnabel, the plaintiffs
purchased a ticket using Priceline.com and were offered defendant's service at checkout, but
plaintiffs claimed they were unaware they were dealing with the defendant, a third party to the
original transaction, despite being provided with a hyperlink. Id. at 114-15. The court refused to
enforce an arbitration clause that was emailed to plaintiffs after contract formation, explaining that
no reasonable person could expect, under those circumstances, that contract terms would be
delivered via email, and held that plaintiffs did not assent to the terms simply by failing to cancel
the service provided by the defendant. Id. at 127-29.
254. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that,
because there is only one form involved in a consumer transaction, section 2-207 of the UCC is
irrelevant). But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (D. Kan. 2000) (finding
that nothing in the language of section 2-207 "precludes application in a case which involves only
one form").
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C. Mutual Assent Under the UCITA
To the extent an 1OT device is engaged in a transaction that
qualifies as a computer information transaction under the UCITA, the
provisions of the UCITA could be applicable to assess notice and assent
to contract terms. Although only two states have adopted the UCITA,
some courts have used its notice and assent provisions to assess a
buyer's consent to a seller's terms and conditions, even where the
UCITA does not apply to a transaction.2 55
Consider a consumer located in Virginia or Maryland, the only two
states that have enacted the UCITA, who has purchased a web-enabled
bottle of spirits from a grocery store-this bottle has the ability to order
additional products, such as electronic books on spirits, on behalf
of the consumer, as well as order home delivery services for additional
bottles of spirits. This scenario is no longer the domain of science
fiction. As part of its 1OT program, Pemod Ricard, a producer of
premium spirits and wine, including Absolut Vodka, has created a
"library of book-shaped containers that hold a sealed bottle of spirits,
which are set on a platform connected to a computer. 2 56 The product
can supply home delivery services, cocktail recipes, and other tailored
offers to consumers.
Suppose this library of spirits or the bottle of spirits purchased by
the consumer places an online order for an electronic book on the history
of vodka by contracting with a seller's online electronic agent, and the
seller is located in one of the two UCITA states.257 The UCITA expressly
provides that a contract can be formed via the interaction of two
electronic agents and acceptance can occur where the electronic agent
engages in behavior that, under the circumstances, indicates acceptance
255. Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 34 (2d Cir. 2002) ("We hasten to point
out that UCITA, which has been enacted into law only in Maryland and Virginia, does not govern
the parties' transactions in the present case but we nevertheless find that UCITA's provisions offer
insight into the evolving online 'circumstances' that defendants argue placed plaintiffs on inquiry
notice of the existence of the SmartDownload license terms."); see also Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A.
v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that the UCITA does
not apply to the transaction at issue, but the UCITA can provide guidance on the UCC's view of
common law); see also infra text accompanying notes 260-6 1.
256. Gemma Charles, Pernod Ricard Reveals Connected Bottle Kit to 'Reinvent' Home
Cocktail-Making, MARKETING MAG. (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.marketingmagazine.co.uk/
article/ 1229084/pernod-ricard-reveals -connected-bottle-kit-reinvent-home-cocktail-making; Shona
Ghosh, How Absolut Vodka Will Use the Internet of Things to Sell More Than 'Static Pieces of
Glass,' MARKETING MAG. (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.marketingmagazine.co.uk/article/1359043/
absolut-vodka-will-use-internet-things-sell-static-pieces-glass.
257. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 109(b)-(d) (noting that the location of the
licensor's principal place of business can determine applicability of the UCITA).
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has occurred.2 58 Thus, by placing the order for the electronic book, the
IOT library of spirits or bottle has arguably engaged in behavior that
indicates it has accepted, on behalf of the consumer, the seller's offer for
the electronic book. Now, suppose that the seller's terms and conditions,
which are displayed on the seller's website using either a clickwrap or
browsewrap agreement, includes a forum-selection clause, a waiver of
the right to jury trial, and a class action waiver. Will the electronic
agent's placement of the order for the electronic book constitute assent
on behalf of the consumer to these online terms and conditions under
the UCITA?
The UCITA provides that an electronic agent manifests assent to a
record or term "if, after having an opportunity to review it, the electronic
agent: (1) authenticates the record or term; or (2) engages in operations
that in the circumstances indicate acceptance of the record or term. '"259
Electronic agents will have an opportunity to review contract terms if the
contract terms are provided in a manner that permits a reasonably
configured electronic agent to respond to the terms.2 6 0 Where the seller's
terms and conditions are displayed using a clickwrap or browsewrap
agreement, one could contend that the IOT device was provided
with an opportunity to review and respond to the terms prior to placing
the order. However, the extent to which the library or bottle of spirits
acting on behalf of the consumer has assented to the seller's contract
terms under the UCITA depends, in part, on whether the device is
sophisticated enough to understand the terms and conditions of sale
provided by the seller.26i
Although IOT devices may not have the intelligence necessary to
understand a retailer's terms and conditions, if the device has the
258. Id. § 206(a). With respect to contract formation between individuals and electronic agents,
the UCITA provides that contract formation can occur in the following circumstance:
[T]he individual takes an action or makes a statement that the individual can refuse to
take or say and that the individual has reason to know will: (1) cause the electronic agent
to perform ... ; or (2) indicate acceptance, regardless of other expressions or actions by
the individual to which the individual has reason to know the electronic agent
cannot react.
Id. § 206(b).
259. Id. § 112(b). Under the UCITA, individuals manifest assent to contract terms in the
following manner:
[I]f the person, acting with knowledge of, or after having an opportunity to review the
record or term or copy of it: (1) authenticates the record or term with intent to adopt or
accept it; or (2) intentionally engages in conduct or makes statements with reason to
know that the other party or its electronic agent may infer from the conduct or statement
that the person assents to the record or term.
Id. § 112(a).
260. Id. §§ 112 cmt. 3,113(b).
261. Id. § 206 cmt. 2.
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capacity to communicate these terms to the consumer before the order is
placed, the consumer could be deemed to have had notice and an
opportunity to review. If the device can be said to understand the terms,
then the buyer will be bound to the terms of the contract for sale of the
electronic book, even though the consumer may not have actually
reviewed or seen the terms of sale prior to purchase.2 62 How can a party
be deemed to have assented to terms that they have never seen? This
result is unfair for consumers where the electronic agent contracts a
virus, malfunctions, or has a design flaw.263
Such a result is also problematic under the autonomy theory of
contract law. Under this theory, contracts are enforceable because they
are an expression of the parties' free will. 264 If the device is acting under
the instructions of a malicious third party and not the consumer, the
resulting contract does not adequately express the will of the parties, and
thus, the contract should not be enforced.2 65 Support for this argument
can also be found in the Contracts Restatement, which provides that
"[t]he conduct of a party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent
unless he intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to
know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents. "266
Where the electronic agent does not act in accordance with the
instructions of the consumer due to no fault of the consumer, the intent
of the consumer to contract in such a circumstance is questionable.2 67
The UCITA has been heavily criticized for failing to adequately
protect consumers. 268 For instance, the UCITA allows licensors to prove
consumer assent to changes in contract terms by showing that the user
continued to use the software.269 The preceding application of the
UCITA's provisions to IOT Contracts indicates that consumers who use
IOT devices to contract for the sale and purchase of computer
262. Id. § 107(d) (stating that a person is bound by the actions of an electronic agent).
263. Chopra & White, supra note 95, at 371.
264. MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE
RULE OF LAW 58-59 (2013).
265. See id.
266. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
267. See id. § 2(1) ("A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a
specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been
made."). A party should be responsible for the creation of the manifestation, even if by mere
negligence. See id. § 19 cmt. c.
268. Szwak, supra note 150, at 30-37. Iowa, North Carolina, and West Virginia have adopted
statutes to protect their citizens from the UCITA laws, which have been adopted in Maryland and
Virginia. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 554D.104 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-313 (2015); W. VA.
CODE § 39A-1-1 (2015).
269. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 112 cmt. 3 (amended 2002), 7 pt. 2 U.L.A.
273 (2009).
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information could be deemed to have assented to a seller's online
terms and conditions. Automatic enforcement of seller terms and
conditions does not incentivize sellers to include reasonable, efficient,
or fair contract terms. Instead, it potentially authorizes them to include
anti-consumer provisions, such as non-disparagement clauses, in their
online terms and conditions.
V. CHALLENGES TO CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
This Part assesses the potential use of the good faith doctrine,
section 211(3) of the Contracts Restatement, and the standard contract
defenses of unconscionability, mistake, and misrepresentation in IOT
Contracts. It suggests that the IOT will worsen preexisting information
asymmetry in consumer contracts to the benefit of companies and that a
merchant's subjective knowledge about the consumer obtained from data
provided by IOT devices should be considered when evaluating issues
related to contract formation and enforcement.270
A. Unconscionability
Article 2 and the UCITA permit courts to refuse to enforce a
contract or clause that is unconscionable.27i Some scholars have
270. See infra Part V.A; infra notes 355-71 and accompanying text.
271. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. &UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2013); UNIF. COMPUT. INFO.
TRANSACTIONS ACT § 111 (amended 2002), 7 pt. 2 U.L.A. 270 (2009). Unconscionability is a legal
question for the court to address, not the jury, and generally, the party raising the issue of
unconscionability has the burden of proof. However, the language of U.C.C. § 2-302(1) suggests
that the court may raise the issue sua sponte. See 1 JAMES J. WHITE ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 413-15 (6th ed. 2012). Unconscionability is measured at the time of contracting, not
performance. Id. While this Article focuses solely on U.C.C. § 2-302, states have adopted
legislation to police unconscionable practices in the sale of goods and in other areas. For instance,
numerous states have adopted unfair and deceptive practice statutes that apply to a range of
transactions including the sale of goods, lease transactions, and real estate transactions. See Carolyn
L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the States: A 50-State Report on Unfair and Deceptive Acts and
Practices Statutes, NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR. 13-15 (2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/
report 50 states.pdf. While all states have one or more consumer protection statutes, these laws
generally prohibit only fraudulent, unfair, and deceptive practices, and are modeled after the Federal
Trade Commission Act. See CAROLYN L. CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, NAT'L CONSUMER L.
CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES 967-89 (6th ed. 2004) (surveying each states'
consumer protection statute); MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, CONSUMER LAW: A GUIDE FOR THOSE
WHO REPRESENT SELLERS, LENDERS, AND CONSUMERS 158-62 (1995) (noting that, unlike the
Federal Trade Commission Act, most state statutes add a private cause of action). However, these
state statutes do not regulate all aspects of consumer form contracts and other statues, such as the
UCITA, may trump the consumer protection provisions of such statutes. Jean Braucher, The Failed
Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market Concept and Its Lessons for Policing of Standard Form
Contracts, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 393, 405 n.60 (2003); Irma S. Russell, Got Wheels?
Article 2A Standardized Rental Car Terms, Rational Inaction, and Unilateral Private Ordering, 40
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 137, 159-60 (2006). For instance, the UCITA allows for delayed disclosure of
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suggested that the defense of unconscionability adequately protects
consumer rights in form contracts.272 However, courts frequently refrain
from finding contract terms unconscionable in an effort to protect
freedom of contract. 273 Empirical studies of unconscionability case law
have found that the number of decisions finding unconscionability in
Article 2 cases is quite small. 274 As Margaret Jane Radin suggests,
businesses frequently use class action waivers, arbitration clauses,
liability limitations, and forum-selection clauses to insulate themselves
from liability, thereby restricting the ability of consumers to obtain legal
redress.275 Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan highlighted similar
concerns in her dissenting opinion in American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Restaurant, where she noted that a large business such as
American Express can use its "monopol[istic] power to insist on a
contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse. ,276
Courts find unconscionability only where the contract term is
extremely oppressive or shocks the conscience, but "[n]ot surprisingly,
when the context is not so stark the judicial approach is less
predictable. 277 The willingness of courts to find unconscionability only
in the gravest of circumstances is alarming considering that almost all
consumer contracts are form contracts that routinely contain terms that
significantly disadvantage consumers. 278  These contracts frequently
grant unilateral amendment rights to sellers, place the risk of loss on
contract terms in consumer contracts, which may "water down state protection laws written in
general terms to prohibit 'unfair and deceptive practices."' Braucher, supra, at 405.
272. See Steven W. Feldman, Mutual Assent, Normative Degradation, and Mass Market
Standard Form Contracts A Two-Part Critique of Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights
and the Rule of Law (Part I), 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373, 428-29 (2014).
273. RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 199, at 79.
274. Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An
Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1097 (2006).
275. See RADIN, supra note 264, at 33-34, 41-42.
276. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2313 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting). The majority of the Court in
American Express upheld a class action waiver. See id. at 2310-13 (majority opinion).
277. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 241, at 457-58; see also Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a
Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form Contracts. In Defense of Restatement
Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 230-31 n.18 (2007) (noting that courts find
unconscionability in only the gravest of circumstances).
278. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 241, at 431; Rakoff, supra note 207, at 1188-89 (noting
that the majority of contracts are contracts of adhesion); W. David Slawson, Standard Form
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971). The
terms of use for Amazon and Barnes & Noble label all purchases as shipment contracts with the
buyer assuming the risk of loss once the goods are delivered to the carrier. See Conditions of Use,
supra note 19; Terms and Conditions of Use, supra note 250. Sears's terms of use also allow for
unilateral amendment, which becomes effective upon posting. See Terms of Use, SEARS (Sept. 25,
2013), http://www.sears.com/csternsofservice/nb-100000000022530.
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consumers, and require arbitration of disputes, class action waivers, and
jury trial waivers.
The doctrine of unconscionability is intended to prevent oppression
and unfair surprise on a party and to correct bargaining misbehavior.27 9
Given this underlying principle, courts have concluded that there are two
prongs to unconscionability: one substantive and one procedural.28
Courts often require the existence of some aspect of both procedural and
substantive unconscionability; however, where one aspect predominates
over the other, some courts will still find that a term or contract is
unconscionable despite the presence of only one aspect.
28 I
1. Substantive Unconscionability
Substantive unconscionability evaluates whether contract terms are
"illegal, contrary to public policy or grossly unfair."28 2 Many of the
cases addressing substantive unconscionability have involved unfair
prices, warranties, and limitations of remedies. 283 Contract terms can be
found to be substantively unconscionable where such terms
unreasonably favor the party with stronger bargaining power.284
In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., one of the first cases
to acknowledge the ability of courts to render contract terms
unconscionable, the court stated:
Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its
terms might be held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided
279. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2013); Danielle Kie Hart,
Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 41 LOY. U. CHI L. J. 175, 193-94 (2009).
280. See Fiser v. Dell Comp. Corp. 188 P.3d 1215, 1221 (N.M. 2008); Brower v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (App. Div. 1998).
281. See Am. Home Improvement Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886, 888-89 (N.H. 1964); Toker
v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78, 80-81 (N.J. Union Cty. Ct. 1970); Padilla v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 68 P.3d 901, 907 (N.M. 2003); Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675, 679 (N.M. 1985).
See generally RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 199, at 78. In response to a claim of
unconscionability, the defending party has the opportunity to prove that the clause or contract is
reasonable given the commercial setting. U.C.C. § 2-302(2).
282. Fiser, 188 P.3d at 1221. The Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, which has been
adopted by Utah, Kansas, and Ohio, also lists a series of factors that should be considered when
assessing unconscionability, including whether the seller took advantage of the inability of the
consumer to protect his interests reasonably because of physical infirmity, ignorance, illiteracy,
inability to understand the language, or similar factors. UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 4
(UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1970).
283. See, e.g., Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170, 175 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979) (holding that
a contract of sale was unconscionable because a buyer paid $1268 for a television worth $499.00);
Sho-Pro of Ind., Inc. v. Brown, 585 N.E.2d 1357, 1361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that it was
unconscionable for a seller to charge $4322.00 for windows that only cost the seller $1080.50);
Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759-60 (Dist. Ct. 1966) (holding that the contract
was unconscionable as the buyer was charged three times the value of an appliance).
284. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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bargain. But when a party of little bargaining power, and hence little
real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or
no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even
an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the
terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of the agreement are
not to be questioned should be abandoned and the court should
consider whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that
enforcement should be withheld.285
Consider an Amazon consumer who purchases a Quirky smart
appliance, such as a coffee machine, a baby formula maker, or a pet food
dispenser, that is enabled with DRS. Amazon's current terms of use
require consumers to either submit all claims to arbitration or to small
claims court if the claim qualifies. 28 6 The unilateral amendment
provisions in Amazon's current terms of use could permit Amazon to
remove the small claims court option at any time. Thus, a consumer who
has purchased a Quirky machine may have the option of bringing any
potential claims in small claims court at the time of purchasing the
product, but this ability may be restricted or eliminated once the
consumer enables the Quirky device to use DRS to order replacement
products. In such a scenario, the consumer is subject to different terms of
use upon the purchase of the Quirky device and upon the device's
purchase of replacement goods using DRS. This should qualify as an
unfair result, particularly since the provision heavily favors Amazon-
the party with stronger bargaining power-thereby satisfying the
requirements of substantive unconscionability. However, given the
unwillingness of most courts to strike down unilateral amendment
provisions, the doctrine of unconscionability may not be useful to
consumers faced with this problem.2 87
285. 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
286. Conditions of Use, supra note 19.
287. Many courts have upheld unilateral amendment of provisions, including unilateral
amendment of dispute resolution provisions. See Vigil v. Sears Nat'l Bank, 205 F. Supp. 2d 566,
572-73 (E.D. La. 2002) (holding that Sears's unilateral amendment provision in its credit
agreement, which was exercised by Sears to include a class action arbitration waiver, was not
procedurally unconscionable because the plaintiff was provided with notice of the amendment); see
also Blaz v. Belfer, 368 F.3d 501, 504-05 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that "there is no substantive right
to a class remedy"); Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638-39 (4th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting plaintiffs' argument that an arbitration clause was unconscionable because of a class
action ban); Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 374-75 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding a class
action arbitration waiver). However, a few courts in New Jersey, California, Illinois, and
Washington have held that class action arbitration waivers are substantively unconscionable where
the cost of bringing an individual suit is much higher than the individuals' expected recovery. See
David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L.
REv. 605, 634 (2010). For examples of cases in which the court struck down a class arbitration
waiver, see Homa v. American Express Co., 558 F.3d 225, 230-31 (3d Cir. 2009); Lowden v. T-
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Further, as discussed in Part IV above, since lOT devices will have
the capacity to automatically reorder products upon depletion, it is
unlikely that a consumer will review any amendment to the terms of use
prior to goods being purchased by the IOT device.2"' In the consumer
context, sellers have frequently exercised their rights to unilaterally
amend terms of use without notifying buyers.289 For instance, in McKee
v. AT&T Corp., a case in which a consumer class action alleged that
AT&T had overcharged customers, AT&T had amended the lead
plaintiff's contract to change its dispute resolution provisions at least
five times after the plaintiff executed the contract.290 In McKee, the
Washington Supreme Court held that the dispute resolution provisions
were substantively unconscionable. 291 However, the ability of sellers to
unilaterally amend contracts has been protected by statutes in the credit
card context.292 Despite the holding in McKee, unilateral amendment
provisions routinely withstand unconscionability claims. 293
Even where consumers are provided with advanced notice of
proposed changes, consumers may not understand the impact of such
amendments or may be so overwhelmed with repeated notices about
contract modifications from different online retailers, service providers,
banks, and credit card companies that such notices become useless,
proving ineffective at providing notice to consumers.294 How many
amended contract terms can a consumer be reasonably expected to
review and understand without the aid of an attorney in light of the
frequency with which merchants unilaterally amend contracts terms, and
where sellers who draft these form contracts have superior information
Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213, 1219 (9th Cir. 2008); Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216,
1224 (11th Cir. 2007); Discover Bank v. Superior Court of L.A., 113 P.3d 1100, 1108-10 (Cal.
2005); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 274-75 (Ill. 2006); Muhammad v. County
Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 99-101 (N.J. 2006); and Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161
P.3d 1000, 1007-08 (Wash. 2007).
288. See supra Part IV.
289. See Horton, supra note 287, at 606 (discussing an example of one company unilaterally
amending the terms of use).
290. 191 P.3d 845, 850 n.2 (Wash. 2008).
291. Id. at 860-61.
292. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 952(a) (2001); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26.1-11(a) (2008);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-4-102(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.63(D)
(Supp. 2009).
293. See infra notes 294-326 and accompanying text.
294. In the social media context, companies such as Facebook and Twitter provide buyers with
advanced notice of changes to terms of use. Jessica Kaufman, Potential Limitations Placed on
Unilateral Right to Modify Terms of Use, SOCIALLY AWARE (Dec. 3, 2013),
http://www.sociallyawareblog.com/2013/12/03/potential-limitations-placed-on-unilateral-right-to-
modify-terms-of-use (noting that Facebook provides seven days notice and Twitter will notify users
of changes to its terms of service via an "@Twitter" update or through email, but only for changes
that Twitter deems to be material in its sole discretion).
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and understanding about these contract terms? Given the willingness of
courts to uphold unilateral contract amendments, it is likely that sellers
in the JOT context will continue to hold consumers to unfair, one-sided
contract terms by utilizing their ability to unilaterally amend their terms
and conditions.
2. Procedural Unconscionability
Procedural unconscionability relates to the circumstances
surrounding contract formation, including the bargaining power of the
parties, deceptive practices, unfair surprise, and contracts of adhesion.295
In addressing procedural unconscionability and the bargaining power of
the parties, courts often focus on whether the parties had a meaningful
choice, which relates to a party's ability to fully understand the contract
terms, the availability of alternative products to the purchaser, and the
ability of the purchaser to walk away from the transaction.2 96 Most form
contracts offered to consumers contain the same terms, even if offered
from different sellers.297 Thus, in today's commercial environment,
rather than having the freedom to negotiate contract terms, consumers
are free only to "choose the organization by which he will be
dominated. 298 Courts tend to find unfair surprise only where there are
"hidden provisions, unintelligible language, and surreptitious attempts to
contract out key provisions. "299
a. Seller's Knowledge and Increased Information Asymmetry
Contract law, including the UCC, assumes that parties either freely
enter into contracts or bargain for contract terms with all pertinent
information available equally to the parties.300 Information asymmetry
295. See M. Neil Browne & Lauren Biksacky, Unconscionability and the Contingent
Assumptions of Contract Theory, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REv. 211, 222-23.
296. Bowlin's, Inc. v. Ramsey Oil Co., 662 P.2d 661, 669 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (citing
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)); see In re
Friedman, 407 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1008 (App. Div. 1978); Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores 972 P.2d 395,
403-04 (Utah 1998); Deminsky v. Arlington Plastics Mach., 638 N.W.2d 331, 342-43 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2001).
297. See Rakoff, supra note 207, at 1227-29 (noting that most forms are protective of the
sellers as the drafting parties).
298. Id. at 1229.
299. Omar Anorga, Note, Music Contracts Have Musicians Playing in the Key of
Unconscionability, 24 WHITTIER L. REv. 739, 745 (2003).
300. LAURENCE KOFFMAN & ELIZABETH MACDONALD, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 4 (6th ed.
2007); see also Robert A. Hillman & Ibrahim Barakat, Warranties and Disclaimers in the
Electronic Age, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2009) (noting that "[a]n important goal of contract law
is to enforce a party's manifestation of assent to a contract made with full access to all pertinent
information and with time to contemplate the terms"). Lack of adequate information and failure to
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occurs in contracting when one party has a different level of information
available to it than the other party.3 ' Examples of information
asymmetry include the superior knowledge that sellers generally have
about their form contracts and "the contingencies under which [they]
operate."30 2 Where one party enjoys overwhelming bargaining power,
that party may impose one-sided contract terms.U3 When there is
information asymmetry in contracts, a party may enter into an agreement
without thoroughly understanding the implications or enter into a
contract with incorrect beliefs about the value exchanged between
parties. 30 4 A consumer who lacks knowledge of her rights or contract
terms is unlikely to actively negotiate contract terms or attempt to
protect her rights. Information asymmetry is exacerbated in the online
context where consumers are not able to physically view goods before
purchasing them.30 5
In assessing unconscionability, rather than evaluating the seller's
knowledge about the consumer, courts often focus on what the consumer
knew or should have known by exercising her opportunity to read before
entering into the contract. 30 6 Today, companies track Internet users' web
fully understand transactions consistently plagues other types of consumer transactions, including
mortgages. Cassandra Jones Harvard, Invisible Markets Netting Visible Results: When Sub-Prime
Lending Becomes Predatory, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 1057, 1064 (2001).
301. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 102-03 (1993)
(discussing the concept of information asymmetry); Eric H. Franklin, Mandating Precontractual
Disclosure, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 553, 561 (2013) (contending that information asymmetry is the
norm in contracting).
302. Praveen R. Nayyar, Information Asymmetries: A Source of Competitive Advantage for
Diversified Service Firms, 11 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 513, 514 (1990); see RADIN, supra note 264,
at 24.
303. See Albert Choi & George Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design,
98 VA. L. REv 1665, 1710-12, 1730 (2012) (contending that one-sided contract terms can persist,
even between sophisticated parties, where there is unequal bargaining power when the seller
engages in screening by imposing harsh contract terms or when the buyer engages in signaling).
304. Franklin, supra note 301, at 563.
305. See Gregory Lewis, Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure:
The Case of eBay Motors, 101 AM. ECON. REv. 1535, 1536 (2011) (contending "that disclosure
costs-whether caused by technology, bandwidth, or time costs-are an important determinant of
the extent to which parties can create well-defined contracts online, and therefore of the success of
online goods marketplaces").
306. At least one court has held that the seller's knowledge of the buyer's circumstances is
relevant in applying the doctrine of unconscionability and that "the meaningfulness of choice
essential to the making of a contract, can be negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power."
Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 267 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (citation omitted). The court in
Jones found unconscionability where there was a large disparity in value obtained and price paid,
the seller knowingly took advantage of the buyer, and gross inequality of bargaining power
precluded any meaningful choice and held that the very limited financial resources of a purchaser,
known to a seller at the time of a sale, is entitled to weight in the balance to determine whether an
agreement is unconscionable. Id. at 266-67.
[Vol. 44:839
CONTRACTING IN THEAGE OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS
activities via cookies and other digital tools, and companies frequently
purchase lists of consumer names, addresses, and phone numbers.30 7 The
1OT is projected to drastically increase the amount and types of data
about individual consumers that will be available to sellers,308 thereby
increasing information asymmetry in consumer contracts. Not only will
companies be able to know how many times consumers have visited
their websites, but interconnected goods will also generate a wealth of
data, such as information about a consumer's heart rate, while browsing
or purchasing goods, fingerprint, voice patterns, stress levels, and rates
of product consumption, among other things.30 9 Presumably, companies
will also have access to information about how many consumers review
conditions of use prior to purchasing goods. This increased knowledge
that is likely to become available to sellers impacts the relative
bargaining power of the parties-a factor relevant to assessing
procedural unconscionability.
Currently, the data generated by web-enabled devices can be easily
accessed and used by companies and sold to third parties, but consumers
are, in some instances, unable to access information generated about
their own behavior without a subpoena.3 1° Amazon recently bolstered its
1OT efforts by acquiring 2lemetry, a platform for tracking and managing
connected devices that complements Amazon's existing platforms,
which "analyze high-volume data streams from various sources in real
time." 311 These platforms could easily be integrated into the Dash
Button, DRS, and Echo to allow for the real time collection of consumer
generated data.31 2 Manufacturers that embed Amazon's DRS into their
products, such as Whirlpool, Brother, and Brita, could have unparalleled
access to data about how consumers use such products once the product
is in a consumer's home.3"3 Data collected by 1OT devices can provide
an "overall assessment of observations of daily living" of individual
users, as well as include health and biometric information. IOT
307. See Bryant Walker Smith, Proximity-Driven Liability, 102 GEO. L.J. 1777, 1782-83
(2014).
308. See Peppet, supra note 15, at 120-22.
309. Id. at 98-104, 114-17.
310. See Smith, supra note 307, at 1783 (describing the need for a subpoena in order for a
buyer to access records of consumer behavior from a cellular service provider, electrical utility, and
health club); Toby Wolpe, Data Privacy: You May Call It Privacy but Who Actually Owns It?,
ZDNET (June 11, 2015), http://www.zdnet.com/article/data-privacy-you-may-call-it-personal-data-
but-who-actually-owns-it (describing lack of clarity regarding who owns and can access the data
generated by smart devices).
311. Sun, supra note 65.
312. Id.
313. See id.
314. David Glance, Will the Elderly Rely on the Internet of Things to Look After Them?,
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devices will act as sensors, which monitor not only their environment
but also consumers.315 As discussed in Part III, above, companies, such
as Samsung, may even be able to record confidential consumer
conversations and use that information to their advantage.
Through the use of 1OT devices, companies such as Amazon will
be able to further market products to consumers and make product
recommendations to each consumer in real time based on the
individualized data collected from interconnected devices. 3 16 Predictive
analytics using aggregated 1OT data sets could forecast the behaviors,
patterns, and preferences of individual consumers and members of their
households and neighborhoods.317 Amazon has obtained a patent for an
anticipatory package shipping system that will analyze and predict
consumer habits and deliver goods to consumers before they place an
order.318 Companies that have access to 1OT data will be able to more
effectively shape and influence consumer behavior. There continues to
be an ongoing debate about who actually owns or should be able to
access and manipulate the data generated by 1OT devices. It is unlikely
that consumers will have equal access to the legion of information
expected to be generated by their use of 1OT devices, including
consumer data analysis reports and information garnered from the use of
predictive, descriptive, and prescriptive analytics. Thus, preexisting
information asymmetry in contracting will be exacerbated by the 1OT.
The goal of freedom of contract is likely undermined when there is large
information asymmetry between the parties.319
PHYS.ORG (Aug. 18, 2015), http://phys.org/news/2015-08-elderly-internet.html.
315. Id.
316. See Kim, supra note 1, at 311.
317. FED. TRADE COMM'N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION?, at i-v,
10 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-
understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf; see Michael Wu, Big Data Reduction 1: Descriptive
Analytics, LITHIUM (Mar. 14, 2013 1:58 PM), http://community.lithium.com/t5/Science-of-Social-
blog/Big-Data-Reduction-1-Descriptive-Analytics/ba-p/77766 (describing the use of predictive,
prescriptive, and descriptive analytics to transform big data into accessible information);
see also Michael Wu, Big Data Reduction 2: Understanding Predictive Analytics,
LITHIUM (Mar. 26, 2013, 9:41 AM), http://community.lithium.com/t5/Science-of-Social-blog/Big-
Data-Reduction-2-Understanding-Predictive-Analytics/ba-p/79616 (noting that, while predictive
analytics cannot predict the future, they could forecast future action).
318. U.S. Patent No. 8,615,473 (filed Dec. 24, 2013); Praveen Kopalle, Why Amazon's
Anticipatory Shipping Is Pure Genius, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2014, 11:34 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/onmarketing/2014/01/28/why-amazons-anticipatory-shipping-is-pure-
genius/#332584882fac.
319. Franklin, supra note 301, at 563. However, others have contended that information
asymmetry is to be expected and cannot, nor should not, be completely eradicated, as to do so
would undermine the contract system. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies
Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 626 (1983).
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b. Explanation of Contract Terms
A seller's explanation of contract terms to consumers is another
factor considered by courts in assessing unfair surprise in the
unconscionability context.3 20 In Weaver v. American Oil Co., the court
expressly noted, in assessing unconscionability, that "[t]he party seeking
to enforce such a contract has the burden of showing that the provisions
were explained to the other party and came to his knowledge and there
was in fact a real and voluntary meeting of the minds and not merely an
objective meeting. 13 21 JOT manufacturers and sellers may be able to
program IOT devices to provide explanations of terms and conditions to
consumers, as well as track how long a consumer spent reviewing the
explanations and follow up with consumers regarding their
understanding of such terms.
The home robot Jibo has the ability to remind its owner of events,
provide recipes, monitor it owner's home, read phone messages, and
take photos.322 In the future, robots such as Jibo may also be able to
provide consumers with explanations of contract terms for the purchase
of JOT devices, as well as terms for goods purchased using JOT devices.
Notwithstanding the possibilities of such developments, explanations of
contract terms after conclusion of the contract formation process may
still be problematic, particularly where consumers are not provided with
the option to return the devices or products, and where the device simply
reads to the consumer the company's online terms and conditions rather
than explaining these terms without legalese or explaining the potential
implications of the terms. Moreover, consumers may continue to ignore
contract explanations, even in the JOT context. On the other hand,
consumers' repeated willingness to ignore terms and conditions, even
where companies have provided detailed and easily understandable
contract terms prior to contracting in the JOT context, may provide a
justification for courts to uphold one-sided contract terms.
Additionally, one-sided contract provisions, such as unilateral
amendment clauses, are so common that perhaps consumers should not
320. See 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 18:9, at 66-67 (4th ed. 2010); see also Peppet, supra note 15, at 140-43 (discussing
seller's use of digital technology to explain contract terms to consumers). For case law melding
unconscionability with sellers' explanation of contract terms, see American General Financial
Services, Inc. v. Griffin, 327 F. Supp. 2d 678, 685 (N.D. Miss. 2004), and Caley v. Gulfstream
Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1377 (1lth Cir. 2005).
321. 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. 1971).
322. See Dominic Basulto, Social Robots Want to Help at Home, VALLEY NEWS (July 26,
2015), htp://www.vnews.com/specialpublications/businessxml/17859976-95/social-robots-want-to-
help-at-home.
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be unfairly surprised by the inclusion of such terms. The fact that
consumers may become accustomed to one-sided form contract terms
should not be used as a justification to encourage contractual abuse by
companies, particularly in light of the various contract doctrines
intended to ensure a minimal level of fairness in contracting. One could
also argue that a company's concern for its reputation should prevent it
from including one-sided contract terms, even if consumers do not
read contracts. This argument suggests that businesses should be
trusted to act in the best interest of consumers and themselves. Further,
if this argument held true, then today's form contracts should
not routinely consist of one-sided contract terms that strip away the
rights of consumers.
B. The Doctrine of Good Faith and Unilateral Amendment Provisions
Consumers have attempted to use the doctrine of good faith to
challenge form-contract terms with limited success. In Rodriguez v.
Instagram, LLC, the Superior Court of California held that the unilateral
amendment of contract terms by Instagram to include an arbitration
provision, among other things, did not violate the duty of good faith as
the plaintiff had the option to stop using the service.3 23 In contrast, in
Badie v. Bank of America, the California Court of Appeals held that a
bank breached the duty of good faith when it attempted to unilaterally
amend a contract to include an arbitration clause, an issue that was not
previously covered in the original contract.3 24 Federal courts, as well as
the Rodriguez court, have routinely distinguished the holding in Badie
where there is an option to opt out of the contract before the terms take
effect, and have consistently upheld unilateral contract amendments on
those grounds.325
The rationale used by courts to distinguish Badie from other
unilateral amendment cases is rooted in the same rationale used to
uphold browsewrap contracts-consumers have consented to amended
terms by continuing to use the seller's website.3 26 In the JOT context,
where the consumer continues to permit an JOT device to use DRS to
order products after an amendment to the terms of use, a consumer's
breach of the duty of good faith claim may be unsuccessful.
323. Rodriguez v. Instagram, LLC, No. CGC-13-532875, 2014 WL 895438 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Feb. 28, 2014).
324. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 290-91 (Ct. App. 1998).
325. Ackerbergv. Citicorp USA, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Cayanan
v. Citi Holdings, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 2013).
326. See Ackerberg, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (noting that plaintiff continued to use the credit
card after being provided with the amended terms).
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C. Section 211(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
Section 211(3) of the Contracts Restatement, provides that
"[w]here the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting
such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a
particular term, the term is not part of the agreement. 3 27 This rule is
closely related to the Contracts Restatement's policy against
unconscionable contract terms, as well as the objective theory of
contracts, which encourages the enforcement of the reasonable
expectations of the parties. 3 28 The reasonable expectations doctrine of
section 211(3) was rejected by drafters of the proposed revisions to
Article 2, the UCITA, and the proposed Article 2B of the UCC. 3 29 Courts
addressing unconscionability have, in some instances, relied on the rule
from section 211(3) to assess the validity of contracts of adhesion, while
other courts have expressly rejected the reasonable expectations
doctrine.330 Although section 211(3) is distinct from the reasonable
expectations doctrine as applied in the insurance context, two of the four
examples given in the Contracts Restatement applying section 211(3)
involve insurance disputes.33
327. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). The comments
to section 211(3) suggest that where a party was not provided with an opportunity to review a
contested term, the term is oppressive, or the terms are hidden from view, the reasonable
expectations doctrine should apply to prevent application of such terms. See id. § 211 cmt. f.
328. See id.; Barnes, supra note 277, at 231.
329. Barnes, supra note 277, at 231-32.
330. See Lowey v. Watt, 684 F.2d 957, 970-71 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (discussing section 211(3) in
connection with the parole evidence rule and contract interpretation). Compare Berkson v. Gogo
LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (relying on the reasonable expectation rle of
section 211(3) in considering the unconscionability of an agreement), and Broemmer v. Abortion
Servs. of Phx., Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Ariz. 1992) (explaining that "[t]o determine whether [a]
contract of adhesion is enforceable, [the court will] look to two factors: the reasonable expectations
of the adhering party and whether the contract is unconscionable"), with Wallace v. Balint, 761
N.E.2d 598, 606 (Ohio 2002) (noting that "there is not yet a majority on this court willing to accept
the reasonable-expectations doctrine").
331. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f, illus. 5-8; see also Barnes,
supra note 277, at 251-52 (explaining how the language in section 211(3) differs from the
reasonable expectations doctrine). The reasonable expectations doctrine, in the insurance context,
provides that "[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries
regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the
policy provisions would have negated those expectations." Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights
at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970). Most cases applying the
reasonable expectations doctrine involve the standardized forms used in the insurance industry,
rather than disputes about standardized forms used in the sale of goods and non-insurance services.
See, e.g., Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., No. CV-12-01237, 2013 WL 4759257, at *5
(D. Ariz. Sept. 4, 2013) (applying the reasonable expectations doctrine in considering the
enforceability of terms of a rental insurance agreement); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bogart,
717 P.2d 449, 454-57 (Ariz. 1986) (applying the reasonable expectation doctrine in striking down
ambiguity in an automobile insurance policy); Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters
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Section 211 acknowledges that consumers are unlikely to read
contract terms, but does not allow consumers to avoid contractual
liability based solely on their failure to read or inability to understand
the contract terms.332 However, section 211(3) is intended to restrict the
ability of sellers to engage in contractual abuse by using one-sided
contract terms that the consumer would not expect to be included in the
contract.333 Section 211(3) has been critiqued on the grounds that it only
protects consumers where a merchant is likely to have advanced
knowledge that the consumer may find the term objectionable.3 34
Nevertheless, section 211(3) could be particularly useful in protecting
consumers in the 1OT context where sellers will have increased access to
detailed, and perhaps even confidential, information about individual
consumers. A company that has access to the data and information
generated by 1OT devices may have reason to believe that one or more
contract terms would be objectionable to a particular consumer had she
been aware of the term.
The usefulness of section 211(3) to consumers in the 1OT context
will depend on courts' willingness to apply the rule to transactions
involving the sale of goods; the ability of consumers to submit sufficient
evidence to prove that the merchant had reason to know that the term
was objectionable; and, whether courts will interpret section 211(3) in a
manner that considers not only the objective knowledge of merchants
but also a merchant's subjective knowledge of an individual consumer,
rather than focusing solely on the reasonable expectations of an average
consumer.335 The average consumer may be so accustomed to unilateral
amendment, class action waiver, arbitration, and choice of forum clauses
that limiting section 211(3)'s applicability to the reasonable expectations
of an average consumer may not provide much help to consumers who
Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 392, 396-97 (Ariz. 1984) (adopting the reasonable expectation doctrine
when considering whether to enforce certain provisions of an insurance policy where the insured
failed to read its terms); Tuckerv. Scottsdale Indem. Co., No. CA-CV 09-0732, 2010 WL 5313753,
at *4-6 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2010) (applying the reasonable expectations principles of section
211 in consideration of the validity of an assault and battery exclusion contained in an insurance
policy); see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REv. 1151, 1152-55 (1981) (discussing the
variety of instances in which courts have relied upon the reasonable expectations doctrine in the
insurance context).
332. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b.
333. Barnes, supra note 277, at 249, 263.
334. See W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts
Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REv. 21, 62 (1984).
335. Scholars have critiqued some courts' application of section 211(3) for ignoring the
merchants' expectations and knowledge of the consumer and focusing on the expectations of the
average or reasonable consumer. See James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 315, 346-47 (1997).
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seek to avoid the operation of such clauses. One could argue that since
consumers assume they have a right to judicial process that cannot be
contracted away, the average consumer would not expect such
provisions to be included in a contract or upheld by a court. However, as
discussed in Part VI below, Supreme Court decisions on arbitration
provisions may limit the ability of courts to use contract law doctrine to
protect consumers.
D. Fraudulent and Material Misrepresentation and Mistake
The UETA notes that the avoidance defenses of misrepresentation,
fraud, and mistake can be used by courts to police bad conduct in e-
commerce. 336 Similarly, the UCITA provides that courts may negate
contract formation by electronic agents when there is electronic mistake
or fraud.337 Although the term "electronic mistake" is not defined in the
UCITA, the comments suggest that electronic mistake and fraud in the e-
commerce context are analogous to the common law doctrines of fraud
and mistake.338 Section 1-103 of the UCC provides that the contract
defenses of mistake, misrepresentation, and fraud are also applicable to
transactions subject to the UCC, unless they have been specifically
displaced by a provision in the UCC.33 9
Where there is a unilateral mistake by one party to the contract, the
mistaken party cannot escape its obligations under the contract unless
the contract is unconscionable or the non-mistaken party had reason to
know of the mistake or caused the mistake. 340 With respect to mutual
mistake, the Contracts Restatement authorizes avoidance of a contract
by the adversely affected party or reformation where there has been a
mistake by both parties at the time of contracting about a "basic
assumption on which the contract was made," which has a "material
effect on the agreed exchange of performances. '341 However, avoidance
336. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3 legis. note 4, 7A pt. 1 UL.A. 239 (2002); see also id. § 9
cmt. 2, at 261 (explaining that an electric signature is attributable to a person unless that person
establishes fraud or forgery).
337. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 206(a) (amended 2002), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A.
305 (2009).
338. See id. § 206 cmt. 3, at 306; see also Ian R. Kerr, Spirits in the Material World: Intelligent
Agents as Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce, 22 DALHOUSLE L.J., no. 2, 1999, at 190, 231
(contending that UCITA does not define electronic mistake).
339. U.C.C. § 1-103 (AM. LAW INST. &UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2001). Section 2-721 of the UCC
provides that the remedies available for fraudulent or material misrepresentation are also available
for non-fraudulent breach. Id. § 2-721.
340. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
341. Id. § 152(1). A mistake is "a belief that is not in accord with the facts." Id. § 151. The
parol evidence rule does not preclude the use of prior or contemporaneous agreements or
negotiations to establish that the parties were mistaken. See id. §§ 214(d), 152 cmt. a. In order to
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is not permitted when the adversely affected party bears the risk of
mutual or unilateral mistake.342 A party bears the risk of mistake if she
expressly agrees to assume the risk by contract, enters into a contract
with the awareness that she has limited knowledge about the facts
related to the mistake but treats such knowledge as sufficient, or the
court allocates the risk to her where it is reasonable to do so under the
circumstances.343 The UCITA also allows the parties to freely allocate
between themselves, in advance, which party should bear the risk of
fraud or mistake.3 44
Suppose a consumer purchases an 1OT washing machine that has
the ability to order Tide high-efficiency detergent, and the device
routinely places online orders with a specific seller for that detergent.
Assume the seller uses a computer program to generate product
descriptions; however, the manufacturer changes the formula for the
detergent unexpectedly, and the consumer and the seller both discover
this change after the consumer receives the detergent with the new
formula. The consumer would like to return the product for a refund,
perhaps because the consumer is allergic to an ingredient in the new
formula, but the consumer has already used the detergent to do a load of
laundry, and the seller's return policy prevents returns of used goods.
Both the seller and the buyer, via its electronic agent, have
contracted for the sale of a specific detergent, but both are unaware of
the change in the product and, thus, have made a faulty assumption
about a core aspect of the contract and the basis of the bargain.345
This error is material as "[t]his mistake went to the essence of
the enforcement of legal obligations and was, therefore, significantly
material to the contract.13 46 However, where a party elects to use an
electronic agent to conclude a transaction, the party does so
under the assumption that the actions of the electronic agent will
be binding without first having an opportunity to review the terms
of the contract.3 47 The party electing to use the electronic agent could
establish materiality, a party must show that "the resulting imbalance in the agreed exchange is so
severe that he cannot fairly be required to carry it out." Id. § 152 cmt. c. Market conditions and
financial ability do not constitute mistake. Id. § 152 cmt. b.
342. Id. § 153.
343. Id. § 154.
344. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 206 cmt. 3 (amended 2002), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A.
306 (2009).
345. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Portlight, Inc., 188 F.3d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that a
basic assumption "relates to the basis of the bargain").
346. Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'nv. Wolf, 553 S.W.2d 800, 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); see also
Reliance Fin. Corp. v. Miller, 557 F.2d 674, 680 (9th Cir. 1977) (distinguishing the concepts of
materiality and essence).
347. See Daniel, supra note 14, at 343.
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be deemed to have been aware it would have limited knowledge about
facts surrounding the transaction, including the actual product
description and, thus, bears the risk of mistake.348 One could also argue
that the consumer should be aware that manufacturers routinely change
the formula for their products.
The limited consumer protection provisions under the UCITA for
electronic errors are unlikely to protect a consumer where a similar type
of error occurs in a computer information transaction, as those
provisions are only applicable to electronic messages, automated
transactions, and where the consumer has not used or received any
benefit from the messages.349 Consumers may not fully understand or
appreciate the risks of contracting with electronic agents.35 ° As new JOT
devices, including those with artificial intelligence, are released,
consumer knowledge and understanding of the abilities and implications
of the use of JOT devices as electronic agents may vary. Although most
consumers are purchasing smart devices, such as web-enabled
refrigerators and watches, they have limited knowledge about the JOT
and the capabilities of JOT devices.35 ' Consumers are unaware that the
smart devices that they purchase are connected to other devices that can
communicate with each other and send data back to manufacturers and
retailers.352 The potential conflicts of interest posed by consumers using
JOT devices as contracting electronic agents, as discussed in Part III,
above, further complicate arguments regarding consumer responsibility
for the risk of mistake in JOT Contracts.353
In the previous example, the source of the mistake is not the
electronic agent, but rather the seller and the manufacturer. As noted in
Parts III and IV, viruses, malfunction errors, and security breaches may
plague JOT devices.354 If the electronic agent malfunctions and
348. Kis, supra note 14, at 56-57; see also Ayer v. W. Union Tel. Co., 10 A. 495, 497 (Me.
1887) (placing the risk of mistake on the party electing to use a telegraph to communicate).
349. See UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 213 cmt. 4 (amended 2002), 7A pt. 2
U.L.A. 325 (2009). Under the UCITA, an automated transaction "means a transaction in which a
contract is formed in whole or part by electronic actions of one or both parties which are not
previously reviewed by an individual in the ordinary course." Id. § 102(7), at 212. The UETA
contains similar provisions to address electronic error. See UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 10,
7A pt. 1 U.L.A. 263 (2002).
350. Lerouge, supra note 14, at 430.
351. David Roe, Say What? Most Consumers Clueless About the Internet of Things, CMS
WIRE (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.cmswire.com/cms/internet-of-things/say-what-most-consumers-
clueless-about-the-internet-of-things-026294.php (noting that a survey of 2000 consumers by
Acquity Group found that 87% of consumers do not know about the JOT).
352. Id.
353. See supra Part I1.A.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30, 144-45, 264-67.
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erroneously orders the wrong product, a consumer may not be able to
escape contract performance where the seller does not have a generous
return policy. Such a mistake by an IOT device acting as an electronic
agent is likely a unilateral mistake, and unless the contract is
unconscionable or the seller has reason to know of or caused the
mistake, the contract cannot be avoided. Although a seller should be
charged with knowledge of the product descriptions it provides to
consumers, one could also argue that a consumer assumes the risk that
the web-enabled IOT device could contract a virus in the same way that
computers routinely contract viruses. If an IOT device is infected with a
virus or malfunctions due to no fault of the consumer, it is unfair to
consumers to assume that they have elected to bear the risk of mistake.
In the original hypothetical posed above,355 the defense of
misrepresentation may also be applicable. This defense may be used to
void a contract where a party was induced to enter into the contract by
fraud or material misrepresentation caused by the other party, together
with justifiable reliance on such misrepresentation.3 56 The seller of the
detergent may have advertised the detergent as containing the original
formula rather than the new formula; therefore, the assertion that was
made by the seller about the product was not in accord with the facts.3 57
With respect to fraudulent misrepresentation, the seller must have had
the intent to deceive and induce the buyer, which may not be present if
the seller is unaware of the change in the formula, perhaps because the
manufacturer failed to provide public information on its updated
formula.35 8 The seller may be negligent in providing an inaccurate
product description and may be liable for damages due to a breach of
warranty. To the extent that the seller is aware of the new
formula but fails to disclose this information, the consumer may be
355. See supra text accompanying notes 344-46, 353-54.
356. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Some courts
have found that the party seeking to use the defense of misrepresentation may not need to prove
harm. See id. § 165 cmt a. However, under the Contracts Restatement, the mistaken party may be
barred from using the defense of misrepresentation where a third party is the source of the material
or fraudulent misrepresentation, and the non-mistaken party gave value in good faith and did not
have reason to know of the misrepresentation. Id. § 164(2). The UCC contains similar rules
regarding innocent parties. U.C.C. §§ 2-403(1), 3-305(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N
2002). Article 2 also provides remedies for material misrepresentation or fraud. Id. § 2-721.
357. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159. Such a seller may also be subject to
liability under false advertising statutes.
358. Id. § 162(1). Fraud occurs where a party intends his misrepresentation to induce the non-
fraudulent party to manifest assent and the party (a) knows or believes that the assertion is not in
accord with the facts; (b) does not have the confidence that he states or implies in the truth of the
assertion; or (c) knows that he does not have the basis that he states or implies for the assertion, and
the non-fraudulent party justifiable relies. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162, 164.
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able to rescind the contract where the misrepresentation is material. 359
Non-disclosure typically results in liability only where there is a
fiduciary or confidential relationship between the parties or where
the misrepresenting party has superior information that cannot be
easily discovered by the non-misrepresenting party. 360 It is unlikely that
sellers and consumers will be viewed as having a fiduciary or
confidential relationship.
However, material misrepresentation can be proven by showing
that a reasonable recipient would have been induced to make the
contract, or that the maker knew for some special reason that the
misrepresentation was likely to induce that particular party. 36' Given the
wealth of information that will become available to companies about
consumers via IOT devices, it is likely that companies may have specific
knowledge about the special circumstances of an individual consumer,
which could help to prove material misrepresentation. This assumes that
consumers would be able to obtain proof of the company's knowledge of
their special circumstances, and it also assumes that the manufacturer's
knowledge about the consumer has been shared with the retailer.
Further, to use the defense of misrepresentation, a party must prove
that they were justified in relying on the misrepresentation.362 Courts,
generally, require that the adversely affected party prove that she
engaged in some type of due diligence.363 Some courts have also used
the duty to read to deny application of the defense of
misrepresentation. 364 A consumer who has relied on a misrepresentation
while neglecting to read the writing may not be viewed as justifiably
relying on the misrepresentation. However, a reasonable consumer, as
well as a reasonable electronic agent, may have been induced into
relying on the product description provided by the seller.365 One could
359. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.11, at 239-42 (4th ed. 2004).
360. Id.
361. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(2).
362. Id. § 164.
363. See Brown v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 817, 833-34 (Ct. App. 2008)
(noting that where the adversely affected party had reasonable opportunity to discover the truth, the
contract cannot be voided); Mims v. Cooper, 46 S.E.2d 909, 910-11 (Ga. 1948) (nothing that the
adversely affected party must exercise ordinary diligence in an effort to discover the fraud); Taggart
v. Claxton, 318 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that the adversely affected party must
prove that he exercised due care to discover the fraud); Stephanie R. Hoffer, Misrepresentation: The
Restatement's Second Mistake, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 132-33 (2014) (noting that most courts
require the adversely affected party to investigate the trth of the counterparty's assertion).
364. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Schroeder, 84 N.W. 14, 14 (Wis. 1900) (noting that "clear neglect
in signing the contract without ascertaining its contents" will prevent avoidance of the contract). But
see FARNSWORTH, supra note 359, at 248 (suggesting that the trend is in the opposite direction
particularly where "some artifice was used to prevent the recipient from reading the writing").
365. See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
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contend that it is questionable for a consumer to rely exclusively on an
IOT device to review contract terms and product descriptions on its
behalf and that the consumer should perform her own due diligence prior
to using an electronic agent to purchase products.
Now, suppose the manufacturer of the IOT device experiences a
security breach and the data collected by the IOT device becomes
available to fraudsters, who are then able to hack into the JOT device
and place orders with sellers for consumable supplies using an innocent
consumer's JOT device, and that the orders are shipped to various third
parties or the consumer. Neither the consumer nor the electronic agent,
assuming that it possesses artificial intelligence, had the necessary intent
or knowledge to defraud the seller.366 Rather, a third party used the
electronic agent to facilitate fraud to the detriment of the consumer and
the seller. Of course, the potential for exposure to criminal liability may
serve as a deterrent to fraudsters.367 Recent reports suggest that even the
Dash Button is susceptible to hacking.368
Manufacturers of JOT devices are better prepared to bear the risks
and costs associated with this type of fraud in the IOT context. The
breach of the manufacturer's database led to the fraud, which, perhaps,
indicates that it should bear some contractual responsibility.36 9 IOT
366. See supra notes 356-58 and accompanying text.
367. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012) (prohibiting unauthorized access to computers and
networks). While there are a number of federal and state anti-hacking statutes, computer hacking
continues to occur despite the adoption of these statutes. Cyber criminal attacks on industrial control
systems, which are now part of the IOT, are increasing. See Alasdair Gilchrist, Cyber Attacks on
Industrial Internet of Things Are on the Rise, BETANEWS, http://betanews.com/2016/01/18/cyber-
attacks-on-industrial-internet-of-things-are-on-the-rise (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
368. Ted Benson, How I Hacked Amazon's $5 WiFi Button to Track Baby Data, MEDIUM
(Aug. 10, 2015), https://medium.com/edwardbenson/how-i-hacked-amazon-s-5-wifi-button-to-
track-baby-data-794214b0bdd8#.tw2mjit6l; see Mark Gibbs, Hacking the Dash Button, NETWORK
WORLD (Oct. 10, 2015, 6:21 PM) http://www.networkworld.com/article/2991411/internet-of-
things/hacking-amazons-dash-button.html; Rich McCormick, Hacked Amazon Dash Button is the
Fastest Way to get Pizza Delivered to Your Mouth, VERGE (Sept. 28, 2015),
http://www.theverge.com/2015/9/28/9407669/amazon-dash-button-hack-pizza.
369. The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has attempted to hold companies liable for
failing to adequately protect consumers' personal information in accordance with the privacy and
data security promises made by such companies. See FTC Files Complaint Against Wyndham
Hotels For Failure to Protect Consumers' Personal Information, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (June
26, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/06/ftc-files-complaint-against-
wyndham-hotels-failure-protect. For instance, the FTC filed a complaint against Wyndham Hotels
and Resorts contending that the company's failure to protect consumers' personal information led to
substantial injury, was unfair and deceptive, and violated the Federal Trade Commission Act. Id.
Other federal statutes may also impose liability for intercepting or disclosing consumer data. For
instance, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act provides a private cause of action for
individuals whose communications and records have been intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally
used in violation of law. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2520, 2707(a) (2012). Similarly, the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act prohibits unauthorized access to computers and networks. 18 U.S.C. § 1030. However,
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device manufacturers, such as Samsung, have placed consumers on
notice that information provided via JOT devices will be collected.3 70
One could posit that, given the frequency with which companies have
been subject to security breaches, consumers who elect to use JOT
devices should be aware of the potential data security risks of using
them. On the other hand, in light of the risks of data breaches that may
plague JOT devices and other electronic agents, the seller's reliance on
orders placed by the JOT device may not be reasonable.
The foregoing discussion illustrates that, while the UCITA and the
UETA expressly permit, and the UCC authorizes, application of the
contract defenses of mistake and misrepresentation to contracts
formed through the use of JOT devices, application of these avoidance
doctrines in the JOT setting may not lead to clear, consistent, or
consumer-friendly results.371
VI. PROPOSALS
As discussed in Parts IV and V above, new technological advances
in the JOT, such as Amazon's DRS, worsen preexisting levels of
information asymmetry and Contract Distancing in consumer contracts,
thereby hindering a true meeting of the minds.372 All of this incentivizes
consumers to fail to read and understand contract terms. A coordinated
approach involving courts, legislative bodies, and state and federal
agencies is necessary to effectively address the concerns highlighted
in this Article. This Part proposes important amendments to the UCC
and calls for a nuanced approach to the application of agency and
contract law principles by courts to JOT consumer contracts that
considers the rapidly increasing levels of information asymmetry and
373Contract Distancing.
Although courts should play a crucial role in ensuring that
consumers are adequately protected in JOT Contracts, it is unlikely that
courts will routinely have the opportunity to do so as consumer access to
courts is limited by the class action waiver and arbitration provisions in
companies have, in some instances, opposed legislative attempts to promote cyber security.
Tim Starks, Automakers Fight Car Hacking Bill Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Takes
Some Blows, POLITICO (Aug. 27, 2015, 10:02 AM), http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-
cybersecurity/2015/08/automakers-fight-car-hacking-bill-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-takes-
some-blows-019811.
370. See Matyszczyk, supra note 123.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 336-70.
372. See supra Parts IV-V.
373. See infra notes 374-425 and accompanying text.
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form contracts, which have been upheld by the Supreme Court.374
Moreover, even if a consumer contract does not contain an arbitration
provision, the individual claim of a consumer could be so small that an
attorney may not be willing to take on such a case, or a consumer may
not be willing to file a claim against a company. Ultimately, a legislative
solution from Congress may be necessary. Federal agencies such as the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") must also take an active role in policing
companies and protecting consumers in IOT Contracts.
The provisions of Article 2 stand in stark contrast to consumer
protection standards adopted in other countries.3 75 The UCC was drafted
in an era when bilateral contracts negotiated in person between
individuals were the norm.376 This is no longer the case.377 With the
dawn of the 1OT, individual consumers will no longer be the primary
actors in contracting. IOT robotic devices will enter into contracts for
consumable goods on behalf of consumers. Courts' current standards for
assessing consumer assent to electronic contracts cannot adequately
protect consumers in this new era.
There have been previous failed attempts to amend the UCC to
include consumer protection provisions.3 78 The time is ripe for courts to
adjust their application of contract and agency principles, as well as for
the ULC and the ALI to consider amendments to Article 2 to address
consumer contracting. This Part proposes six amendments to Article 2
and encourages courts to reevaluate existing contract and agency law
principles.3 79 The amendments proposed and the issues raised in
this Article should also be considered by the ALI when drafting the
proposed Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts ("Consumer
374. See infra note 416 and accompanying text.
375. See Jennifer S. Martin, An Emerging Worldwide Standard for Protections of Consumers
in the Sale of Goods: Did We Miss an Opportunity With Revised UCC Article 2, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J.
223, 238-58, 266-68 (2006) (comparing Article 2 to consumer protection provisions in the European
Union ("EU"), Eastern Europe, China, Japan, and India, and arguing that Article 2 inadequately
protects consumers); Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum Standards for
Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041, 1071-73 (2005) (contending that the EU
approach to consumer contracts and the "Stop Before You Click Principles" are better alternatives
for assessing unconscionability).
376. See Martin, supra note 375, at 226-27.
377. See discussion supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
378. See Martin, supra note 375, at 226-27. These amendments, which were ultimately
withdrawn, contained meager attempts to address consumer protection issues. For instance,
revised section 2-316 would have imposed additional requirements to disclaim implied warranties
in consumer contracts, and revised section 2-710 would have expressly prohibited sellers
from obtaining consequential damages from consumers in consumer contracts. Id. at 231-32,
238 & a 106.
379. See infra notes 383-425 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 44:839
CONTRACTING IN THEAGE OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS
Restatement"), a project aimed at clarifying the treatment of consumer
contracts.38 ° The new lOT contracting environment and its implications
for consumers must be evaluated by the ALl and addressed in the
Consumer Restatement.
Given the tedious and lengthy process for amending the UCC and
previous failed attempts to revise Article 2 to address consumer
contracting, a private ordering approach to remedy the problems
addressed in this Article may be preferable. One could envision a world
in which lOT companies voluntarily adopt consumer-friendly data
protection standards and eliminate the use of contract terms that are
detrimental to the ability of consumers to seek legal redress. Industries
that have adopted a self-regulatory approach to addressing consumer
privacy concerns include the mobile -marketing industry and the
automaker industry.38 ' In the absence of a timely and effective private
ordering solution, the need for the amendments discussed below
becomes even more pressing.382
A. Defining Consumer Transactions
First, rather than section 2-103(3) merely referencing the
application of the definition of consumer goods contained in Article 9,
Article 2 should be amended to include specific and clear definitions of
consumer transactions and consumer contracts. The drafters of the UCC
have acknowledged the uniqueness of consumer transactions in other
sections of the UCC.383 Article 9 of the UCC currently contains a
definition for consumer transactions and consumer-goods transactions,
and has special rules for these transactions.384 Thus, there is no reason
that Article 2 should not be amended to more specifically address the
sale and purchase of goods by consumers. The definitions of consumer
transactions and consumer goods contained in Article 9 focus on
whether the obligation was incurred or goods were bought or used,
380. The Restatement of Law of Consumer Contracts was proposed by the ALI in 2012, and a
revised draft of the Restatement will be presented to the ALI Council in October 2016. Restatement
of the Law, Consumer Contracts, ALI, https://www.ali.org/projects/show/consumer-contracts (last
visited Apr. 10, 2016).
381. Jay Cline, A Privacy Standard for Internet of Things Suppliers, COMPUTER WORLD (Dec.
1, 2015), http://www.computerworld.com/article/30 10626/internet-of-things/a-privacy-standard-for-
internet-of-things-suppliers.html (describing the mobile marketing industry's mobile application
privacy policy framework and the automaker industry's consumer privacy protection principles for
vehicle technologies and services).
382. See infra notes 383-425 and accompanying text.
383. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015) (describing the
scope of Article 9).
384. Id. §§ 9-102(23)-(26), 9-620(g), 9-614.
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primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.38 5 Section 2-103
should be amended to more specifically define terms related to
consumer transactions and Article 9 should serve as the model for
these revisions.386
B. Amending Section 2-206's Contract Formation Rules to Account
for Increasing Levels of Information Asymmetry and
Contract Distancing
Increased information asymmetry in IOT Contracts and companies'
increased knowledge about individual consumers provides a strong
justification to rework the application of contract formation rules in the
IOT consumer setting. Section 2-206 should be amended to provide that
traditional views of assent, which rely solely on restrictive notions of
constructive notice and an opportunity to read, are inadequate for
consumer contracting in the age of the 1OT.387 This section should
require courts to evaluate the level of Contract Distancing and
information asymmetry, which favors companies, when determining
whether a consumer has consented to a company's terms and conditions.
IOT technology facilitates an environment in which automatic and
interface-free contracting is the norm.38 8 The very nature of the IOT
devices manufactured by companies encourages consumers to shop for
goods without reviewing contract terms. As noted in Part IV, although
contract terms are provided upon activating Amazon's Dash Button,
consumers are not provided with contract terms before clicking the Dash
385. Id.
386. The withdrawn 2003 amendments to Article 2 of the UCC contained a definition of
consumer contracts and consumers which was similar to the consumer related definitions found in
Article 9. In the proposed amendment, section 2-103(1)(d) defines "consumer" as "an individual
who buys or contracts to buy goods that, at the time of contracting, are intended by the individual to
be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(d) (withdrawn
2003). "Consumer contract" is defined as a "contract between a merchant seller and a consumer."
Id. § 2-103(1)(e) (withdrawn 2003 revision). The definition of consumer contract should be
included in Article 2.
387. Using an objective theoy of contract formation may also be insufficient to protect
consumers in IOT contracts. This theory evaluates whether the person to whom a manifestation is
made is justified in viewing the opposing party's actions as assent and whether a reasonable person
in the opposing party's position should know that her actions would be viewed as assenting to
contract terms. See Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding
that a Spanish-speaking employee who signed an English-language employment agreement was
bound by the arbitration clause therein because the employee had not alleged fraud or
misrepresentation and that it was the employee's duty to ensure that he understood the agreement
before signing it). An objective theory of contract formation fails to effectively consider whether a
consumer truly assented to contract terms, and it may not adequately take into consideration the
increased levels of contract distancing and information asymmetry.
388. See supra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
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Button to place subsequent orders.3"9 Rather, the Dash Button and other
JOT devices were created to incentivize consumers to purchase goods
without having to continually access Amazon's website or the Amazon
application, which contains the company's terms and conditions, before
each subsequent purchase.39° In the JOT context, consumer assent to
contract terms should be assessed by looking at the level of Contract
Distancing and information asymmetry. The higher the level of Contract
Distancing and information asymmetry, the less likely it should be that
the consumer is bound to unfair contract terms.
To assess the level of Contract Distancing, courts should consider
the following: (1) the type of JOT device used by the consumer (for
instance, contracting via a Dash Button is different from contracting via
Amazon's DRS, as discussed in Part II of this Article); (2) the type of
consumer form contract at issue, such as browsewrap, clickwrap, or
sign-in wrap contracts; (3) the individual consumer's understanding of
the contract terms, particularly in cases where JOT data has been used to
target vulnerable consumers, low income individuals, and underserved
communities for contracting; and (4) the method of notice used by the
manufacturer or retailer to provide notice of contract terms to the
consumer prior to contracting. As discussed in Part V above, JOT
devices, such as the Jibo home robot, may be able to explain contract
terms to consumers prior to each successive purchase by an JOT
device.39' Amazon's Echo may also have the ability to read contract
terms to consumers. Consumers should not be deemed to have assented
to contract terms based solely on the fact that they have either continued
to allow the JOT device to place orders or continued to use the
company's goods. Courts should be wary of automatically finding
mutual assent where parties attach drastically different meanings to
contract terms, such as where consumers believe that their right to access
the judicial system cannot be varied by contract. A consumer's
understanding of contract terms at the time of contracting may be
difficult to assess or prove. However, where vulnerable consumers are
targeted for contracting by companies using JOT data, consumers should
not continue to be bound to contracts where it is clear that they failed to
fully understand the contract's terms and implications.
Further, it may be time to expressly limit the application of the duty
to read in the consumer setting as it is often detrimental to consumer
claims. In the JOT setting, a company's privacy policy and adherence to
389. See supra text accompanying notes 226-53.
390. See supra text accompanying notes 226-53.
391. Seesupra Part V.B.
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its provisions are particularly important given the amounts and types of
data that can be collected from a consumer's use of IOT devices.
Consider that a company's disclosure of consumer data in violation of its
published privacy policy may not give rise to a breach of contract claim,
as some courts have held that privacy policies are simply broad
statements of company policy rather than enforceable agreements. 2
Other courts require that the party alleging a breach have read the policy
and relied on its provisions before contracting in order for the policy to
constitute a contract.393 Thus, in the privacy context, a consumer's
failure to read a privacy policy prior to contracting may prevent the
consumer from bringing an action for breach of contract where the
company violates the privacy policy, but the consumer is unable to use
her failure to read a company's conditions of use as grounds for
preventing enforcement of the company's terms and conditions.
With respect to information asymmetry, courts should evaluate the
following factors: (1) the extent to which consumers have access to and
ownership of their JOT data; (2) whether the consumer has the ability to
opt-out of or opt-in to having their JOT data disclosed to the
manufacturer and other third parties without impacting their ability to
use the JOT device; (3) the amount and types of data that the retailer and
manufacturer have collected from the consumer based on the consumer's
use of JOT devices; and (4) the manufacturer and merchant's compliance
with the FTC's JOT best practices, which includes data minimization
and the use of measures to keep unauthorized users from accessing a
consumer's device, data, and personal information. If a consumer is
required to transfer title of her data to the manufacturer or retailer to use
all of the features of the device, has no ability to limit the types and
amount of data that can be collected or request that her data be deleted,
or is required to opt-out of having her data disclosed and collected,
rather than actively opt-in, then the consumer should be less likely to be
deemed to have consented to contract terms that are detrimental to her
ability to seek legal redress. The more data the manufacturer and retailer
are able to aggregate about the consumer and her preferences, the higher
the level of information asymmetry. In the event of a dispute with the
consumer, manufacturers and retailers should be required to disclose this
392. See, e.g., Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199-200 (D.N.D. 2004)
(holding that a lawsuit alleging disclosure of consumer information in violation of a company's
stated privacy policy did not give rise to a claim for breach of contract).
393. Id.; see also Meyer v. Christie, 2007 WL 3120695, at *5-6 (D. Kan. Oct. 24, 2007)
(noting that a privacy policy can constitute a contract where the party alleging a breach of the
company's privacy policy read and relied on the policy before contracting with the company).
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information to the consumer.39 4 Adherence to other lOT regulation that
may be issued by federal and state agencies should also be considered.
C. Prohibiting Post-Contract Formation Disclosure of Contract Terms
Section 2-204 of the UCC, which addresses contract formation,
should be amended to expressly prohibit post-contract formation
disclosure of terms in consumer transactions. In no event should contract
terms be disclosed to consumers after they have purchased goods. The
inclusion of such a provision would prevent merchants from surprising
consumers with contract terms after buying goods. Enforcing contracts
in which the terms are disclosed after contract formation is also
problematic, particularly where the seller does not have a generous
return policy. Such an amendment would also prohibit the post-contract
disclosure of terms by email and would signal to sellers that the holding
in Starkey is not applicable to Article 2 consumer transactions.
Courts should be wary of enforcing contracts where terms are
disclosed via email. Disclosure of terms and conditions via email may
not provide adequate notice to consumers. Even if a notice of contract
terms email is provided to consumers before contract formation, it does
not mean that the consumer has reviewed the email or has clicked on the
hyperlinked contract terms contained in the email. There are many
potential reasons that may explain a consumer's failure to read emailed
contract terms. Emails may end up in a spam folder, or delivery of the
email could be delayed or blocked due to server issues beyond the
consumer's control that may decrease the likelihood that a consumer will
view the terms. In an interface-free contracting environment in which
companies routinely rely on emails to provide contract terms before
contract formation, consumers may become overwhelmed with the
volume of such emails, which may decrease the probability that
consumers will have adequate notice of such terms.
D. Restricting the Use of Unilateral Amendment Provisions
Under Section 2-209
The provisions of section 2-209, which address contract
amendments, should be revised to prohibit the use of unilateral
amendment provisions in consumer contracts where the use of such
provisions would permit amendments that are detrimental to consumer
394. See FTC Report on Internet of Things Urges Companies to Adopt Best
Practices to Address Consumer Privacy and Security Risks, FED. TRADE COMMISSION
(Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/01/ftc-report-internet-things-
urges-companies-adopt-best-practices.
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rights under the contract.395 Consumers should not be deemed to
automatically agree to revised terms simply because they consented to a
unilateral amendment provision upon activating an IOT device or simply
because they have continued to permit the IOT device to order products
on their behalf Further, consumers should not bear the burden of
conducting investigations and routinely checking a company's website
to determine if the terms and conditions have been amended.
An example of a prohibited unilateral amendment could include a
revision that removes a small claims court option or that decreases the
length of time that a consumer has to bring a claim. Similarly, unilateral
amendments that impact the way consumers assent to contract terms
(such as, switching from a clickwrap to a browsewrap format), or places
the risk of loss on consumers, or amends preexisting forum-selection or
choice of law provisions, should all be prohibited where doing so is
harmful to the consumer's ability to seek redress in the event of a
dispute. The goal of this proposed amendment to section 2-209 is to
prevent merchants from amending contract terms to the detriment of
consumers after the consumer activates the IOT device to place
successive orders for goods.
E. Amending Section 2-302 's Unconscionability Provisions to Account
for Increasing Levels of Information Asymmetry and
Contract Distancing
Section 2-302's provisions on unconscionability should be revised
to provide that unconscionability could result from high levels of
information asymmetry and Contract Distancing.39 6 The courts' current
interpretation of 2-302 fails to adequately consider that consumers have
no incentive to read contract terms, in part because they have no ability
to change such terms.3 9 7 The ease with which consumers can enter into
contracts through the use of IOT devices will encourage consumers to
continue to fail to read contracts. Article 2 can no longer ignore this fact.
Article 2 does not contain a definition of unconscionability, and, as a
result, case law and the Contracts Restatement become relevant.398
The Contracts Restatement currently provides, in pertinent part,
that "[a] bargain is not unconscionable merely because the parties to it
are unequal in bargaining position, nor even because the inequality
395. U.C.C. § 2-209 (AM. LAW INST. &UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2013).
396. Id. § 2-302.
397. See Hazel Glenn Beh, Curing the Infirmities of the Unconscionability Doctrine, 66
HASTINGS L.J. 1011, 1040-41 (2015).
398. See id. at 1041.
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results in an allocation of risks to the weaker party.""3 9 High levels of
information asymmetry favoring sellers can lead to gross inequalities in
bargaining power, and where this is combined with contract terms that
heavily benefit the party with superior bargaining power, such as
unilateral amendment rights, it may confirm indications that the
consumer did not assent to the contract or had no real meaningful choice
or alternative. Article 2 should clearly authorize courts to find
unconscionability in such an instance. Consider, for instance, that
OfficeMax obtained information about the death of a father's daughter,
which it purchased from a third-party data broker, and sent a targeted
mailing to the father addressed to "Daughter Killed in Car Crash or
Current Business."400 Data brokers have attempted to sell lists of rape
victims, alcoholics, and erectile dysfunction sufferers.'"
Case law suggests that a seller's knowledge of the buyer can be
considered in a contract formation and unconscionability analysis
where the seller knew that the buyer was not fluent in the language
used in the contract, or where the seller had knowledge of the buyer's
limited financial resources.40 2 However, courts are generally disinclined
to allow contract defenses such as unconscionability to serve as a basis
for contract avoidance.40 3
In addition to assessing potential language barriers and awareness
of consumer finances, a merchant's knowledge of the individual buyer
gained from JOT data should also be considered when evaluating
contract formation and defenses in the new interface-free contracting
environment. Courts must be willing to let go of their reluctance to strike
down unconscionable contract terms.40 4 As currently applied by courts,
the doctrine of unconscionability holds consumers accountable for their
failure to read but does not adequately account for increased levels of
399. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
400. Kashmir Hill, OfficeMax Blames Data Broker for 'Daughter Killed in Car Crash'Letter,
FORBES (Jan. 22, 2014, 12:09 PM), htp://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/01/22/officemax-
blames-data-broker-for-daughter-killed-in-car-crash-letter.
401. Kashmir Hill, Data Broker Was Selling Lists of Rape Victims, Alcoholics and 'Erection
Dysfunction Sufferers,' FORBES (Dec. 19, 2013, 3:40 PM), htp://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/
2013/12/19/data-broker-was-selling-lists-of-rape-alcoholism-and-erectile-dysfunction-sufferers.
402. See Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 265-67 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (finding
unconscionability where there was a large disparity in value obtained and price paid, and that the
seller knowingly took advantage of the buyer); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757,
759-60 (Dist. Ct. 1966) (holding that a contract involving a sale of a refrigerator to a Spanish-
speaking couple was found to be unconscionable where the installment contract was in English and
was not translated or explained to the couple).
403. See Beh, supra note 397, at 1039-42 (describing the reasons for courts' reluctance to
allow successful use of the unconscionability defense, such as contract law's infatuation with
formalism and freedom of contract).
404. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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information asymmetry, which may further incentivize companies to use
one-sided contract terms and unilaterally amend terms of use to the
detriment of consumers.40 5 Amending section 2-302 to acknowledge
information asymmetry and high levels of Contract Distancing should
encourage courts to be more open to finding unconscionability in
consumer contracts.
The U.S. approach to addressing unconscionability in electronic
form contracts is quite different from the view taken in the European
Union ("EU").40 6 The EU Directive contains a non-exhaustive list of
form contract terms that are deemed to be unfair and invalid.40 7 Jury trial
and class action waivers and mandatory arbitration provisions fall into
that category.40 8 Where a contract term is deemed unfair, the term will
not be binding on consumers, but the contract will still be enforceable if
it is "capable of continuing in existence without the unfair terms., 40 9 The
EU Directive provides a great starting point for consumer friendly
revisions to Article 2. American companies operating in Europe have
been required to amend their form contracts to comply with legislation
adopted by EU states in accordance with the EU Directive.410 In 2004, a
French court found thirty-one provisions of AOL's form contract unfair
and void, including a provision which provided that the use of the
website constituted acceptance of web site terms and a provision that
granted AOL the right to unilaterally modify the contract terms. 41' If this
dispute had been heard in a U.S. court, it is likely that these AOL
contract provisions would have withstood an unconscionability and
assent analysis.
412
405. See supra Part V.A.2.a.
406. See Jane K. Winn & Mark Webber, The Impact of EU Unfair Contract Terms Law on
U.S. Business-to-Consumer Internet Merchants, 62 BUS. LAW. 209, 212-13 (2006).
407. Council Directive 93/13/EEC, art. 3, 1993 O.J. (L 095) (EC). Under the EU Directive,
form contract provisions that result in a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations
under the contract to the detriment of the consumer are also viewed as unfair. Id.
408. See id. The directive explicitly bans mandatory arbitration provisions. Id.; see also
Zealander v. Laing Homes Ltd., 2 T.C.L.R. 724 (2000) (interpreting the Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts Regulation, which was adopted to give effect to the EU Directive, and striking down a
mandatory arbitration provision in a consumer contract).
409. Council Directive 93/13/EEC, supra note 407, art. 6.
410. See Winn & Webber, supra note 406, at 209-10.
411. Id. at 223-24; see Bradley Joslove & Andrei V. Krylov, Standard American Business to
Consumer Terms and Conditions in the EU, 18 MICH. INT'L LAW., no.2, Spring 2005, at 2-3.
412. See Winn & Webber, supra note 406, at 225.
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Consider that Amazon's U.S. terms and conditions contain a class
action ban, a mandatory arbitration provision that excludes small claims,
and a waiver of the right to a jury trial.413 In contrast, Amazon's U.K.
terms and conditions do not contain such provisions.414 Amazon's
arbitration provisions have withstood unconscionability attacks by U.S.
consumers. 411 U.S. consumers should be afforded protections under
Article 2 similar to those found in the EU Directive. Imposing such
protections would not be burdensome on companies, as many companies
have already adapted their form contracts to comply with consumer
protection standards in the EU.
Given recent Supreme Court decisions restricting the ability of
states to enact legislation that prohibits mandatory arbitration and class
action waiver provisions and limiting the authority of state courts to use
contract law doctrines to invalidate such clauses, Article 2 is unlikely to
be the appropriate instrument for addressing such provisions.416
Congressional intervention to prohibit the use of such anti-collective
action provisions in consumer contracts is sorely needed.41 7 Such an
413. See Amazon Dash Button and Amazon Dash Replenishment Terms of Use, supra note 19.
414. See Conditions of Use & Sale, AMAZON.CO.UK., http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/
customer/display.html?nodeld-1040616 (last updated Aug. 4, 2015).
415. See, e.g., Fagerstrom v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 15-cv-96-BAS-DHB, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 143295, at *30-48 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2015) (holding that Amazon's arbitration provisions
were not unconscionable when consumers contended that Amazon overstated the amount of
discounts consumers would receive from Amazon in comparison to discounts from other retailers).
416. In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court noted that while the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA") restricts the application of state law to evaluate the fairness of arbitration
provisions, the FAA does not preempt the use of "generally applicable contract defenses" subject to
the FAA's overriding policy favoring arbitration. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (citation omitted);
see also Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 353 P.3d 741, 745-46 (Cal. 2015) (applying the
doctrine of unconscionability to evaluate the validity of class action waiver and arbitration
provisions and noting that, under Concepcion, contract defenses, such as the doctrine of
unconscionability can be used to invalidate such provisions, as long as they are applied
"evenhandedly and do not interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration"). In DirecTV, Inc. v.
Imburgia, plaintiff-consumers initiated a class action and contended that the company imposed
illegal early termination fees. 135 S. Ct. 463, 466 (2015). The service terms and conditions, which
were governed by the FAA, provided that the class action arbitration provisions would be
ineffective if state law would find the provisions unenforceable. Id. The lower California court held
that the reference to state law in the arbitration clause required the application of that state's law
because the parties were free to refer to California law in the contract, as it would have been absent
federal preemption. Id. at 467. The court concluded that California's interpretation of the phrase,
"law of your state," did not place arbitration contracts "on equal footing with all other contracts"
and was preempted by the FAA. Id. at 468.
417. A congressional bill introduced in 2015 would prohibit the enforcement of mandatory
arbitration provisions in employment, consumer, antitrust, and civil rights disputes. See Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, 114th Cong. § 3; Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, H.R. 2087, 114th
Cong. § 3. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is also currently considering a proposal to
ban class action waiver provisions in consumer financial contracts. See CFPB Considers Proposal
to Ban Arbitration Clauses that Allow Companies to Avoid Accountability to Their Consumers,
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approach would prohibit the use of such clauses even though state courts
may not always strike down these provisions under an unconscionability
analysis. One could argue that this approach impedes freedom of
contract. However, these anti-collective action provisions should be
prohibited given the extent to which corporations use them to insulate
themselves from consumer liability.41
Moreover, a recent empirical study of consumer contracts suggests
consumers assume they have a right to judicial process that cannot be
varied by contract and are unwittingly waiving these rights because they
fail to understand the consequences of entering into consumer
contracts.41 9 The study found that only nine percent of the 5000
respondents realized that the sample credit card form contract contained
an arbitration clause that would prevent them from suing in court, and
although the class action waiver was printed twice in bold in the sample
contract, more than seventy percent of the respondents failed to realize
that they could not participate in a class action.420 Companies are well
aware that consumers fail to adequately understand form contract
terms. 421 Further, once a court upholds a mandatory arbitration provision
and dismisses a class action, very few consumers elect to use the
CFPB (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-considers-proposal-to-ban-
arbitration-clauses-that-allow-companies-to-avoid-accountabiity-to-their-customers.
418. CFPB Considers Proposal to Ban Arbitration Clauses that Allow Companies to Avoid
Accountability to Their Consumers, supra note 417. A party may contractually insulate itself from
civil but not criminal liability. Corporations are recognized as subjects for purposes of criminal laws
and can be held criminally liable for the federal crimes of their employees and agents. See 1 U.S.C.
§ 1 (2012) ("[T]he words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations, companies, associations,
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals."); CHARLES DOYLE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43293, CORPORATE CRIIINAL LIABILITY: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL
LAW 2-5 (2013). Criminal liability may deter corporations from engaging in behavior that may be
harmful to consumers. See State v. Graziani, 158 A.2d 375, 381-84, 387 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1959) (finding a corporation and its officers criminally liable for unlawfully conspiring to obtain
money by false pretenses from members of the general public by falsely representing to some
customers that certain cars were leftover new cars when in fact they were used cars). Critics of
corporate criminal liability have often contended that corporations cannot form the specific intent to
commit certain criminal offenses and are not actors for the purposes of relevant criminal standards.
See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Criminal Liability of Corporation for Extortion, False Pretenses,
or Similar Offenses, 49 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 2 (1973); Nora A. Uehlein, Annotation, Corporation's
Criminal Liability for Homicide, 45 A.L.R. Fed. 4th Art. 2, 6 (1986). Despite the potential role of
criminal law in discouraging abusive practices against consumers, criminal law is unlikely to be
able to fully protect consumers from contractual abuse. Thus, contract law must also play an
important role in safeguarding consumers.
419. Jeff Sovern et al., "'Whimsy Little Contracts" with Unexpected Consequences. An
Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 47-
51(2015).
420. Id. at 47, 54-55.
421. See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 20.
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422arbitration process. These concerns justify prohibiting the use of such
clauses in consumer contracts.
F Addressing the Agency Problem
Lastly, Article 2 should be amended to more specifically address
the question of agency in IOT consumer contracts. Section 1-103
suggests that common law principles of agency are applicable to Article
2 contracts. 423 As discussed in Part III, above, agency law may not
effectively protect consumers in IOT Contracts.424 Courts must be
cautious in applying common law agency principles to IOT consumer
contracts. Article 2 should be amended to provide that consumers are not
automatically bound to contracts entered into on their behalf by IOT
robotic devices under traditional agency principles.
If IOT devices are ultimately provided with the capacity to think
and act independently so that they qualify as agents under agency
principles, the extent to which consumers should be bound to IOT
Contracts under an agency rationale should depend, in part, on whether
the IOT device can fulfill its fiduciary duties to the consumer and the
amount of control that the consumer has over the IOT device. This
depends on the amounts and types of data that the IOT device will be
disclosing to the manufacturer or retailer while simultaneously
contracting on behalf of the consumer, as well as whether the consumer
will have the ability to prevent the IOT device from disclosing certain
types of data. The more confidential the data (for instance, biometric
data or health data) or where a consumer's ability to restrict disclosure of
her data without rendering the device useless is limited, the less likely it
is that a consumer should be bound to one-sided contract terms under an
agency rationale. Further, in assessing the validity of contract defenses
such as mistake, a consumer should not automatically be deemed to have
assumed the risk of mistake simply because they have elected to contract
using an IOT electronic agent. As I have discussed above, IOT devices
have been created by companies to encourage consumers to use these
devices to purchase goods without accessing the company's website,
which contains contract terms, as well as to encourage brand loyalty.425
422. Id. Additionally, consider, for instance, that consumers can be sued for failing to pay old
debts by debt collectors but anti-collective action provisions in such contracts prohibit these
consumers from suing these companies. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, Creditors
Sue, Then Block Use of Courts to Fight Back, N.Y. TImMS, Dec. 23, 2015, at Al.
423. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2001).
424. See supra Part III.
425. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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In short, in the age of the lOT, contract-formation and contract-
defense rules, as well as agency principles, should not be used to
automatically bind consumers to contracts of adhesion without
accounting for the new contracting environment. Courts should
reevaluate concepts crucial to the application of the contract defenses of
misrepresentation, mistake, and unconscionability, such as lack of a
meaningful choice, unfair surprise, unequal bargaining power, justifiable
reliance, and assumption of risk, all of which were discussed in Part V,
above.426 In conducting this reevaluation, this Article suggests that
courts, the ULC, and the ALI adopt an Article 2 framework that
adequately considers the ways in which increased levels of information
asymmetry and Contract Distancing impact contract formation and
standards related to contract defenses in the new, interface-free
contracting environment.
VII. CRITIQUES
A. Conscious Consumer Ignorance and Responsibility
The first critique of the arguments posed in this Article is a
normative one. Even if the IOT incentivizes consumers to fail to read
contracts, consumers should be held accountable for their failure to read.
A number of cognitive and psychological reasons have been offered to
explain consumers' reasons for failing to read contracts, including
bounded rationality, rational ignorance, disposition, and defective
capability limits. 427 Generally, consumers are aware that, even if they
read consumer contracts, it is highly unlikely that large retailers like
Amazon will be willing to change contract terms, such as risk of loss,
class action and jury trial waivers, and forum-selection provisions. 428 As
a result, consumers may simply decide to ignore contract terms.429
426. See supra Part V.
427. Barnes, supra note 277, at 254-59. According to the disposition limits theory, consumers
are optimistic and "underestimate the possibility of negative consequences resulting from their
behavior." Id. at 256. Unrealistic optimism is a behavioral bias that is found not only in consumers'
purchasing of goods but also in consumers' use of credit cards. See Ebon S. Nelson, Young
Consumer Protection in the "'Millennial" Age, 2011 UTAH L. REv. 369, 380-81 (2011). Defective
capability limits include several potential heuristics, such as when people: (1) evaluate data based
on factors immediately available to them, often giving disproportionate value to such factors; (2)
make erroneous decisions based on statistically unsound samplings of data they nevertheless judge
to be sufficiently representative; (3) value present and immediate benefits and expenditures
disproportionately more than they value benefits or expenditures which may occur in the future; or
(4) systematically underestimate the risks that they undertake. Barnes, supra note 277, at 257-59.
428. Barnes, supra note 277, at 259.
429. Id.
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Further, as Nancy Kim and Jeremy Telman have argued:
[Internet companies] use contracts to insulate themselves from legal
claims that derive from consumer protection legislation .... [As a
result, u]ntold hours of toil in the realm of public policy advocacy are
undone with the stroke of a pen, or more likely, with a reflexive and
unreflective click on an "I agree" icon.430
Consider that courts have allowed companies to use arbitration
agreements to defeat consumer claims under federal and state debt
collection statutes.4 3'
It is worth noting that this Article does not adopt the position that
courts should strike down all consumer JOT Contracts simply because
consumers are unlikely to read such contracts. Rather, I claim that the
JOT will bring about a new, automatic, and interface-free contracting
environment that is likely to further exacerbate this problem while
simultaneously benefiting companies such as Amazon and other big
brands that will reap the rewards of locking consumers into their
products, while locking their competitors out. 4 3 2 Dash Buttons are
configured to purchase only replacement goods from a specific brand.433
Glad Dash Buttons can only order trash bags produced by Glad, and
cannot purchase replacement trash bags from competing brands.
Amazon only provides a Dash Button for certain large brands such as
Bounty, Olay, and Clorox.434 Consumers who elect to use the Dash
Button will only be given the option to purchase replacement goods
from brands that have been approved by Amazon.435 Thus, companies
that manufacture and provide JOT devices to consumers will have a
significant advantage over companies that do not.
Consumers are unlikely to be fully safeguarded from contractual
abuse and contractual provisions that restrict their right to legal recourse
in the JOT setting, given the current absence of clear consumer
430. Nancy S. Kim & D.A. Jeremy Telman, Internet Giants as Quasi-Governmental Actors
and the Limits of Contractual Consent, 80 MO. L. REv. 723, 753 (2015).
431. Grant-Fletcherv. Collecto, Inc., No. RDB-13-3505, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64163, at *28
(D. Md. May 9, 2014) (enforcing an arbitration provision in favor of a debt collection company
and noting that "keeping in mind the broad federal principle favoring arbitration, the
claims pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Maryland Consumer Debt
Collection Act are squarely within the scope of the valid Arbitration Agreement that is enforceable
by Defendant Collecto").
432. Needleman, supra note 168.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. See id.
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protection provisions in Article 2 and courts' current interpretations of
contract law principles.436
Neither traditional contract law principles nor Article 2 have
historically provided complete protection from contractual abuse in the
consumer setting. However, the harms that consumers may face in the
1OT setting are significant and may have grave consequences for
consumers. Examples of potential problems discussed in this Article
include exacerbation of the lack of reading and understanding problem
due to increased levels of Contract Distancing and manipulation of the
1OT lifestyle, biometric, and health data to generate an even more
accurate picture of consumer habits, which may lead companies to target
consumers for contracting. 1OT devices may generate data about adults
who purchase these devices, as well as data about the preferences and
activities of children and guests in a consumer's household.437 These
concerns warrant a new approach in the application and interpretation of
traditional contract law and agency principles.
B. Lowered Transaction Costs
A second concern is that form contracts, including those with class
action waiver, unilateral amendment, and forum-selection clauses, are
beneficial to consumers and companies because they lower transaction
costs.438 These lowered transaction costs include lower agency costs,
certainty regarding contract terms, and negotiation-free contracts.439
Such savings are supposedly passed on to consumers in the form of
lower prices. 440 Additionally, one could also argue that if form 1OT
Contracts were individually negotiated or contained more balanced
provisions, such as allowing consumers to sue in their home state, JOT
devices would become more expensive to make. Such an increase in
436. See supra Part IV.
437. However, to the extent that the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act is applicable to
IOT transactions, companies may be prohibited from collecting and using the information of
children under 13 years of age. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506.
438. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 302-04 (5th ed. 2008);
Mark R. Patterson, Standardization of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition and Contract
Implications, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327, 342-45 (2010). Form contracts allow goods to be
provided to a larger segment of the population than would be possible if contracts were individually
negotiated. Russell, supra note 271, at 160.
439. See John J.A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 285, 289 (2000).
440. See Horton, supra note 287, at 622. A study of consumer financial contracts conducted by
the Consumer Financial Bureau found no evidence that the inclusion of mandatory arbitration
provisions led to decreased prices for consumers. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a), § 10.3, at 15 (2015) [hereinafter "CFPB STUDY"].
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production costs could result in manufacturers electing not to make these
devices, or consumers not being able to afford JOT devices once they are
made. However, a recent study suggests that the inclusion of standard
form contract terms, such as arbitration provisions, does not lead to
decreased prices for consumers.44' It is questionable whether the
exclusion of such terms from form contracts will automatically lead to
higher prices for consumers.
In the JOT context, transaction costs for sellers and consumers may
also be lowered, as sellers can now easily explain contract terms to
consumers, which can be a central factor when assessing
unconscionability. Consumers will also have easier access to
information about products.442 For instance, as discussed in Part V,
above, JOT devices, such as the Jibo home robot, may be able to easily
find consumer reviews and warranty information on products and inform
consumers of them, thereby lowering the transaction costs for consumers
searching for information about products and contract terms.
443
Further, law and economics scholars attempt to negate the concerns
of contract scholars that unequal bargaining power can result in unfair
contract terms by arguing, in part, that each contract term generates
value for at least one party to the contract.444 These scholars contend that
"[p]arties jointly choose the contract terms so as to maximize the
surplus, which the parties may then divide unequally. 445
Forum-selection clauses, unilateral amendment provisions, and
class action waiver provisions may lower transaction costs for
companies that impose such provisions, but may increase costs for
consumers, and any savings received by companies through the use of
such provisions may not be passed on to consumers. Forum-selection
clauses can be a serious deterrent to consumer litigation, thereby
insulating companies from liability. 446 Consumers with limited resources
may elect not to sue in a distant venue and, as a result, will forego
receiving compensation for their injuries. Consumers who elect to
initiate the litigation process may ultimately accept smaller settlements
during negotiations, as they may become overwhelmed by the costs and
uncertainties involved in litigating in a foreign forum.447 Class action
waivers require consumers to individually litigate or arbitrate claims. 448
441. See CFPB STUDY, supra note 440.
442. See infra notes 443-44 and accompanying text.
443. See supra Part V.B.
444. Choi & Triantis, supra note 303, at 1679.
445. Id. (citations omitted).
446. Purcell, supra note 225, at 455.
447. See id. at 445-48.
448. See CFPB Considers Proposal to Ban Arbitration Clauses that Allow Companies to Avoid
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Individual consumers must generally bear the costs of bringing such
claims rather than sharing these costs with class members.449 Unilateral
amendment provisions permit companies to amend contract terms,
including choice of law provisions.450 Such amendments do not impact
the price of the product purchased under the original contract, and
therefore, companies which use such provisions cannot share a portion
of the litigation savings they receive with consumers who accept a one-
sided amended contract term. Thus, consumers who have already
purchased a product from a company are unlikely to be compensated for
accepting a unilateral amendment provision.45' Moreover, consumers
who are unhappy with a company's unilateral amendment of a contract
provision are unlikely to elect to reject such terms and contract with
other companies, as the form contracts of other companies will also
likely contain a unilateral amendment provision.
While the use of form contracts in the consumer setting has
advantages, including the potential lowering of transaction costs, there
are also significant drawbacks to using such contracts in both the IOT
and non-IOT consumer setting.452 Companies routinely exert social
pressure on consumers to sign contracts without reading the terms,
thereby "draw[ing] upon a host of social conventions and influences that
lead people into quiet compliance when signing standard form
contracts. 453 Companies such as Facebook and Google routinely use
social shaming and pressure to shape public opinion and legitimize
questionable provisions in their form contracts (for example, data
collection provisions). 454
As companies obtain more data about individual consumers via the
IOT, they will be able to create even more ingenious ways to encourage
consumers to sign form contracts without reflection, understanding, or
review. Companies know that consumers are unlikely to read contract
terms and may be tempted to include abusive terms, as well as use form
contracts and data generated by the IOT to discriminate between
consumers. 455 Companies are also aware that one-sided contract terms
Accountability to Their Consumers, supra note 417.
449. See id.
450. Horton, supra note 287, at 636-37.
451. Id. at 609.
452. See supra notes 438-51 and accompanying text.
453. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 241, at 450; see Barnes, supra note 277, at 260.
454. See Kim & Telman, supra note 430, at 731-32.
455. Contract scholars have also argued that sellers may include inefficient terms in form
contracts to differentiate between different types of consumers. See David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The
Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction
Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REv. 983, 988-1003
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that strip away consumer rights, and which are offered on a take-it or
leave-it basis, will be upheld by courts where the company's website
contains a conspicuous disclosure of the terms.456 Courts routinely hold
that in such an instance the consumers had notice and an opportunity to
review the contract terms.457 In some instances, courts have allowed
notice of a seller's terms and conditions to defeat consumer claims of
false advertising and deceptive practices, although such notice may be
inadequate for assessing consumer assent to contract terms.458
Moreover, the lowered transaction cost benefits of form contracts
may not outweigh the many consumer concerns posed by form JOT
Contracts, including increased information asymmetry and Contract
Distancing. Although JOT devices may make it easier for consumers to
obtain information about products, access customer reviews, and even
explain warranty information to consumers, this may not serve as an
adequate proxy for explaining the legalese oftentimes contained in the
terms and conditions of companies' websites.
C. Increased Consumer Bargaining Power and Decreased
Information Asymmetry
Another notable critique is that the IOT may increase consumer
bargaining power and will decrease, rather than increase, preexisting
information asymmetry in consumer contracts. This critique is a
continuation of the lowered transaction costs argument posed above. If
the transaction costs of consumers searching for information are lowered
because product and contract information is readily available to
consumers via IOT devices, then consumers will have more information
about products and contract terms before contracting. As a result,
information asymmetry in consumer contracts will be decreased, and
consumers will have more bargaining power.
(2006); Jonathan Klick, The Microfoundations of Standard Form Contracts: Price Discrimination
vs. Behavioral Bias, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 555, 562-69 (2005) (contending that form contracts can
be used as a price discrimination mechanism).
456. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 241, at 489-90.
457. Id. at 487-88.
458. See Handy v. LogMeln, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01355, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97021, at *21-
23 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2015) (holding that notice of a company's terms and conditions of use was
sufficient to defeat consumer claims under California's Unfair Competition and False Advertising
Statute); Nancy Kim, Good Enough Notice Even if not for Assent, LAW PROF. BLOGS NETWORK
(Aug. 24, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof blog/2015/08/good-enough-
notice-even-if-not-for-assent.html (contending that the Handy court held that there was notice
good enough to defeat the consumer's claims-even if that notice might not be sufficient for
contract formation).
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Scholars have contended that the Internet has increased consumer
bargaining power as more consumers have taken to Twitter, Facebook,
and YouTube to share their dissatisfaction with contract terms and
products.45 9 Several companies, including United Airlines and Bank of
America, have relented in the face of widespread consumer criticism. 460
Consumers have also exercised their newfound bargaining power
through local undertakings, such as the farm to table movement. One
could argue that the IOT, which is the next evolution of the Internet,
may facilitate the creation of similar consumer movements, thereby
increasing consumer bargaining power in IOT Contracts. However,
companies have attempted to restrain this supposed increase in consumer
bargaining power by restricting the ability of consumers to post negative
reviews through the use of non-disparagement clauses in contracts, as
well as suing consumers who have given negative reviews.46
Moreover, as discussed in Part IV, above, the data suggests that
consumer reviews and complaints are not an adequate proxy for contract
terms, and these reviews are only effective to the extent that they are
seen and reviewed by other consumers. 462 According to the concept of
bounded rationality, consumers "have limited time, money, energy, and
memory, and so cannot make 'perfect' decisions when entering into
contracts.1 463 With the plethora of available product descriptions and
459. See Wayne R. Barnes, Social Media and the Rise in Consumer Bargaining Power, 14 U.
PA. J. Bus. L. 661, 693-96 (2012).
460. Id. at 694-95.
461. See Company That Threatened to Sue Negative Reviewer Just Lost Its Amazon Account,
NAT'L J. (May 9, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/company-that-threatened-to-sue-
negative-reviewer-just-lost-its-amazon-account-20140509; Alison Smith-Squire, Patient Who
Posted Bad Review of Dentist on Yelp Sued for £125,000 by Practice, with Legal Move Slammed as
Being a 'Poor' Substitute for Customer Service, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 1, 2015, 8:27 AM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-293480 1/Patient-posted-bad-review-dentist-Yelp-sued-
125-000-practice-legal-slammed-poor-substitute-customer-service.html; Herb Weisbaum, Can a
Company Stop You from Writing a Negative Online ReviewI Not if Congress Passes This Bill,
TODAY (Sept. 24, 2014, 9:58 AM), http://www.today.com/money/congress-wants-you-be-able-
criticize-companies-2D80168557. California has been adopting statutes to preclude non-
disparagement clauses, but such clauses are still permissible in consumer contracts in other states.
See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1670.8 (West 2014); Melanie Mason, Gov. Jerry Brown Signs Bill Protecting
Consumers' Online Reviews, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2014, 5:28 PM), htp://www.latimes.com/
local/political/la-me-pc-brown-bill-signing-20140909-story.html. The proposed Federal Consumer
Review Freedom Act would also prohibit the use of such clauses. H.R. 2110, 114th Cong. § 2
(2015). The FTC has recently attempted to discourage the use of non-disparagement clauses in
consumer contracts by instituting lawsuits against companies using such provisions. FTC Sues
Marketers Who Used "Gag Clauses, " Monetary Threats, and Lawsuits to Stop Negative Customer
Reviews for Unproven Weight-Loss Products, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Sept. 28, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/09/ftc-sues-marketers-who-used-gag-clauses-
monetary -threats-lawsuits.
462. See supra Part IV.
463. Barnes, supra note 459, at 669.
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customer reviews, consumers may become so overwhelmed with this
wealth of available information that the data becomes unhelpful to them
in making purchasing decisions.464
Admittedly, Amazon and other large companies are certainly
concerned about public opinion and confidence in their JOT devices. 465
As a result, these companies may eagerly seek to address consumer
concerns about JOT data collection. Despite this fear of public
opinion, to date, Amazon, like so many other companies, continues
to use contract terms that are detrimental to a consumer's right to
seek legal redress. The fear of negative public perception and an increase
in consumer bargaining power may not be significant enough to
encourage these companies to eliminate one-sided contract terms, even
in the JOT setting.
Other related objections are that information asymmetry in
contracts favors consumers over sellers and that information asymmetry
will decrease in the JOT context as consumers will have access to the
same data generated by JOT devices as companies. Following that line
of argument, a consumer should know how many times a device places
an order, as well as the rate at which they consume a product. Moreover,
consumers are not required to disclose to sellers information that they
have about the seller or the value of their goods.466 Sellers routinely
provide material information about their products to consumers.467
However, much of the information available to consumers about
sellers and goods is likely to come from consumer reviews, which are
also publicly available to sellers. Further, sellers and manufacturers are
likely to have more detailed information about their JOT devices than
consumers. Although consumer knowledge and access to information
about products may increase in the age of the JOT, it is also likely that
companies will have more information about individual consumers and
their preferences, which will further shift the power dynamics between
consumers and companies. Today, the vast majority of the data
generated by web-enabled devices is not collected or fully analyzed.468 A
large portion of the estimated economic value of the JOT will be
464. Peppet, supra note 14, at 729-30.
465. See Barnes, supra note 459, at 698 (contending that the ability of the consumer to post
comments to sites like Facebook that reach a widespread audience puts pressure on merchants to
worry about public opinion, adding to consumers' bargaining power).
466. Marc Ramsay, The Buyer/Seller Asymmetry: Corrective Justice and Material Non-
Disclosure, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 115, 116, 120 (2006).
467. Id.
468. Jonathan Camhi, Here's What Happened in the Internet of Things This Week, BUS.
INSIDER (June 28, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-what-happened-in-
internet-of-things-this-week-2015-6-27.
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maximized once companies begin to fully exploit the data generated by
the JOT. Once interoperability issues are remedied, companies will be
able to fully collect, analyze, and aggregate the multitude of data
generated by such devices.46 9
Through various digital marketing techniques, companies can use
data generated by IOT devices to predict the preferences, behaviors, and
habits of consumers and individuals in their households in real time. JOT
data could also be used in real time to allow companies to learn which
advertisements are most effective with specific consumers. There is
significant value in aggregating IOT data and categorizing consumers by
type to forecast consumer behavior. The FTC has acknowledged the
potential use of IOT data and predictive analytics to discriminate against
low income and underserved communities and to target vulnerable
consumers for fraud.4 70 Even if consumers were given unlimited access
to their JOT data, they are unlikely to be able to manipulate and
aggregate the data in the same manner as companies to glean the same
information that could be used to target them for contracting.
Currently, the terms and conditions of websites routinely imply that
data collection is being done mainly to benefit consumers, but
companies clearly do not collect consumer data only to meet the needs
of their customers. 471 For instance, Amazon's privacy policy states,
"[w]e use the information that you provide for such purposes as
responding to your requests, customizing future shopping for you,
improving our stores, and communicating with you. ' 472 The policy also
states, "we are not in the business of selling [information about our
consumers] to others," but the notice then goes on to provide exceptions
to this policy where consumer information may be disclosed, such as
upon the purchase and sale of subsidiaries and business units and upon
the acquisition of Amazon by a third-party company. 473 The language
used in Amazon's terms of use to describe the class action waiver
469. See id. The McKinney research firm estimates that at least forty percent of the economic
value of the JOT will not be achieved if interoperability issues remain unresolved. Manyika et al.,
supra note 31. The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers has called for the adoption of the
time sensitive networking standard to aid in the resolution of interoperability issues in the industrial
JOT. Todd Walter, It's About Time: The Evolving Time-Sensitive Networking Standard for the
Industrial JoT, DESIGN WORLD (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.designworldonline.com/its-about-time-
the-evolving-time-sensitive-networking-standard-for-the-industrial-iot.
470. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 317, at 9-12. The FTC has also expressed concerns
about companies drawing conclusions from big data and then discriminating against consumers as
correlation does not imply causation. Id. at 9.
471. See, e.g., Amazon.corn Privacy Notice, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.htmlnodeld-468496 (last updated Mar. 3, 2014).
472. Id.
473. Id. Consumer information can also be disclosed to affiliated businesses and third-party
service providers and to further promotional offers, per the Amazon notice. Id.
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implies that the provision is fair to both consumers and Amazon, as both
parties are waiving the right to sue on a class action basis. 474 The ability
to bring suit on a class action basis is more valuable to consumers than
to businesses.
As part of its advertising business, Amazon has created targeted
audiences for marketers based on consumer purchasers, which allows
specific marketers to bid on advertising to specific consumers. 47  Data
about consumer purchases via inter-connected devices may be sold to
consumer data companies, such as Datalogix, and data brokers who, in
turn, sell this information to companies that will use the data to
market products directly to consumers.476 While there may ultimately
be some restrictions placed on the data that companies may collect
from JOT devices, the amount and type of information available to
companies about individual consumers in the age of the JOT is likely to
increase, and the resulting information asymmetry will favor companies
over consumers.
477
474. Amazon's terms of use provide as follows: "We each agree that any dispute resolution
proceedings will be conducted only on an individual basis and not in a class, consolidated or
representative action." Conditions of Use, supra note 19.
475. See Ginny Marvin, Big Data: Amazon Set to Sell Advertisers on Its Trove of Consumer
Buying Data, MARKETING LAND (Jan. 22, 2013, 3:21 PM), htp://marketingland.com/big-data-
amazon-set-to-sell-advertisers-on-consumer-buying-dat31344-31344.
476. See Lois Beckett, Everything We Know About What Data Brokers Know About You, PRO
PUBLICA (June 13, 2014, 12:59 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-about-
what-data-brokers-know-about-you.
477. See Internet of Things: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and
the Internet of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 3-4 (2015) (statement of Jerrold Nadler,
Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet) (discussing data
collection and privacy concerns). The FTC has encouraged companies using IOT devices to adopt
its recommended best practices, which include data minimization and the use of measures to keep
unauthorized users from accessing a consumer's device, data, or personal information stored on the
network. See FTC Report on Internet of Things Urges Companies to Adopt Best Practices to
Address Consumer Privacy and Security Risks, supra note 394. The FTC has acknowledged the
importance of providing consumers with notice and a choice in connection with data collection.
FED. TRADE COMM'N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRVACY AND SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD 39-
40 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federaml-trade-commission-staff-
report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf. However, with
respect to the JOT, the FTC has also stated:
[C]ompanies should not be compelled to provide choice before collecting and using
consumer data for practices that are consistent with the context of a transaction or the
company's relationship with the consumer. Indeed, because these data uses are generally
consistent with consumers' reasonable expectations, the cost to consumers and
businesses of providing notice and choice likely outweighs the benefits.
Id. at 40.
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D. Economic Justifications for Information
Asymmetry
A fourth objection is that, given conscious consumer ignorance,
information asymmetry in consumer contracting is to be expected, and
any resulting information asymmetry in favor of companies can be
rationalized using economic justifications. Obtaining information is
costly and, therefore, those who have paid to obtain such information or
through their own innovation have created JOT devices should be
rewarded over those who have not.47 Further, information asymmetry is
necessary for the functioning of proper markets.47 9 Buyer and seller
information asymmetry encourages efficient use of resources.4"'
Following this line of argument, businesses, rather than consumers, are
likely to be able to bear the cost of paying for relevant information.
Therefore, manufacturers and sellers of JOT devices should be able to
collect, use, and sell data generated by JOT devices and reap the benefits
of such data collection and the resulting information asymmetry. A
second related argument is that warranties provided by sellers and
manufacturers can guard against the negative effects of information
asymmetry and that products liability law can adequately protect
consumers in the JOT setting. 48 i However, given the frequency with
which large retailers and manufacturers limit or fully disclaim
warranties, the effectiveness of warranties in solving this problem is
questionable. Further, products liability is only relevant to the extent that
consumers are injured by a company's defective product.
As to the first argument, manufacturers and retailers who invest in
the JOT are obviously entitled to expect a return on their investment, and
it is likely that there will always be some level of information
asymmetry in consumer contracts regardless of the context. This does
not mean that contract law should fail to consider the ways in which
these new technologies may disadvantage consumers in contracting to
the benefit of companies. The law certainly cannot ignore the data
collection and privacy implications of the JOT.
Consider that RadioShack attempted to sell its 100-million-
consumer database, containing consumer addresses and phone numbers,
as part of its bankruptcy asset sale. 482 As previously discussed, JOT
478. Franklin, supra note 301, at 562.
479. Unger, supra note 319, at 626.
480. See Ramsay, supra note 466, at 116, 125-26 (noting that buyer-seller information
asymmetry promotes the efficient use of resources).
481. See Nayyar, supra note 302, at 514.
482. Paula Rosenblum, Bankrupt RadioShack's Attempts to Sell Customer Data Meets
Resistance, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2015, 2:55 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/paularosenblum/
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devices are expected to generate even more data about consumers."'
Should a company that has obtained data about consumers and
individuals in their household via JOT devices (such as, health and
biometric data, including fingerprint scans, stress levels, scans of retinas
and irises, voice patterns, facial patterns, and hand measurements) be
able to sell these types of consumer data during bankruptcy to satisfy
debts to creditors? Or, should a company be able to use these types of
consumer data as collateral in a secured financing transaction under
Article 9 of the UCC, even when the company has made promises to
consumers about protecting their information? These are questions that
cannot be easily answered by relying on the justification that, because a
party has paid for the data or has invested in obtaining the information,
the sale and collateralization of the data should be possible.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The JOT will allow devices, businesses, and consumers to make
more valuable connections.484 One such useful connection is the
convenient and easy facilitation of the purchase and sale of goods and
services. The application of e-commerce statutes, agency law, and
contract law principles found in Article 2 and the Contracts Restatement
to JOT Contracts to evaluate mutual assent, unconscionability, good
faith, mistake, and misrepresentation may lead to problematic results for
consumers. 48 6 The increased interconnectivity generated by the JOT
brings along with it certain concerns including exacerbating preexisting
information asymmetry and Contract Distancing in consumer contracts
to the benefit of businesses.4 7 This may encourage consumers to
continue to fail to review and understand contract terms, lead businesses
to continue to include one-sided contract terms in form contracts, and
encourage contractual abuse. The types and amount of data that will be
generated by JOT devices will increase companies' knowledge about the
2015/03/24/bankrupt-radioshacks-attempts-to-sell-customer-data-meets-resistance. Other companies
have also attempted to sell consumer data after they filed for bankruptcy. See Walter W. Miller, Jr.
& Maureen A. O'Rourke, Bankruptcy Law v. Privacy Rights: Which Holds the Trump Card?, 38
Hous. L. REV. 777, 790-92 (2001) (discussing the sale of consumer data in bankruptcy proceedings,
and acknowledging that the practice is common); Daniel Solove, Going Bankrupt with Your
Personal Data, TEACH PRIVACY (July 6, 2015), https://www.teachprivacy.com/going-bankmpt-
with-your-personal-data (explaining the use of consumer data by some companies as an asset).
483. See supra notes 308-19 and accompanying text.
484. Evans, supra note 30, at 2.
485. See supra notes 80-97 and accompanying text.
486. See supra Parts III-IV.
487. See supra Part V.
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health, lifestyle, and everyday activities of consumers and individuals in
their households and communities.
Courts should adjust their application of common law agency and
contract law principles, as well as that of Article 2, by considering
IOT information asymmetry and Contract Distancing. The IOT will
create a new contracting environment in which interface-free automatic
shopping and consumer use of electronic agents is widespread.488 Courts,
the ULC, and the ALI must acknowledge this new contracting
environment and ensure that consumers are adequately protected in the
age of the IOT.
488. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
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